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ON LAW AND CHASTITY
Robert E. Rodes, Jr.*
I could never mix in the common murmur of that rising generation
against monogamy, because no restriction on sex seemed so odd
and unexpected as sex itself.
-G.K Chestertonl
INTRODUCTION
When Dwight Eisenhower was President, and the baby boomers
of today were but gleams in the eyes of their monogamous parents, it
was well understood that chastity was the prevailing social norm.
Whatever their practices, everyone knew what the standard was: mar-
ried people were to have sex only with their spouses; the unmarried
were to abstain.2 Nor was the standard flouted as often as is com-
monly supposed. Professor Kinsey and his followers, using samples
* Paul J. Schierl/Fort Howard Corporation Professor of Legal Ethics, Notre
Dame Law School. I am grateful for suggestions, encouragement, or both to Gerard
V. Bradley, Nicole Stelle Garnett, Richard IV. Garnett, Mary Ann Glendon, Kenneth
L. Karst, Nicholas Kasirer, M. Cathleen Kaveny, John C. Nagle, John T. Noonan, Jr.,
Walter F. Pratt, Jr., Charles E. Rice, John H. Robinson, Thomas L. Shaffer, Steven D.
Smith, andJ. Eric Smithburn.
1 G.K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 101 (1909).
2 For purposes of this Article, I shall define chastity as adherence to this stan-
dard and unchastity as failure to adhere to it. I realize that there are philosophical
and theological problems in reducing a virtue to a standard of behavior. But I do not
think they arise in legal analysis, for the law supports virtue mainly by encouraging
virtuous acts and discouraging acts opposed to the virtues. See THoMAs AQunAs,
SUMMA THEOLOGIC% pt. I-, q. 92, art. 1 (Fathers of the Eng. Dominican Province
trans., Benzinger Bros., Inc. 1947) (1485); Robert E. Rodes,Jr., On Law and "irtue, in
VmTu, PuBuc AND PRrvATE 30, 31-32 (Richardj. Neuhaus ed., 1986). I also realize
that many thoughtful people would characterize as chaste the committed and caring
sexual relations that exist between some persons of the same sex and some persons of
opposite sexes who are not married to each other. My reasons for not being of the
same mind are set forth briefly infra in the text accompanying note 462 and at greater
length in the works cited in that note.
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heavily skewed toward laxity,3 found that over a third of the popula-
tion (about half of the women and a quarter of the men) had not
violated it even once.
4
On the whole, the standard was reinforced by the social ambi-
ance. It was not at all difficult for people of relatively chaste mind to
go for days, sometimes weeks, without encountering much of anything
at which they could justly take offense. In most environments, social
discourse was relatively free of explicit sex, and even sexual innuendo
was far from pervasive. Films and broadcasting were closely cen-
sored,5 and detailed descriptions of sexual acts were rare in the print
media also.
The reticence of the period is in sharp contrast with the perva-
sive, even compulsive frankness that prevails today. For instance, the
article on "Sexual Behaviour" in the fourteenth edition of the Encyclo-
pedia Britannica6 deals almost exclusively with animals, only mention-
ing briefly in one or two places that the higher primates sometimes do
things that people sometimes do also,7 whereas the fifteenth edition
(1995) devotes twelve pages of very small type to the sexual practices
3 There is by now a considerable literature attacking Kinsey's methodology and
in some cases his integrity. The objection to his samples is lucidly (and non-polemi-
cally) explained in ROBERT T. MICHAE.L ET AL., SEX IN AIERICA 15-21 (1994).
4 I have not found in Kinsey's books any figures applicable to a whole sample.
But from the tables appearing in ALFRED C. KiNsEy ET AL., SExuAL BEHAVIOR IN T-IE
HuMAN MALE 280, 550 (1948), I calculate that about 70% had had premarital sex and
that about 5% had had extramarital but not premarital sex-leaving about 25% who
had had neither. As for the women, Kinsey reported that "nearly" 50% of the married
women in the sample had had premarital sex-that is, that more than 50% had not.
See ALFRr C KiNsEy ET AL., SEXuAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HutAN FEHAL 286 (1953). 1
cannot find a corresponding figure for the single women in the sample, but the per-
centage of virgins must have been at least as great. Of those who were virgins at
marriage, only 164 individuals, 2.8% of the sample, were unfaithful afterward. Id. at
427. It is interesting to compare these figures with the 1992 survey reported In
MICHAEL ET AL., supra note 3, at 15-21, and in EDWARD D. Lt uMANN ET AL., TI So.
CIAL ORGANIZAION OF SExuALri" 169, 198, 214, 216 (1994). From a table on page 169
of the latter book, it appears that just short of a quarter of the whole sample were
either single people who had had no sex with anyone since the age of eighteen or
married or formerly married people who had had sex with only one person since that
age. These figures are not broken down by gender. But other relevant figures are.
From the tables on pages 198 and 214, I calculate that 20.9% of the men, 34.4% of
the women, and 28.4% of the whole sample were virgins at marriage. From the table
on page 216, I find that 75.5% of the married men and 85% of the married women
had been faithful since marriage.
5 See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
6 See Sexual Behaviour, 20 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANIcA 420C, 420C-20F (14th ed,
1952).
7 See id. at 420D-20E.
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of people.8 The 1960 edition of Emily Post's Etiquette takes the reader
through dating,9 college,' 0 living alone in the city," traveling alone,
12
and working with people of the opposite sex'3 without mentioning
any more serious concerns than not giving occasion to the scandal-
mongering "Mrs. Grundy" or making sure that a secretary's hotel
room is not on the same floor as her employer's,1 4 and that one's
friends "are of the sort that pass that sharpest of character readers, the
house detective." 15 I found only one intimation that something more
serious than scandal might be at stake: "A young woman's very accept-
ance of a man's dinner-for-two invitation [in his apartment] shows her
confidence that her host is a gentleman who will not ply her with
cocktails for nefarious purposes, and his behavior should certainlyjus-
tify her confidence."16 The 1963 edition of Amy Vanderbilt's mew
Complete Book of Etiquette'V has even less to say on these subjects. By
contrast, a work of Judith Martin (Miss Manners), published in 1989,
deals with such questions as whether a reader's widowed mother and
her live-in boyfriend should be put in the same bedroom in the
reader's house,' 8 how parents who are not married to each other
should word a birth announcement,' 9 and how a couple who spent
the night together on slight acquaintance should treat each other
afterward.2
0
Looking back on the earlier period, I believe that the most im-
portant consequence of the prevailing reticence was the absence of
any general assumption of unchastity. Steady dating couples could be
constantly in each other's company and even have keys to each other's
apartments without it being taken for granted that they were sleeping
together. People of the same sex could share an apartment and not
be involved in dating without it being assumed that they were homo-
sexual lovers. On dates, marks of affection such as were shown in
8 Sex and Sexua/;, 27 EN-C.LOP.DIA BRrrANICA 233, 240-52 (15th ed. 1995).
9 EDmLY PosT, ETIQuzTFE 174-80 (1960).
10 I& at 155-67.
11 Id.
12 I& at 596-97.
13 I& at 546-61.
14 See U at 557-58.
15 Id. at 600.
16 I& at 172.
17 AY VANDERBILT, Amy VANDnRBiT's Nrw Co .Em BOOK OF EoQL'T-E THE
GuiDE TO GRAaous LIVING (1963).
18 SeeJuDrH MAR-nN, Iss MNALz'ts' GUDE FOR THE TURN-Inr-mE MiLUNNLo. t
500-01 (1989).
19 See d. at 223-24.
20 See id- at 550.
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movies consistent with the rigors of the Production Code2l were freely
exchanged, and in some situations conventional. But nothing more
was expected in the absence of a clear signal that it would be
forthcoming.
The conventions afforded a certain amount of protection against
both sexual harassment and date rape. Both may have been more
common than was supposed at the time, but I believe they were con-
siderably less common than they are now. In or out of the workplace,
a sexual overture that bypassed the dating conventions was commonly
regarded as an insult not only by the person addressed but also by
everyone who learned of it. And within the conventions, it was not too
difficult to avoid the crossed signals that often presage date rape.
The social commitment to chastity was of course not new, but
new forces had arisen in its support. These supplemented, and in part
superseded, utilitarian concerns with the social function of monog-
amy and with what we now call family values. The gradual domestica-
tion of the conventions of the medieval courtly love tradition had
been going on for more than a century, so that those conventions had
come to be firmly identified in the popular culture with honorable
courtship and ensuing marriage.22 At the same time, new develop-
ments in philosophy and theology were placing new emphasis on the
transcendent significance of the human person, on interpersonal ("I-
Thou") relations, 23 on the metaphysical complementarity of male and
female, 24 and on the unitive power of sex.23 New attitudes toward love
and complementarity were also fostered by a gradual expansion of the
social roles of women that had been going on since the late nine-
teenth century and by a religious revival that set in after the Second
World War. The whole combination led to a general acceptance of
the idea that waiting for marriage, marrying for love, and living faith-
21 The Production Code was a system of self-censorship adopted by the studios in
1930 and retained into the 1960s. See LEONARD J. LEFF & JERoLD L. SIMMONS, THE
DAME IN THE KIMONO: HoLLYwOOD, CENSORSMP, AND THE PRODUCTION CODE 270-72,
283 (1990). Anyone who has watched films from the decades in question will know
well enough what the Code did and did not permit.
22 See DENIS DE RoUGEMENT, LOVE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 291-315 (Montgomery
Belgion trans., rev. ed. 1956). "No other civilization [than the U.S.] has embarked
with anything like the same ingenious assurance upon the perilous enterprise of malt-
ing marriage coincide with [romantic] love." Id. at 292. "Marriage [is] the institution
in which passion is 'contained,' not by morals, but by love." Id. at 315. This was first
published in French in 1938. See id. at 323.
23 See MARTIN BUBER, BETWEEN MAN AND MAN 173-77 (Ronald Gregor Smith
trans., Macmillan Co. 1965) (1947).
24 See DiETRIcH VON HILDEBRAND, MAN AND WOMAN 15-17 (1966).
25 See id. at 7-31.
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fully thereafter were both normal and normative. That acceptance
was both rooted and reflected in the law. Only in a few cases was the
law a serious obstacle to anyone who was determined to be unchaste.
But as a witness to how society regarded the subject, it was a support
and encouragement to people who aspired to chastity and a guide to
those who were making up their minds.
What I intend to do in this Article is to survey the common law
and statutory provisions that produced that effect and to indicate what
has become of them. I will try to show that we should not put up with
the marginalization of chastity that has accompanied these changes in
the law, and I will offer a legal agenda that those who still think chas-
tity is an important social value can hope to see put in place.
I. THE LAW iN =H Fwr=s
WhenJudge Ploscowe published Sex and the Law in 1951,2G forni-
cation was a punishable offense in all but ten states,27 adultery in all
but five,28 and sodomy or something of the kind in all.2 Discreet vio-
lations of these prohibitions were generally not punished, but the pos-
sibility of their being punished played a part in keeping them discreet.
Some variations were more systematically prosecuted. "Lewd and las-
civious cohabitation" was in a number of states a crime in its own
right.-0 So was "seduction," intercourse where consent was gained by
a false promise of marriage or, under some laws, by other forms of
cajolement or deceit.3 ' Some acts fell within statutes or ordinances
against public indecency, and otherwise dormant laws against fornica-
tion and adultery might be invoked if their violation was too notorious
or in too public a place.3 2 Persons of opposite sexes could generally
not get a room together in a decent hotel without falsely registering as
husband and wife and so exposing themselves to a charge of false re-
26 MORRIS PLoscowE, SEX AND THE Lkaw (1951). Ploscowe (1904-75) vas a noted
trial judge in New York City. He also taught at New York University Law School.
Roscoe Pound wrote an Introduction to his book recommending it as a source of
%ell thought-out measures toward effective securing of social interests." Roscoe
Pound, Introduction to PLoscoWE, supra, at vii.
27 PLoscowE, supra note 26, at 145.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 208-09.
30 Id. at 150; see, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-1-82-2 (1971) (repealed 1976).
31 WIuLA L. G.RK & WutAs L. MARsHAuI., A TREAMSE ON THE LAw oF CuMEs
§ 11.02 (7th ed. 1967); see, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-1-82-3 (1971) (repealed 1977).
32 See CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 31, § 11.04.
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gistration-which the hotel management might set in motion for the
sake of the reputation of their house. 33
Acts between persons of the same sex, especially men, were more
apt to be punished than acts between men and women. 4 Or perhaps
we should say it took more discretion to be sure they would not be
punished. Laws against deviant sex acts were applicable also to heter-
osexual encounters35 and were occasionally set in motion in the after-
math of particularly nasty divorces. 36
Sex by men with underage girls was punishable as "statutory
rape,"37 the theory being that a girl below a certain age should be
deemed incapable of legally effective consent. The age in question
was as low as sixteen in many states, as high as twenty-one in a few.38
The honest belief of the man that the girl was older was generally not
a defense.39 A person who sets out to commit an illicit act-and forni-
cation was considered illicit even in states where it was not punisha-
ble-cannot complain that he was not aware of circumstances making
the act more serious than he intended it to be. It was like the case of
the hemophiliac who bled to death after being punched in a brawl.
The man who punched him was guilty of manslaughter even though
all he had intended was battery.40
The Mann Act made it a federal crime to transport women or
girls in interstate commerce for prostitution, debauchery, or other im-
moral purposes.41 Although the Act was originally intended to deal
with organized prostitution,42 the famous Caminetti case, decided in
1917, made it applicable to any kind of illicit sex, if the woman was
33 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 16-9-1-1 (1971) (repealed 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit,
30A, § 3822 (West 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 72-30, 72-34 (1999); Cramer v. Tarr, 165
F. Supp. 130, 132 (D. Me. 1958); State v. Vowell, 128 S.E.2d 259, 260 (N.C. 1962).
34 See PLoscowE, supra note 26, at 201.
35 See id. at 200.
36 See id. at 202-03. Coiner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873, 874 (7th Cir. 1968), in which
the Indiana sodomy statute was declared unconstitutional as applied to married
couples, arose because a wife had her husband prosecuted in the course of a divorce.
37 See PLoscoWE, supra note 26, at 184-85.
38 See id.
39 See id.; infra text accompanying notes 343-48.
40 See State v. Frazier, 98 S.W.2d 707, 713 (Mo. 1936); see also White v. State, 185
N.E. 64, 65 (Ohio Ct. App. 1933) (upholding the trial court's finding that a man was
guilty of the offense of abandoning his pregnant wife even though he did not know
she was pregnant).
41 White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, 18 U.S.CA. §§ 2421-2424 (West 2000); PLos.
cowE, supra note 26, at 260-62.
42 See ROBERT E. RODES, JR., LAW AND LIBERATION 154-55 (1986).
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transported interstate.4 It was not rigorously applied to non-commer-
cial relations, but common legend took it fairly seriously.
Didn't know I was in Mississippi,
Didn't know I'd crossed that old state line.
The lady with me weren't my sister;,
Now I'm in Atlanta doing time.4
In 1946, it was used against members of a polygamist Mormon splinter
group who moved with their plural wives from Utah to Arizona. 45
Procedures for the support of illegitimate children tended to be
criminal or quasi-criminal in form. Pennsylvania used its law against
fornication for this purpose,4 6 and Massachusetts had a statute making
it an offense distinct from fornication for anyone not being the hus-
band of a woman to get her With child.47 Whether these statutes
(commonly referred to as Bastardy Acts) 43 were criminal or civil, they
resulted in orders to provide support for the children in question.
Laws against fornication or adultery were used to provide the
prosecutor with a backup position in rape cases.49 A prosecutor who
was convinced that a rape had occurred, but who could not prove lack
of consent beyond a reasonable doubt could have at least the satisfac-
tion of seeing the defendant subjected to the modest penalties for
fornication. At the same time, the possibility might put somewhat of a
damper on the enthusiasm of sexual opportunists in equivocal cir-
cumstances. The woman, of course, could not be convicted of forni-
cation in such a case because, although it could not be established
beyond a reasonable doubt that she was raped, neither could it be
established beyond a reasonable doubt that she consented.
43 See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 492 (1917).
44 This passage comes from a folk song I heard from a colleague. I am not sure
of its origin.
45 See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946).
46 E.g., Commonwealth v. Shook, 236 A.2d 559, 561 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967) (apply-
big PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4506 (West 1939) (repealed 1973)).
47 M%,ss. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 273, § 11 (West 1959) (repealed 1977); see also PLos-
coiE, supra note 26, at 120 (discussing Massachusetts and Pennsylvania lav).
48 See, e.g., Cruz v. Gardiner, 375 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1967) (appl)ing Indi-
ana's Bastardy Act); State v. Hicks, 211 P.2d 473, 476 (Ariz. 1949) (discussing Ari-
zona's bastardy provisions).
49 E.g., People v. Hopkins, 238 N.Y.S.2d 485, 493 (Crim. Ct. 1963) (appl)ing
Pennsylvania law); Commonwealth v. Small, 240 A.2d 386, 387 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1968);
Commonwealth v. Brown, 136 A.2d 138, 140 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1957); Commonwealth v.
Moskorison, 85 A.2d 644, 646 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952); Byrd v. State, 222 NW.2d 696,
700 (Wis. 1974).
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Unconsented sexual approaches short of rape could often be
punished as assaults or batteries.5 0 Indeed, in some cases the assault
would be punished even though intercourse had ensued by consent
or without the vigorous resistence required by the unrealistic stan-
dards of the time.5 ' Serious sadomasochistic encounters could be
punished as batteries, even if they were consented to by both parties.
The law was clear that in a prosecution for bruising, battering, burn-
ing, or torturing consent was not a defense.
5 2
Rape, of course, was a serious crime then as now, but commenta-
tors tended to be more impressed then than they are now with the
difficulty of proving it. No one failed to quote Sir Matthew Hale's
remark that "it is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be
proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, though
never so innocent."53 But it was not generally noted that the "never so
innocent" men in Hale's examples were innocent because they had
never had intercourse with their accusers, not because their accusers
had consented. In the usual case that made it into the law reports, the
issue was consent.54 On this issue, many judges and most commenta-
tors displayed a skepticism at which the feminist writers of our own
day have taken very legitimate offense.
55
While the unchastity of the victim has never been a defense to a
rape charge, it was generally regarded as admissible evidence on the
issue of consent.56 The courts seem habitually to have conflated an
50 See People v. Lipski, 43 N.W.2d 325, 326 (Mich. 1950). Indecent exposure and
indecent solicitation were also crimes in many places. See Goodsaid v. District of Co-
lumbia, 187 A.2d 486, 487 (D.C. 1963); PLoscoWE, supra note 26, at 157-60.
51 See, for example, Bye v. Isaacson, 173 N.W. 754 (N.D. 1919), which was a civil
case, but the result would have been the same in a criminal case.
52 Commonwealth v. Farrell, 78 N.E.2d 697, 705 (Mass. 1948); R. v. Donovan, 2
K.B. 498, 507 (1943). More recent cases are to the same effect. State v. Collier, 372
N.W.2d 303, 307 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); Commonwealth v. Appleby, 402 N.E.2d 1051,
1060 (Mass. 1980).
53 1 MAITrHEw HALE, HIsromIA PLACiTORUM CoRoNAE *635. The works of Hale
(1609-76) were not published until 1736. See id. at i-xiii.
54 See id.
55 E.g., Vivian Berger, Man's Tria Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Court-
room, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 12-49 (1977). The writer cites other feminist critiques. See
id. at 1-4.
56 E.g., State v. Wood, 122 P.2d 416, 418 (Ariz. 1942), overruled by State ex rel.
Pope v. Superior Court, 545 P.2d 946 (Ariz. 1976). The state of the law is described in
the Annotation on WoodJ.B. Glen, Annotation, Admissibility in Rape Cases ofEvidence of
Previous Unchastity, or Reputation for Unchastity of Prosecutrix, 140 A.L.R. 364, 380-92
(1942), and that on Pope, Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Modern Status of Ad
missibility, in Forcible Rape Prosecution, of Complainant's Prior Sexual Acts, 94 A.L.R.3d 257
(1979). Clark and Marshall are quite wrong when they say "[pirevious voluntary in-
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inference of non-consent from the chastity of the victim with one of
consent from her lack of chastity. Actually, the inferences are quite
different. An inference that a woman who has never consented to
intercourse with anyone, or with anyone but her husband, is unlikely
to have consented to intercourse with the defendant on the occasion
charged seems plausible enough to be taken into account with the
rest of the evidence in a case. But an inference that a woman who was
willing to have intercourse with a particular man on a particular occa-
sion-or with different men on different occasions-must have been
willing to have intercourse with any man any time is absurd.
The illegality of non-marital sex was reflected in the civil law
rather more than in the criminal. It could not be consideration for a
contract, and the courts generally construed any contract between il-
licit lovers in such a way that the sex was part of the consideration and
the contract was unenforceable.5 7 In addition to voiding meretricious
transactions, the principle sometimes got in the uay of arrangements
to take serious responsibility for long term relationships.58
Seduction was a tort as well as a crime.59 Redress was available to
the parents of the victim (for "loss of services") as well as to the victim
herself. (It was always herself: seducing boys was not a tort, although
it might be a crime if the boys were young enough.) 0 Adultery was
also a tort: it gave rise to an action by the wronged husband for "crimi-
nal conversation." 6 ' The action was not available to the wronged wife,
but there was a gender-neutral action for "alienation of affections" if
the paramour (or anyone else for that matter) broke up the mar-
riage.62 Adultery was also, of course, recognized everywhere as
tercourse between the parties was a defense at common law." CL rIu & AShtLUL,
supra note 31, at 755 n.21. In the medieval (1221) case they cite, the jury used the
previous intercourse as evidence of consent on the occasion charged-not as making
consent unnecessary to acquittal. See id. Modernjuries have tended to do the same.
See 1mw KALvEN, JR. & HANS ZmSEL, THE AMriCAN JURy 249-54 (1966).
57 See RESTATEmNT OF CoNTRAars § 589 (1932); 17A CJ.S. Contracts § 276
(1999); SAn-TEL GaEN & JOHN V. LONG, MARRIACE AND FA.tux LW AcRRE ',trs
§ 3.14 (1984).
58 E.g., Stevens v. Anderson, 256 P.2d 712, 715 (Ariz. 1953) (holding that a wo-
man who cohabited for more than thirty years was not entitled to property promised
her); Wellmaker v. Roberts, 101 S.E.2d 712, 713 (Ga. 1958) (holding a contract void
when based on the illegal and immoral consideration of living together); Creasman v.
Boyle, 196 P.2d 835, 838 (Wash. 1948) (holding that a man had no claim to property
in a woman's name even though they lived together).
59 Wni.Aui L PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LA% OF TORTS 906 (3d ed. 1964); see
also 70 Ai. JuR. 2D Seduction §§ 53-55, 60 (1987).
60 PROSSER, supra note 59, at 906.
61 Id. at 896-97.
62 Id. at 903.
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ground for divorce. In some states, notably New York, it was the only
ground.
63
Sexual overtures could result in several different kinds of tort lia-
bility. There was a developing tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, which was coming to be recognized in various cases of
offensive conduct short of traditional assault or battery.64 A mere so-
licitation was not enough to constitute this tort, "the view," in Judge
Magruder's famous dictum, "being, apparently, that there is no harm
in asking."65 But if the solicitation was sufficiently persistent or offen-
sive, it would be actionable-as in one case where a man included a
nude photograph of himself in a letter.66 Also, it took very little to
turn the harmless asking into an assault or a battery. The applicable
legal principles were about the same in tort cases as in the criminal
cases already discussed. If the solicitation was frightening (as where
the man entered the woman's bedroom wearing only a nightshirt) it
would be an assault.67 If it included any touching (say the man took
the woman's hand), it would be a battery.68
Sexual practices were of concern in a number of situations in
which the law took account of "moral character" or what we would
now call lifestyle. Federal judges were of two minds about whether
fornicators or adulterers had the "good moral character" required by
statute for becoming American citizens. 69 Doctors and lawyers could
63 See PLOSCOWE, supra note 26, at 75.
64 See Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARv. L. REv. 1033, 1055-56 (1936); John W. Wade, Tort Liability for Insulting and
Abusive Language, 4 VAND. L. REV. 63, 74-76 (1950); W.J. Dunn, Annotation, Civil
Liability for Insulting or Abusive Language Not Amounting to Defamation, 15 A.L.R.2d 108,
108 (1951).
65 Magruder, supra note 64, at 1055.
66 Mitran v. Williamson, 197 N.Y.S.2d 689, 690 (Sup. Ct. 1960). A few states have
statutes, evidently adopted to discourage dueling, that give a cause of action for insult-
ing words tending to a breach of the peace. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01.45 (Michie
1950); see Magruder, supra note 64, at 1054. It has been held that an indecent propo-
sal violates such a statute. See Rolland v. Batchelder, 5 S.E. 695, 697 (Va. 1888).
67 McGlone v. Hauger, 104 N.E. 116, 121 (Ind. App. 1914); cf Leach v. Leach, 33
S.W. 703, 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895) (stating that touching is not necessary for a sexual
approach to be actionable).
68 E.g., Erwin v. Milligan, 67 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Ark. 1934); Johnson v. Hahn, 150
N.W. 6, 6 (Iowa 1914). Either an explicitly sexual touching or a non-sexual touching
where words or actions bespeak a sexual intent will be actionable, Annotation, Civil
Action for Assault Upon Female Person, 6 A.L.R. 985, 993-94, 1013-14 (1920), although
in the latter situation a few cases go the other way, see, e.g., Prince v. Ridge, 66 N.Y.S.
454, 454 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
69 E.g., Flumerfelt v. United States, 230 F.2d 870, 871 (9th Cir. 1956) (denying
application); Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1949) (granting
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lose their professional licenses for sexual misconduct,70 and public
employees, especially teachers, could be fired.71 Only in the most fla-
grant or most notorious cases was the blow sure to fall; on the other
hand, in no case was it sure not to. Case reports and secondary treat-
ment of the subject were both rare in the period. I suspect that sexual
irregularities were somewhat less common than they are today; they
were certainly more discreet and more circumspectly dealt with.
In divorce proceedings, there was a tendency for courts to regard
an unchaste mother as not fit to have custody of her children.
7 2
Exceptions were sometimes-but not always-made if the unchastity
had ceased, as when the mother after the divorce married the
paramour who caused the divorce to take place.73 Generally, there
was no reciprocal attention to the unchastity of the father, be-
cause the mother would be preferred for custody in any event,
unless she was found unfit-74 Occasionally, both parents were
application); seeV. Woerner, Annotation, Mluat Constitutes "Showing of God Moral Char-
acter" on the Part of an Applicant for Naturalization, 22 A.LR.2d 244, 271-75 (1952).
70 E.g., Grievance Comm. of the Hartford County Bar v. Broder, 152 A. 292, 295
(Conn. 1930); Fla. Barv. Kay, 232 So. 2d 378,379 (Fla. 1970); In reHicks, 20 P.2d 896,
897 (Okla. 1933); R.C. Howard, Jr., Disciplining Attorneys for Non-Profeional Conduct
Involving Alcohol and Sex, 1975 Aim. ST. LJ. 411, 419-22 (1975).
71 E.g., Brown v. Bathke, 416 F. Supp. 1194, 1200 (D. Neb. 1976); Pettit %. State
Bd. of Educ., 513 P.2d 889, 894 (Cal. 1973); GRAnu-i DouTHmrTE, UNMtARRIED
CouPLes AND =rE LAW 28-34 (1979);Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Serual Conduct as
Ground for Dismissal of Teacher or Denial or Revocation of Teaching Certfleate, 78 A.LR.3d
19, 24-28 (1977). This material from the seventies either reflects or describes the
prevailing doctrine of the fifties and sixties. It did not get much play in the literature
until it began to be challenged.
72 E.g., Hild v. Hild, 157 A.2d 442, 448 (Md. 1960); Bunim v. Bunim, 83 N.E.2d
848, 849 (N.Y. 1949); Ho~m-R H. CLARK, JR., THE L-%v OF Do.tsnc RExmroxs IN THm
UNrra_ STATES 585-86 (1968); William J. O'Connor, Recent Decision, Bunim v.
Bunim, 24 NOTRE DAriE LAkW. 597, 599 (1949).
It is not logical to assume that a woman can be a good mother and an adul-
tress at the same time. The primary duty of any mother is to educate her
children in basic moral principles. One who does not possess these princi-
ples can hardly be expected to teach them to others.
Id
73 See Wilcox v. Wilcox, 287 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Ky. 1955); cf Oliver v. Oliver, 140
A.2d 908, 912 (Md. 1958) (finding that unchastity ceased when the paramour left
town); C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Award of Custody of Child to Parent Against WhTom
Divorce is Decreed, 23 A.L.R.3d 6, 42-45, 65-83 (1969).
74 It appears that at common law there uws a preference for the father, which uwas
subject to an exception giving preference to the mother if the child was of "tender
years." CAIA~x, supra note 72, at 584-85. In Michigan, until its repeal in 1970, there
was a statute, MicH. CohIp. LAws § 722.541 (1948) (repealed 1970), embod)ing these
preferences. See Ostergren v. Ostergren, 118 N.W.2d 245, 246 (Mich. 1962). The
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found unfit, and the court made some other disposition of the
children.
75
Unchastity was not always safe even in the privacy of one's home.
If it was sufficiently flagrant, it could be regarded by one's neighbors
as a nuisance,7 6 by one's landlord as a breach of one's lease,77 or even
by the authorities as making the place a "disorderly house."78 An oc-
casional clandestine encounter would not be apt to have these conse-
quences, nor would a regular cohabitation if the fact of not being
married was not flaunted.79 But even here local law enforcement au-
thorities might take punitive action that would not be undone until it
reached an appellate court. In one case, for instance, a man and wo-
man were in bed in his apartment when his wife, two of her male
relatives, and a policeman came in from the fire escape to arrest
them. 0 Only after they had been tried and convicted did the highest
court of the state finally determine that their conduct was not suffi-
ciently overt to violate the applicable statute.8' Hotels and motels
("tourist camps" as they were called then) were often invaded by the
police with similar results.8 2 Welfare laws, spearheaded by the feder-
ally funded Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 3 were often
limited to the families of widowed or deserted mothers living chastely.
The applicable statutes would require a "suitable home," and it would
be determined that if the mother was unchaste the home was not suit-
able.8 4 Restrictions of this kind were coming under attack as punish-
preference for the mother of young children is still strong in manyjurisdictions, See
Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation, Modern Status of Maternal Preference Rule or Preuinp
tion in Child Custody Cases, 70 A.L.R.3d 262, 287-93, 302 (1976).
75 E.g., Spade v. Spade, 163 N.Y.S.2d 146, 149 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
76 See PROSSER, supra note 59, at 618.
77 SeeJohnson v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 253 N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (Sup. Ct.
1964) (discussing acts of adultery as grounds for breach of lease).
78 See State v. Seaburg, 145 A.2d 559, 561 (Me. 1958) (discussing a disorderly
house); Commonwealth v. Hartung, 39 A.2d 734, 736 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1944) (same);
27 C.J.S. Disorderly Houses § 4(5) (c) (1959) (holding a house to be disorderly if people
go there for immoral purposes).
79 E.g., Gill v. State, 240 P. 1073, 1075 (Okla. Crim. App. 1925); PLOSCOWE, supra
note 26, at 149-53.
80 State v. Brenner, 41 A.2d 532, 532 (N.J. 1945).
81 Id. at 534.
82 E.g., State v. Parker, 128 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939) (holding a
couple not guilty of open lewdness). But cf Allinder v. City of Homewood, 49 So. 2d
108, 115 (Ala. 1950) (upholding an ordinance specifically directed against illicit sex
in a tourist camp).
83 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-687 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000).
84 See WINWRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 93-110 (1965).
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ing children for their mothers' sins, but they persisted through the
1960s and early '70s.35
Because chastity was recognized by the law as the norm, the gen-
eral evidentiary presumption of innocence translated into a presump-
tion of chastity.8 6 The presumption could sometimes support treating
a cohabiting couple as married. 7 It could also be used in actions for
seducing a woman of previous chaste characterss or taking indecent
liberties without consent 8 9 In criminal cases, however, it had to give
way before the presumption that the accused is innocent of the crime
charged. The State could not use it in a rape case to escape the neces-
sity of proving lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.90
Laws against prostitution and the like were pretty much the same
as they are now. Some of the ancillary case law, however, was differ-
ent. A line of cases, beginning with one under the Mann Act in 1913,
held that recruiting women for an establishment in which their
morals were apt to be corrupted was tantamount to recruiting them
for prostitution.9' A particularly obnoxious dive in Calumet City, Ill-
nois occasioned three prosecutions along these lines, two of them suc-
cessful.92 The modus operandi involved hiring girls as waitresses, not
paying them enough to live on, and suggesting to them how they
could supplement their wages.
93
The juxtaposition of sex and alcohol came in for particular scru-
tiny. A licensee who permitted lewdness, immorality, or the sale of
contraceptives anywhere on the licensed premises (or, in the case of a
hotel, anywhere in the hotel) could have his license revoked or sus-
85 Id. The suitable home restriction was invalidated by a federal regulation in
1961. See id. at 147. It provided that aid must be continued as long as the child
remained in the home. Id. The suitable home limitation was then replaced by "man
in the house" rules that treated the mother's paramour as a substitute father. Id. at
148-51. These were invalidated in Kingv. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 329 (1968), and Lewis
v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 556-60 (1970).
86 JOHN I-AWSON, THm LAw OF PREsuM-PTVE EvIDENcE 505 (2d ed., St. Louis, Cen-
tral UJ. Co. 1899) (discussing the general presumption of chastity).
87 Id.
88 E.g., Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 176 S.W.2d 219, 219 (Ky. 1929).
89 E.g., Davis v. Richardson, 89 S.W. 318, 318 (Ark. 1905); Meredith v. Common-
wealth, 96 S.W.2d 1049, 1049-50 (Ky. 1936).
90 See People v. O'Brien, 62 P. 297, 299 (Cal. 1900).
91 See Athanasaw v. United States, 227 U.S. 326, 332 (1913); United States v.
Lewis, 110 F.2d 460, 463 (7th Cir. 1940); State v. Reed, 163 P. 477, 479 (Mont. 1917)
(applying the equivalent Montana statute).
92 United States v. Sapperstein, 312 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1963); United States v.
Amadio, 215 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1954), reu'd without opinion, 348 U.S. 892 (1954);
United States v. Austrew, 202 F. Supp. 816 (D. Md. 1962).
93 Austrew, 202 F. Supp. at 820.
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pended in an administrative hearing without any opportunity to show
a reviewing court that what happened was not as bad as the adminis-
trator believed it to be.94 It did not matter if his employees acted with-
out his knowledge or against his instructions. 95 And if the
administrator decided that the floor show was indecent, it did not
matter if the same acts would be constitutionally protected in a
theater.
96
Throughout the 1950s and into the '60s, serious pornography was
excluded from mainstream media, both print and film. The law of
obscenity had for some time been governed by the formula adopted
in Regina v. Hicklin9 7 that forbade any publication likely to corrupt the
morals of people whose minds were open to such influences. In the
famous Ulysses case,98 decided in 1933, a federal court adopted a more
flexible test, making a work obscene only if, taken as a whole, it would
strike the average person as appealing primarily to a prurient inter-
est.99 The opinion, affirmed by the prestigious Second Circuit'00 and
appended to most editions of the book, Ulysses, was taken up by the
drafters of the Model Penal Code' 0' and, in 1957, by the Supreme
Court.'0 2 But objectionable works were subject to significant sanc-
tions on which mainstream publishers were not willing to take
chances. They tended to stay well on the safe side. Even works that
were sold under the counter were pretty innocuous compared to what
circulates today.
As a general matter, stage presentations had as much and as little
constitutional protection as writings. There was less inclination than
there is now, however, to think of nudity and contortion as forms of
expression. Furthermore, theaters, because of the crowds they at-
tracted, were subject to municipal inspection and licensing. The req-
uisite licenses could often be refused to a person with a history of
putting on lewd shows.' 03 And the standards of fire safety might be
94 See Mitchell v. Cavicchia, 101 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953);
Mazza v. Cavicchia, 100 A.2d 550, 552 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953), revd on other
grounds, 105 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1954).
95 Mazza, 100 A.2d at 552.
96 See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 116-18 (1972).
97 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360, 370 (1868).
98 United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933),
afd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
99 See id. at 184-85.
100 United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F.2d 705, 709 (2d Cir. 1934).
101 MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4 (1962).
102 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
103 See, e.g., Adams Theatre Co. v. Keenan, 96 A.2d 519, 523-24 (N.J. 1953) (Bren-
nan, J.).
[VOL- 76:-
2001] ON LAW AND CHASTITY 657
applied with additional zeal and rigor, if the municipal authorities or
their constituents disapproved of the shows.104 All in all, therefore,
burlesque houses were vulnerable to harassment, to restriction, and, if
the authorities were sufficiently motivated, to outright suppression, al-
though in most places they managed to survive.
Films were still subject to licensing in a number of states.'0 3 Until
1952, it was not dear that they were entitled to any constitutional pro-
tection at all.' 0 6 Even after the 1952 Burs yn case established that the
making and showing of films was a form of free speech,10 7 the State
still had the power to require a viewing by some official before general
distribution to exhibitors. 108 Whatever official viewed the film had to
use the same criteria of obscenity that applied to books and
magazines, but, if a film fell within those criteria, the refusal of per-
mission to show it could be upheld even though it ums a prior re-
straint. 09 The officials were not all severe, and many states had no
licensing requirement at all. But the major studios generally had
more to gain by satisfying the strictest officials than by resisting them.
The broadcast media came under special rules. The technology
of the time offered a severely limited number of channels, which the
government was mandated to assign in accordance with the public
interest."10 Objectionable material, even if not obscene, could be evi-
dence that a channel would serve the public better in different
hands."'
104 See, e.g., DBM Amusement Corp. v. Thourot, 102 A.2d 774,777 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1954).
105 See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 151 N.E.2d 197,
201 (N.Y. 1958) (upholding New York's film licensing law).
106 See Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 286 U.S. 230, 243-44 (1915)
(holding that film is mere entertainment, not a form of speech or press). But se
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 136 (1948) ("Ve have no
doubt that moving pictures ... are included in the press whose freedom is granted by
the First Amendment.").
107 SeeJoseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 499-502 (1952).
108 Note, Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal Surve 1955-57, 33 Nom DA.,m
LAv. 416, 446-53 (1957).
109 SeeTmes Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 49 (1961); Note, Religious Institu-
tions and Values: A Legal Survey 1960-62, 37 NOTRE DA.%i Lxw. 649, 689-95 (1961-62).
110 See HAROLD L. NELSON & D GtH" L. TEETER, LW OF MASS Comsumcnoxs
415-16 (1969).
111 See id. at415-20; cf. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,386-90 (1969)
(discussing the power of government to distribute broadcast frequencies based upon
content).
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The distribution of contraceptives was forbidden in most
states." 2 There was also a federal prohibition." 3 The federal Second
Circuit in 1936 had carved out an exception for doctors who thought
their patients' health required not becoming pregnant.1 4 Most states
followed suit, although a few did not.115 But the law still could and
generally did prohibit counter displays in drugstores and vending ma-
chines in bars." 6
Abortion, except for serious health reasons, was forbidden evey-
where." 7 The political and intellectual forces that were eventually to
produce Roe v. Wade" 8 were only beginning to take shape.
Also just beginning to take shape were the legal developments
that did away with discriminatory treatment of illegitimate children
and their fathers." 9 The notion that a bastard was filius nullius had
been pretty well abandoned for some time as regards the mother.
12 0
But as regards the father, the old learning tended to persist. In some
states, his right to be involved in the child's life depended on the
prompt execution of somewhat obscure formalities. 12 1 In others, it
depended on securing custody.122 In still others, it was never better
than at sufferance, or never recognized at all. 125 In most states, a bas-
tard did not take by intestacy from the father or the father's relatives
and was not included in any reference to "children" in a will.124
112 See LouisJ. REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 344-46 (3d ed. 1956);
1972-73 HUMAN REPROD. & L. REP. (Legal Medical-Studies) §§ III, V.
113 See United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737, 738 (2d Cir. 1936).
114 Id. at 739.
115 See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856, 858-59 (Conn. 1940) (refusing to ac-
knowledge an exception to the prohibition on contraceptives).
116 See, e.g., Howell v. Bryant, 130 N.E.2d 837, 841-45 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954) (de-
nying appellant's claim that prohibition on the sale of contraceptives in vending ma-
chines was unconstitutional).
117 See RcAN, supra note 112, at 320-29; 1972-73 HuMAN REPROD. & L. REP. (Le-
gal Medical-Studies) § 1.
118 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
119 See CLARK, supra note 72, at 158-62, 176-80.
120 See, e.g., Gorden v. Gorden, 119 N.E. 312, 313 (Ill. 1918) ("An illegitimate son
can only inherit property from his mother and any maternal ancestor and any person
from whom his mother might have inherited if living.").
121 See Pfeifer v. Wright, 41 F.2d 464, 466-68 (10th Cir. 1930) (discussing the vari-
ous formalities required by the states); Holloway v. McCormick, 136 P. 1111, 1114
(Okla. 1913) (requiring the father to acknowledge paternity in a writing signed in the
presence of a competent witness).
122 See Vetten v. Wallace, 39 Ill. App. 390, 395 (1890).
123 See Gorden, 119 N.E. at 313.
124 See, e.g., Eaton v. Eaton, 91 A. 191, 194-96 (Conn. 1914) (holding that fathers'
testamentary references to children include only legitimate children).
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Divorce was still dominated by the concept of fault.'2 Some
courts were willing to take the small change of matrimonial disagree-
ment as evidence of "extreme cruelty," if the parties wished to call it
by that name.'126 Many courts were receptive to spurious adultery
charges like those involved in Tuw Gay Divorcee, with Fred Astaire and
Ginger Rogers. 127 But no State had yet adopted the no-fault system
advocated by various scholars of the subject. It was still possible, there-
fore, to believe that divorce was not an inevitable misfortune like the
winds and the tides-that it happened because of somebody's act or
omission, an example from which others could take warning and save
their own marriages.
II. CRrrQUES
This state of the law came under criticism from a number of dif-
ferent sources, and the sources multiplied as time went on and atti-
tudes developed. Looking back, we can sort most of the brickbats into
four coherent critiques.
The first, exemplified by Ploscowe's book, already mentioned,
can be called instrumentalist. It is that the legal dispositions I have
been describing, taken as a whole, do more harm than good. In the
first place, they are useless as a curb on consensual sex.
The mere prohibition of an offensive act will not discourage it, par-
ticularly when it is in response to so basic a drive as sex. Moreover,
a prohibited sexual act performed in private by t, o people who de-
rive satisfaction from it and will not complain is not likely to come
to the attention of law-enforcement authorities. Police officers or
district attorneys are not clairvoyants. They must receive notice of
some kind before they can prosecute or make an arrest.'1
2 8
Because it is impossible to enforce these laws across the board,
they are apt to be enforced selectively. The possibility exposes citizens
to blackmail and tempts public officials to corruption. The danger of
being blackmailed, in turn, exposes people in responsible jobs to a
minute investigation of their private lives by employers who would
otherwise have no legitimate interest in the subject.
Moreover, the proliferation of useless and unenforceable laws
gets in the way of laws that can and should be enforced. Ploscowe
shows, for instance, how the system for confining sexual psychopaths
had become so cluttered with persistent petty offenders that serious
125 CAsu, supra note 72, at 327-58; PLoscowu, supra note 26, at 58-99.
126 PLoscowu, supra note 26, at 67-71.
127 Tim GAY DivoRcuE (RKO 1934); PLoscoE, supra note 26, at 75.
128 PLoscouE, supra note 26, at 281.
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pedophiles and sadists were being overlooked. 129 Similarly, the laws
against prostitution were often so broad in their coverage that major
exploiters of women and carriers of venereal disease got off with mi-
nor penalties because other violators did. 30
The laws affecting the status of illegitimate children came in for
particular criticism as punishing children for the sins of their parents.
Ploscowe insists that illegitimate children should have the same rights
as legitimate ones to the support and attention of living parents and
to the estates of dead parents.' 3' I have already referred to the attack
on laws excluding illegitimate children from welfare benefits. It used
arguments similar to Ploscowe's.
The second critique is more theoretical. It is that private sexual
acts between consenting adults, even if they are morally objectionable,
should not concern the law because they do not hurt anyone. The
critique appeals to John Stuart Mill's On Liberty: "The only purpose for
which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civi-
lized community against his will is to prevent harm to others.' 13 2
A doctrine in pretty much this form was advanced by the framers
of the Model Penal Code in 1955133 and by the authors of the
Wolfenden Report, presented to the British Parliament in 1957.1s4 In
both cases, the recommendation was that all punishment of sexual
acts committed in private by consenting adults should be dropped, 35
Most Anglo-American jurisdictions adopted these recommendations
in the next decade or so.
The subject received considerable treatment in the legal litera-
ture of the 1960s as a result of the case of Shaw v. Director of Public
Prosecutions'36 in the House of Lords. Shaw published a directory with
the names and addresses of prostitutes who paid to be included.'37
One of the charges on which he was convicted was conspiracy to cor-
rupt public morals, 38 an offense referred to in passing by Lord Mans-
129 See id. at 229-30.
130 See id. at 281.
131 See id. at 132-35.
132 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LMERTY 9 (Alburey Costell ed., Harlan Davidson Inc.
1947) (1859).
133 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
134 REPORT OF THE CoMMITrrEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENCES AND PROSTITUTION,
1957, Cmnd. 247, at 9-10.
135 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955); REPORT OF THE
COMMrrrEE ON HoMoSEXUAL OFFENCES AND PROSTITUTION, 1957, Cmnd. 247, at 115.
136 1962 kC. 220 (H.L.).
137 Id. at 221.
138 See id. at 223.
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field in 1774,1- 9 but long dormant until it was brought forward to deal
with Shaw.14° The affirmance of Shaw's conviction evoked a major
debate over whether the enforcement of morality in general and sex-
ual morality in particular was a proper function of the law. Sir Patrick
Devlin, then a member of the Court of Appeal, later to be raised to
the House of Lords, led the authors on the affirmative side; 141 H.LA.
Hart, Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford, led those on the nega-
tive.'4 Hart, with his lucidity and fair-mindedness, his meticulous or-
ganization, and his support in the great Milian tradition, is generally
regarded in academic circles as having prevailed. I have to agree, de-
spite my belief that Devlin was generally right. Devlin's argument con-
cedes too much to cultural relativism to be fully effective.
Criticism of the laws regarding obscenity and the like has tended
lately to merge with the libertarian critique, but it has an independent
constitutional and philosophical basis in the traditional protection of
free speech. I prefer, therefore, to regard it as a third critique. We
can take as its point of origin the vastly erudite concurring opinion of
Judge Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit in United States v. Roth.
14
3
Frank's basic line was that a citizen should have the same right to dis-
seminate sexual attitudes as to disseminate any other attitudes.'"
While he did not feel free to depart from precedent to the extent of
abolishing the obscenity laws, he pretty dearly invited the Supreme
Court to do so. That Court did not take up the invitation, but it em-
barked on several decades of agonizing over the subject.
The critique has an admirable simplicity. As Justice Stewart said
in one Supreme Court opinion, "The Constitution... protects advo-
cacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper, no less
than advocacy of socialism or the single tax. And in the realm of ideas
it protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is un-
convincing."145 The question then becomes whether the advocacy
reaches the point of creating a clear and present danger of action that
the State has a right to prevent. Proponents of the critique find no
139 See id at 291.
140 See id. at 233.
141 PATRICK DEVLU, THE ENFORcEmNT OF MORALS (1968).
142 H.LA. HART, Lmv, LIBERT, Am MoRA=rr (1966). Hart criticizes an earlier
(1959) edition of Devlin's book. See id. at 28-32. Devlin responds in the text cited
above. See DEvUN, supra note 141, at 91-94.
143 237 F.2d 796, 801-27 (2d Cir. 1956), alfld, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
144 See id. at 801 (Frank, J., concurring).
145 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 634, 6S9
(1959).
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sufficient empirical evidence that it does.' 46 Their approach disre-
gards the traditional recognition of lust as a sin in its own right-
something less than action, to be sure, but still something more than
opinion. 14
7
The feminist movement, reviving in the late 1960s after some de-
cades of eclipse, provided a fourth critique. 148 It was noted that the
protection of women against sexual exploitation generally took the
form of restrictions on the women rather than on the potential ex-
ploiters.149 The dangerous juxtaposition of alcohol and sex was made
an excuse for forbidding women to tend bar. 50 Punishing prostitutes
was much less effective against prostitution than punishing their cus-
tomers would have been, but the law seldom provided for punishing
customers and was seldom enforced when it did.' 15 Institutions, espe-
cially schools, that professed to place a high value on chastity, were
highly punitive when a lapse manifested itself in pregnancy, but often
paid little attention otherwise. 152 As a result, the burden of upholding
the moral standards of such institutions fell more heavily on women
than on men.
The treatment of rape victims came in for a good deal of feminist
criticism, much of it bitter.153 I have already taken up the state of the
law that evoked the criticism. The intellectual background probably
contributed a good deal to the bitterness. It seems unbelievable at
this remove that as late as 1970 the leading treatise on the law of evi-
dence was urging that no one should be convicted of rape until the
complaining witness has successfully undergone a psychiatric
evaluation. 54
More or less on the fringes of the feminist critique there has been
a more radical attack on legal support for chastity as such. The gist of
146 See COMM'N ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, 90M CONG., REPORT OF THE
COMM'N ON OBSCENrrY & PORNOGRAPHY (1970).
147 See Matthew 5:28; cf. LANE V. SuNDERLAND, OBSCENITY, THE COURT, THE CON-
GRESS, AND THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION 75-84 (1974); Henry M. Clor, Science, Eros,
and the Law: A Citique of the Obscenity Commission, 10 DuQ. L. REV. 63 (1971).
148 See, e.g., KAREN DECRow, SExisTJusTXcE (1974).
149 See id. at 212 ("When Golda Meir was asked if she felt there should be a curfew
for women because of the rape problem, she replied that since men did the raping,
there should be a curfew for men.").
150 See Gosaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).
151 DECROW, supra note 148, at 204-07 (discussing the National Organization of
Women's 1973 resolution concerning prostitution).
152 See id. at 238-41.
153 See id. at 209-15; Berger, supra note 55, at 12-39.
154 See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 736 (James
H. Chadbourn ed., 1970).
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the argument is that, if sex is forbidden outside of marriage, and if
married women are dominated by their husbands, women must either
abstain from sex or submit to being dominated. They should not have
to do either. This criticism could theoretically be met by excluding
domination from the marriage relationship. But hard line critics will
say that the exclusion is impossible. They may add, with appropriate
historical allusions, that if male dominance were to be abolished there
would be no need for the sexually exclusive marriage relation as we
know it; that relation was set up to secure that dominance. Arguments
of this kind have never been in the mainstream of the feminist move-
ment, but they were given currency by Victoria Woodhull in the nine-
teenth century 55 and are at least implicit in the writing of Germaine
Greer in the twentieth. 156 More circumspect arguments along similar
lines have been used to support varying degrees of sexual permissive-
ness in other feminist agendas.
157
IlI. Lwcj. E DvEroPMNTs
The development of the law in the next few decades responded
in part to these critiques, in part to broader social changes. There was
also at work a general moral relativism that became dominant in
American jurisprudence somewhere in the second quarter of the
twentieth century. This relativism was seldom fully articulated, but it
tended to make judges inhibited in their judgments about sexual mis-
conduct. The inhibition is interestingly shown in the case of Schmidt
v. United States, 58 in which Learned Hand, often regarded (rightly in
my opinion) as the best judge in the United States at the time, ad-
dressed the question whether an unmarried man who admitted to oc-
casional acts of sexual intercourse with unmarried women possessed
the "good moral character" necessary to become a naturalized citizen.
Instead of treating the issue as one of moral discernment, for which
he was as well qualified as anyone else, Hand turned it into one of
sociological discernment, for which he confessed himself totally un-
qualified.159 He and his colleagues, "[I]eft at large... without means
of verifying our conclusion, and without authority to substitute our
155 VIcroRIuA WOODHULL, THE PRINCIPLES OF SoCIAL FREEDOM (1871), reprinted in
Tr VicroIuA WOODHULL RE.Ea 3, 3-43 (M. Stem ed., 1974).
156 GEP.NL, rs Gp.ER, THE FFziALE EUNUCH 317-29 (1971).
157 See the quotations from Emma Goldman in DECRow, supra note 148, at 189.
See also SIMONE DE B-Auvom, THE SECOND SEx 475-540, passirn (H.M. Parshley ed. &
trans., 1953).
158 177 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1949).
159 Id. at 451-52.
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individual beliefs,"'160 had to make "some estimate, necessarily based
on conjecture, as to what people generally feel."1' 1 Every job has its
difficulties and "so far as we can divine anything so tenebrous and
impalpable as the common conscience," 62 Hand and his colleagues
do so gamely, because it is their job.
I have no quarrel with their decision in Schmidt's favor; 63 I be-
lieve it was right. The question raised by the applicable law was not
whether Schmidt was perfect but whether he was good enough to be
an American citizen. Interpreting the term "good moral character" in
the light of its purpose, what the judges have to ask is not whether
people generally approve of Schmidt's behavior, but whether his be-
havior is on the whole as good as other people's-whether he is on
the same moral level as the general run of those whose fellow-citizen
he wishes to become.
Answering the question requires a kind of synthesis of moral and
social discernment. It calls for recognizing that Schmidt has been do-
ing something wrong and at the same time that his wrongdoing is not
of a kind that sets him apart from a body of citizens and would-be
citizens who are none of them perfect. The discernment is not much
different from what is required of a judge who has to decide whether
to let a shoplifter out on probation.
Here, though, Hand and his colleagues are strictly disclaiming
any judgment of the kind. They cannot accept the idea of a statutory
authority to use their own consciences in distinguishing right from
wrong. A congressional reference to morality must mean something
else, even though there is nothing else that the courts are equipped by
ability and training to decide. This kind of bewilderment affects the
judicial treatment of sex throughout the period we have now to
consider.
It is particularly noticeable in the convoluted body of case law
involving obscenity. Basically, the subject is fairly simple. The gratui-
tous and impersonal intrusion of the erotic into people's conscious-
ness is bad for them both morally and psychologically. If it happens
often, it is bad for society. Communications that intrude in this way
are not entitled to the same respect and encouragement as other com-
munications by which people try to share thoughts, feelings, or infor-
mation with their fellows. On the other hand, our minds are not
160 Id. at 451 (quoting Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152, 153 (2d Cir.
1947)).
161 Id. at 450 (quoting United States ex rel. Iorio v. Day, 34 F.2d 920, 921 (2d Cir.
1929)).
162 Id. at 452.
163 See id.
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compartmentalized, and all kinds of communications that carry erotic
freight may be valuable for some other reason. So what has to be
decided in a particular case is whether a communication is intrusively
erotic, and, if so, whether it has other important value as well. The
two questions are differently formulated in different cases. Terms like
"prurient interest" and "tendency to deprave and corrupt go with the
first one; "redeeming social importance" and "public good" go with
the second.164
However the questions are formulated, answering them requires
moral discernment. It is a kind of discernment that judges deploy
quite freely in other contexts and are admired for deploying well. Its
use in, say, products liability or landlord-tenant cases is well docu-
mented and shows the common-law method effectively at work in giv-
ing us ever better and clearer principles of law. 165 It is not surprising,
therefore, that its abandonment in obscenity cases results in an ever
worse and more obfuscated body of law. First, by looking to a moral
judgment other than their own, the judges tend toward permissive-
ness: if evidence on the judgment of the relevant community is not
forthcoming, the prosecution has not proved its case, and book, au-
thor, and publisher go free. Moreover, if the prosecution does prove
its case, it does so by introducing expert witnesses, who will be coun-
tered by expert witnesses for the defense. 166 The whole process ends
up costing the taxpayers more than a major murder trial. As regards
the general run of obscene materials, the tendency has been for the
authorities to give up.
An exception has arisen in the case of child pornography, that is,
films or videos whose making involves sexual abuse or simulated sex-
ual abuse of children. Here, there has been moral discernment: the
164 "Prurient interest" and "redeeming social importance" have been the standard
American criteria at least since Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 489 (1957).
"Tendency to deprave and corrupt" and "public good" are the British counterparts.
See Obscene Publications Act, 1959, 7 Eliz. 2, c. 66, §§ 1, 4 (Eng.); Theatres Act, 1968,
c. 54, §§ 2-3 (Eng.).
165 On products liability, see generally AfacPhermon v. Buidt Motor Co., 111 N.E.
1050 (N.Y. 1916), and its progeny; on landlord and tenant, see generally Edwards v.
Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968),Javins v. First NationalRealy Corp., 428 F.2d 1071
(D.C. Cir. 1970), and their progeny.
166 See GERALD GUNTHER & KATmEN M. SuuLiAN, Co~n1iTuzo,,L LLw 1144
(13th ed. 1997). Luke Records, In= v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 138 (11th Cir. 1992),
indicates that some criteria can be applied by ajudge orjury looking at or listening to
a work, but the crucial one-artistic merit or seriousness--must be shown by experts.
Luke Records involved the sexually explicit rap record of 2 Live Crem Id. at 135. The
defense came well supplied with experts; the prosecution, rel)ing on the record
alone, was defeated. See i&L at 136-39.
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Supreme Court has determined that the product can be forbidden for
the sake of preventing the abuse.167
Where the abuse is less flagrant, though, it is often the prevention
that gives way. A colorably communicative function can elicit constitu-
tional arguments in support of sexual behavior that would otherwise
be clearly against the law. The United States Supreme Court has up-
held bans on nude dancing and the like, especially in bars, but subject
to elaborate qualifications and agonized dissents that would never be
thought necessary if the same things were done on a street comer or
even a beach.16 The Arizona Court of Appeals went to considerable
trouble to establish that a sexual exhibition for an individual behind a
pane of glass was not entitled to the same protection as one for an
audience in a theater. 69 Sexual acts for the purpose of making films
are in a kind of twilight zone, if the actors are adults. According to
the Supreme Court of California, hiring actors to be filmed having sex
cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, be treated as prostitu-
tion.170 But according to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, transporting them interstate for the same purpose is a
violation of the Mann Act.'
7'
The Supreme Court, in a series of cases involving contraception
and abortion, beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965,172 gave
constitutional status to a right of privacy in sexual matters.173 This
right of privacy, first discerned by Warren and Brandeis in a famous
1890 law review article having nothing to do with sex,174 was conflated
167 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982). The rationale is not unlike that
of the feminist attack on other forms of pornography as degrading to women. See
infra note 470 and accompanying text. That attack was rejected in American Booksellers
Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1985), affd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986),
but accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina v. Butler, 89 D.L.R.4th 449,
467 (Can. 1992).
168 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572, 587 (1991); 48 CJ.S. Intoxi-
cating Liquors § 165 (1981). Note the change in standards between JDH Restaurant v.
New York State Liquor Authority, 236 N.E.2d 159, 159 (N.Y. 1968), and the more recent
Beal Properties Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 340 N.E.2d 476, 476 (N.Y. 1975),
and Bellanca v. New York State Liquor Authority, 429 N.E.2d 765, 766 (N.Y. 1981).
169 See State v. Taylor, 808 P.2d 314, 316-18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
170 People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128, 1132 (Cal. 1988).
171 United States v. Roeder, 526 F.2d 736, 738-39 (10th Cir. 1975). But cf United
States v. Prater, 518 F.2d 817, 820-21 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that it is not a violation
to transport a stripper who engages in prostitution on her own).
172 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
173 See GUNTHER & SuLLIVAN, supra note 166, at 518-84.
174 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 -ARv. L. RFv.
193 (1890). Justice Black, dissenting in Griswold, objected to the prevailing opinion as
"exalting a phrase which Warren and Brandeis used in discussing grounds for tort
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for the purpose with the search-and-seizure provisions of the Fourth
Amendment and the Millian critique of all laws interfering with self-
regarding conduct But the Supreme Court has thus far resisted at-
tempts to extend the conflated right to protect all forms of consensual
sex.17
5
Some state courts and lower federal courts have gone farther.
Cases have expanded the right of privacy to cover almost anything
done in private or even with an unfulfilled expectation of privacy if it
was reasonable. Some have added other conceptual ingredients to
the mix. "Freedom of association," first articulated by the Supreme
Court in NAACP v. Alabama (1958),176 a civil rights case, was recast as
"freedom of intimate association" by Professor Kenneth Karst in an
able article of that name, published in 1980.'77 A federal court in
Michigan extended this freedom to protect the job of a policeman
who was living with another man's wife,' 78 and one in Illinois indi-
cated that it would protect most of the activities of a suburban sex
club.1
79
Measures taken against the unchaste, usually by employers, run
afoul of laws against gender discrimination if, as is often the case, they
bear more heavily on women than on men. Where two employees are
having an extramarital affair, the employer can get in trouble by firing
the woman but keeping the man on the job, although sometimes he
has been able to show that the woman was more expendable or more
affected in her work.'80 An employer is particularly vulnerable to gen-
der discrimination charges if he worries about illicit sex among his
workers only when one of them shows up pregnant. As a practical
matter, such an employer demands chastity of women and not of
men.181
relief, to the level of a constitutional rule...." 381 U.S. at 507, 510 n.1 (BlackJ.,
dissenting).
175 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190, 196-97 (1986). See the note
on Bowers in GuNTHER & SuL~rvAN, supra note 166, at 599.
176 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
177 Kenneth L. Karst, 77m Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE UJ. 624 (1980).
178 Briggs v. N. Muskegon Police Dep't, 563 F. Supp. 585, 590-92 (W.D. Mich.
1983).
179 See Kraus v. Barrington Hills, 571 F. Supp. 538, 541-42 (N.D. IIl. 1982). The
court refused, however, to interfere with what the club members claimed ,as harass-
ment through selective enforcement against them of laws unrelated to their sexual
activities. 1d. at 542-43.
180 See Reber v. Mel Falley, Inc., 683 P.2d 1229, 1233-35 (Kan. 1984); C. Thorrez
Indus. v. Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights, 278 N.W.2d 725, 727-28 (Mich. CL App. 1979).
181 See Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Boyd
v. Harding Acad., 887 F. Supp. 157, 161 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) (finding evidence that a
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Some long-standing criminal statutes against sexual misconduct
have been objected to on account of gender discrimination. They
tended to treat illicit intercourse as adultery if the woman was mar-
ried, fornication if she was single-regardless of the marital status of
the man.1 8 2 Also, under most statutes only a woman could be the vic-
tim of either forcible or statutory rape or of various kinds of sexual
exploitation. 8 3 Under many statutes, only a woman could be a prosti-
tute.18 4 The distinction between fornication and adultery has been
found unconstitutional by a court or two,1 85 but the other distinctions
have generally been upheld. 8 6 By now, though, most legislatures, in-
cluding Congress, have overhauled all their statutes on these subjects
and recast them in gender-neutral terms, whether or not they passed
muster with the courts in their previous form.'
8 7
Cases invalidating sodomy statutes have gone off on a mixture of
privacy and equal protection grounds. To punish for deviate acts with
someone of the same sex and not to punish for the same acts with
someone of the opposite sex has been seen as a violation of strictures
against discrimination on account of sexual orientation. 188 To punish
opposite sex couples also unless they are married to each other
church-related school also fired male teachers for nonmarital sex); Dolter v. Wahlest
High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 267 (N.D. Iowa 1980); Leechburg Area Sch. Dist. v.
Commonwealth, 339 A.2d 850, 854 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975); cf. Ponton v. Newport
News Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 1056, 1065 (E.D. Va. 1986) (holding that making an
unmarried pregnant teacher take leave is unlawful discrimination, as pregnancy is
something that can only happen to a woman and that she has a constitutional right to
have happen). But see Brown v. Bathke, 416 F. Supp. 1194, 1200 (D. Neb. 1976) (stat-
ing that a school board can fire an unmarried teacher for being pregnant and that
her reproductive and associative freedom is outweighed by the school board's interest
in imparting social values).
182 See PLoscowE, supra note 26, at 145-49.
183 See DECRow, supra note 148, at 194-200.
184 E.g., IND. CODE § 35-30-1-1 (1971) (repealed 1976).
185 E.g., Purvis v. State, 377 So. 2d 674, 681 (Fla. 1979).
186 See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 475 (1981) (statutory rape);
Wilson v. State, 278 N.E.2d 569, 570-71 (Ind. 1972) (prostitution); cf. Plas v. State,
598 P.2d 966, 968-69 (Alaska 1979) (saving the constitutionality of laws against pro.sti-
tution by extending them to cover males).
187 E.g., Pub. L. No. 99-628, 100 Stat. 3511 (1986) (amending the Mann Act); 1975
Ind. Acts 325 § 2 (prostitution); 1974 Mass. Acts 474 (rape); 1978 Mass. Acts 379 § 4
(prostitution). The editors of Annotated Laws of Massachusetts refer to the 1978 Act as
'part of a legislative plan redefining sex crimes in sex-neutral terms." MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 272, § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
188 See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 502 (Ky. 1992). But see Baker v.
Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985).
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has been seen as an impermissible discrimination against the
unmarried.8 9
A number of states have statutes forbidding discrimination on the
basis of marital status.1 90 I believe the original idea was to keep em-
ployers from favoring workers who would be more exploitable, be-
cause they had no family responsibilities to compete with theirjobs.29'
There may also have been concern with landlords of rooming houses
who took a punitive attitude toward single mothers or who preferred
not to have potentially growing families on their hands. Lately, such
provisions have been invoked to claim that landlords must rent hous-
ing to cohabiting couples on the same terms as if they were married.
Several States have rejected this claim, sometimes by close votes;' -
others have accepted it.'93 In the latter jurisdictions there have been
landlords who have sought to trump the statutory provision by claim-
ing that their religion forbids them to facilitate non-marital sex. The
courts have then had to determine whether the rights of cohabiting
couples afford a compelling state interest to supersede the religious
freedom of the landlords. The cases are in some disarray on the
point.'
94
189 See People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940 (N.Y. 1980); Commonwealth v.
Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 49-50 (Pa. 1980). But see State v. Lopes, 660 A.2d 707, '710
(R.L 1995).
190 SeeJohn Edward Alley, _larita! Status Discimination: An Amorphous Prohibition,
54 FLA. B.J. 217, 217-18 (1980).
191 See i. (indicating that airline hiring policy was the main cause of the
legislation).
192 See Mister v. A.RK. P'ship, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1159 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Md.
Comm'n on Human Relations v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 475 A.2d 1192, 1198 (Md.
1984); State ex reL Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990); Hudson Vie,
Props. v. Weiss, 450 N.E.2d 234, 235 (N.Y. 1983); McFadden v. Elma Country Club,
613 P.2d 146, 152 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980); County of Dane %. Norman, 497 N.W.2d
714, 714 (Wis. 1993) ("[L]iing together is 'conduct' not 'status.'").
193 See Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1199, 1203 (Alaska
1989); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 918 (Cal. 1996);
Worcester Hous. Auth. v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 547 N.E.2d 43, 45
(Mass. 1989); McReady v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 726-28 (Mich. 1998), vacated on
other grounds, 593 N.W.2d 545 (Mich. 1999); Schaap v. Canada (Canadian Armed
Forces), 56 D.LR.4th 105, 115 (Can. Fed. Ct. 1988) (stating that a cohabiting couple
has the same right to military housing as a married couple).
194 See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 717 (9th Cir.
1999) (accepting a religious claim on federal constitutional grounds); S%,anner v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 285 (Alaska 1994) (rejecting a relig-
ious claim); Smith, 913 P.2d at 928-29 (same); Attorney Gen. v. DeSilets, 636 N.E.2d
233, 240 (Mass. 1994) (remanding the case for further consideration of a religious
claim); McReady, 586 N.W.2d at 724-25.
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The courts' discomfort with moral discernment in sexual matters
causes a good deal of waffling and obfuscation in cases where some-
one's character has to be taken into account. These include cases in-
volving fitness for some job-usually teacher or police officer,
occasionallyjudge-that calls for serving as a role model or upholding
the dignity of the state; professional licensing or discipline cases; and
cases involving custody or visitation rights of a parent. Some courts
deciding such cases seem still to recognize that there are objective
standards of sexual morality and that anyone with the responsibilities
of a role model, fiduciary, or parent can be required to live up to
them at least in public.195 More, though, seem to treat such standards
as vague, subjective, idiosyncratic, or characteristic of only a few of the
numerous lifestyles subsisting in our pluralist society.' 96 References to
them can be given effect only by considering how they are received
among those with whom a person works or associates. 19 7 And even
then, applying them may interfere with the constitutional freedom of
all citizens-even schoolteachers, doctors, lawyers, and parents-to
live as they please.' 98
Against this ambiguous background, we can examine the role
model cases, the professional discipline cases, and the child custody
cases. The trend, if there is one, seems to be in the direction of grad-
ually increasing permissiveness. More important, school boards, li-
censing authorities, and even disgruntled ex-spouses if they are not
rich are reluctant to embark on proceedings that will probably go
through several layers of appellate review with no guarantee of win-
ning in the end. So a certain amount of conduct is probably reluc-
195 E.g., Brown v. Bathke, 416 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Neb. 1976) (teacher); In re Sny-
der, 336 N.W.2d 533, 536 (Minn. 1983) (judge); Lile v. Hancock Place Sch. Dist., 701
S.W.2d 500, 506 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (teacher); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va.
1985) (parent); Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 559 P.2d 1340 (Wash. 1977)
(teacher).
196 See Sherburne v. Sch. Bd., 455 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Fort v.
Fort, 425 N.E.2d 754, 757 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981); DeVita v. DeVita, 366 A.2d 1350,
1354 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Ross v. Springfield Sch. Dist. No. 19, 716 P.2d
724, 728-29 (Or. 1986).
197 See Nat'l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1984);
Childres v. Dallas Police Dep't, 513 F. Supp. 134, 142 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Thompson v.
Wis. Dep't of Pub. Instruction, 541 N.W.2d 182, 189-90 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
198 See Thorne v. El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 469 (9th Cir. 1983); Ponton v. New-
port News, 632 F. Supp. 1056, 1062 (E.D. Va. 1986); Briggs v. N. Muskegon Police
Dep't, 563 F. Supp. 585, 590-91 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Shuman v. Philadelphia, 470 F.
Supp. 449, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Owens v. Jennings Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd.,
454 So. 2d 426, 428 (La. Ct. App. 1984); cf. Aumiller v. Univ. of Del., 434 F. Supp.
1273, 1301 (D. Del. 1977) (freedom of speech).
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tantly tolerated or prudently ignored that might well be reached
under the applicable law if anyone were determined enough to reach
it.
The chief role model cases deal with teachers in public grade
schools and high schools. The one thing that is quite clear about
these teachers is that they will be subject to swift and undebatable dis-
missal, if they involve their students directly in their sexual adven-
tures.1 99 A teacher can also get in trouble for discussing sensitive
sexual topics with students, and the trouble will be a good deal more
serious if his or her own private life is questionable.200 On the other
hand, in most jurisdictions, private affairs that only accidentally come
to the attention of the authorities cannot be made the basis for dis-
missing a teacher.201 Courts hold that the right of privacy precludes
interfering With conduct that does not affect the ability to teach.
202
The view that every teacher must teach chastity, and cannot teach it
without practicing it, is still raised occasionally, but it is pretty much
on the ay out 203 What remains debatable is whether general oppro-
brium in the community can be regarded as impairing the ability to
teach, or whether there must be a showing that actual students have
lost respect for the teacher on account of the conduct in question or,
worse, are in danger of following the teacher's example. Courts go
both ways.2
04
Some of the sexual irregularities of police officers involve actual
abuse of their position, either by intimidation or by accepting sexual
favors as bribes for overlooking unrelated offenses.20 In other cases,
199 See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Sexual Conduct as Ground for Dismissal of
Teacher or Denial or Revocation of Teaching ertificate, 78 A.LR.3d 19, 35-40 (1977); cf
Li 701 S.W.2d at 506 (teacher cohabits with student's mother).
200 See Yanzick v. Sch. Dist. No. 23, Lake County, Mont., 641 P.2d 431, 441-43
(Mont. 1982); Gaylord, 559 P.2d at 1441-42.
201 See Thompson v. S.W. Sch. Dist., 483 F. Supp 1170, 1181-82 (W.D. Mo. 1980);
Sherburne, 455 So. 2d at 1061; Yanzidt, 641 P.2d at 441-42.
202 See Thompson, 483 F. Supp. at 1180.
203 See Brown v. Bathke, 416 F. Supp. 1194,1198 (D. Neb. 1976); Sherburne, 455 So.
2d at 1061; Yanzich, 641 P.2d at 441-42; Sheila A. Skojec, Annotation, Job Diserimina-
tion Against Unwed Mothers or Unwed Pregnant Women as Proscribed Under Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act, 91 A.L.R. FED. 178, 198-200 (1989) (stating that a role model
requirement, if applied equally to males and females, is acceptable as a bona fide
occupational qualification in church related or similar pri%-ate agencies).
204 Compare Thompson, 483 F. Supp. at 1181, with Ross v. Springfield Sch. Dist. No.
19, 716 P.2d 724, 728-29 (Or. 1986) (holding that a decision about a teacher's con-
duct should not be based upon reference to community moral standards).
205 See Washington v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 423 N.E.2d 1136, 1138 (Ill. App. C.
1981); Douglas v. Daniels, 382 N.E.2d 90, 92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); cf. McCormack v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 315 N.W.2d 855, 857 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981) (involving police in-
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police cars are used for assignations, or apartment managers lend out
rooms in the hope of favorable treatment on other occasions. 206 Af-
fairs within a department are often dealt with as disrupting morale,2 07
and, in one case, the very presence of a homosexual was treated as
disruptive.208
It is sometimes thought that the responsibility of the police for
law enforcement calls for disciplinary action whenever an officer vio-
lates a law, even one as seldom enforced as that against adultery.209
Sometimes also, it is felt that an officer's behavior, even if private and
not subject to criminal prosecution, will interfere with the orderly op-
eration of the police by undermining public confidence. As the Com-
monwealth Court of Pennsylvania put it, "[I] t is not difficult to foresee
a certain amount of insecurity on the part of absent spouses when they
consider that an officer with adulterous tendencies may be summoned
in their absence."210
Even so, the ight of privacy has prevailed in some cases. Federal
district courts in Pennsylvania and Michigan have held that, in the
absence of specific evidence of a bad effect on law enforcement in the
community, the sex life of a police officer is of no legitimate interest
to the employing agency.211 What seems to be a sharp split between
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania and the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of that state has not yet been
resolved. 212
timidation of the husband of a paramour); Police Comm'r v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 494
N.E.2d 27, 29 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (involving a police officer who had sex with a
woman picked up for drunkenness).
206 SeeMcConnack, 315 N.W.2d at 857; Oswald v. Allentown, 388 A.2d 1128, 1129
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
207 See Fugate v. Phoenix Civil Serv. Bd., 791 F.2d 736, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1986);
Hamilton v. Mesa, 916 P.2d 1136, 1141 (Ariz. 1995); Ealey v. Bd. of Fire & Police
Comm'rs, 544 N.E.2d 12, 13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Diane C. Schering, Annotation, Sex.
ual Misconduct or Irregularity as Amounting to "Conduct Unbecoming an Officer, " 9
A.L.R.4th 614 (1981).
208 Childers v. Dallas Police Dep't, 513 F. Supp. 134, 142 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
209 E.g., Oliverson v. West Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1483 (D. Utah 1995).
210 Faust v. Police Civil Serv. Comm'n, 347 A.2d 765, 769 (Pa. Comnw. Ct. 1975),
quoted with approval in Fabio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 414 A.2d 82, 90 (Pa. 1980).
211 Briggs v. N. Muskegon Police Dep't, 563 F. Supp. 585, 591 (W.D. Mich. 1983);
Shuman v. Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1979); cf Duckworth v.
Sayad, 670 S.W.2d 88, 92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that an officer cannot be
disciplined on evidence obtained in contravention of a reasonable expectation of
privacy).
212 I have found no citation of Shuman, 470 F. Supp. 449, by any Pennsylvania state
court and only two citations of Faust, 347 A.2d 765, or Fabio, 414 A.2d 82, by federal
courts, both on points unrelated to the merits.
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There is some material suggesting that lawyers can be disciplined
for sexual immorality as such, but most cases-indeed, all the cases I
have found since the early 1980s-require some kind of impact on
professional life.2 13 Thus, in 1979 the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that a woman could not be excluded from the bar merely because she
was cohabiting with a man to whom she was not married.2 14 And in
1981, the Supreme Court of Florida held explicitly that private, non-
commercial sexual conduct between adults had no bearing on fitness
to practice law and should not be inquired into by the bar examin-
ers.2 15 Two dissenters argued that some private, noncommercial sex-
ual conduct between adults was criminal and that all of it outside
marriage was regarded as immoral by most of the people of the
state.2 16 Someone who had not only violated applicable legal and
moral standards in the past, but who intended to go on doing so was
not fit to practice law.2 17 A few earlier courts had been persuaded by
this reasoning,218 but no later ones were.
Practice-related conduct sometimes affects the dignity of the pro-
fession. There was a strange case in Iowa in 1979 where the prison
officers reported a lawyer for heavy petting with a prisoner she had
come to see.219 She was reprimanded, but the court indicated that, if
she had not signed into the prison in her capacity as a lawyer, she
would not have been subject to discipline.
220
Most cases involve either abuse of power (a lawyer demands sex
from his client as part of his fee) 22 1 or abuse of trust (the lawyer takes
advantage of the emotionally shattered state of a divorce client).22 2
213 See generally Robert C. Howard, Jr., DiscipliningAtioraeysforNon-Profes.ional Mis-
conduct Involving Alcohol or Sex; 1975 ARtz. ST. U. 411; Eric H. Miller, Annotation,
Sxual Conduct or Orientation as Ground for Denial of Admission to the Ba,; 21 A.LR4th
1109 (1983); Gregory D. Sarno, Annotation, Sexual Misconduct as GrozundforDisciplin-
ingAttomey orjudge 43 A.L.R.4th 1062 (1986).
214 Cord v. Gibb, 254 S.E.2d 71, 73 (Va. 1979).
215 In re N.R.S., 403 So. 2d 1315, 1317 (Fla. 1981).
216 See id. at 1317-19 (Boyd, J. and Alderman, J., dissenting).
217 Id- at 1317-19.
218 SeeFla. Bar v. Kay, 232 So. 2d 378,379 (Fla. 1970); In re Hicks, 20 P.2d 896, 897
(Okla. 1933); Moore v. Strickling, 33 S.E. 274, 278 (W. Va. 1899).
219 Comm. on Prof l Ethics & Conduct v. Durham, 279 N.W.2d 280, 281 (Iowa
1979).
220 See a at 284.
221 E.g., McDaniel v. Gile, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242,245-46 (Ct. App. 1981); In reWood,
358 N.E.2d 128, 130 (Ind. 1976).
222 E.g., In reLewis, 415 S.E.2d 173, 174-75 (Ga. 1992); In re Berg, 955 P.2d 1240,
1243-44 (Kan. 1998); see also GEoFREY C. HAzAR,Ja. ET At., THE LwAND EmIcs OF
LAV.YERnG 600-02 (2d ed. 1994) (citing cases); cf. In 7e Heard, 963 P.2d 818, 820-22
(Wash. 1998) (client recovering from head injury).
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The rules of professional conduct generally deal with these cases only
obliquely.223 Sometimes a lawyer who takes advantage of the emo-
tional condition of the client is found to have violated Model Rule
1.8(b) by using confidential information to the disadvantage of the
client. 224 If the representation will be materially limited by the law-
yer's interest in the sexual relation, it will violate Rule 1.7(b).225 In
states where the sexual acts are still illegal, the lawyer may be disci-
plined for causing the client to violate the law (Rule 1.2(d)22 6). And
in a divorce case where the adultery of a party may affect the outcome,
the lawyer obviously violates the duty of diligent representation by en-
couraging the client to commit it.
It is clear from the cases that these rules, as most courts interpret
them, will not do the job. Lawyers have emerged without either pro-
fessional discipline or malpractice liability from situations where sex-
ual relations left their clients devastated. Accordingly, there has been
a good deal of agitation for more specific rules. On the whole,
though, the bar has opted for privacy and freedom of association.
Only a few states have adopted rules expressly addressing the subject,
and some of those rules have so many qualifications and exceptions as
to look more like invitations than restrictions.227 The Illinois legisla-
ture passed a resolution in 1991 asking the state Supreme Court to
223 See In re DiSandro, 680 A.2d 73, 74-75 (R.I. 1996) (conflict of interest); HAz-
ARD Er AL., supra note 222, at 600-02; Anthony E. Davis & Judith Grimaldi, Se.ial
Confusion: Attorney-client Sex and the Need for a Clear Ethical Rule, 7 NOTRE DAME JL.
ETmIcs & PUB. POL'y 57, 68-76 (1993).
224 MODEL RULS OF PROF'L CoNDuar R. 1.8(b) (1997); see Berg. 955 P.2d at
1256-57 (upholding the disbarment of a divorce attorney who engaged in a sexual
relationship with an emotionally-abused client); In re Halverson, 998 P.2d 833, 840
(Wash. 2000) (holding that an attorney's failure to disclose the material implications
of his sexual relationship with a client on the client's divorce violated Washington's
Rules of Professional Conduct).
225 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (1997); see Halverson, 998 P.2d at
840.
226 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.2(d) (1997).
227 The rules are cited in Heard, 963 P.2d at 825 n.8. MINN. RULES OF PROr't
CoNDucr R. 1.8(k) (1997), OR. CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBLUTY DR 5-110 (1998), and
Wis. Sup. CT. R. 20: 1.8(k) (2) (1998) outlaw all sex with a current client unless the
relationship predated the representation. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CODUCr R. 3-120
(1998), FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 4-8.4(i) (1998), and IOWA CODE OF PROF'L
REsPONSiBxLrr EC 5-25 (1998) limit the prohibition to cases where the relation is
exploited or the power of the attorney is abused. N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBuuar
DR 1-102(A)(7) is limited to domestic relations cases. The Washington Supreme
Court refused to adopt a rule like Oregon's. See Heard, 963 P.2d at 825. The Indiana
Supreme Court has outlawed all sex with a current client. See In re Hawkins, 695
N.E.2d 109, 109-10 (Ind. 1998). The language of the Colorado Supreme Court in
People v. Good, 893 P.2d 101, 103-05 (Colo. 1995), is almost as sweeping. Proposed
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adopt a rule.228 Instead, the court reopened the case of the woman
whose grievance had prompted the legislative action. The lawyer in-
volved had survived a grievance proceeding2- and a malpractice suit
brought by that woman,230 and a RICO proceeding brought by an-
other of his victims (the Seventh Circuit held that coercion of sex was
not a deprivation of property). 231 He was suspended for three years
and until further order.23 2 The court said that he should have knoun
better than to do what he did, but it made no change in the rules.233
The rules governing other professions are, on the whole, less per-
missive. Consensual sex between a physician and a current patient is
condemned by the American Medical Association, by statutes and ad-
ministrative regulations in a number of states, and by the Hippocratic
Oath.2 4 Other professions such as dentistry, psychology, and social
work are similarly restricted, but we would have to go over the rules,
the statutes, and the cases both state by state and profession by profes-
sion to get all the details right. Generally, the closer the sexual mis-
conduct is to the professional service the practitioner is supposed to
be rendering, the more scope the licensing authorities have for con-
demning it. It is easy to say that an optometrist who makes his female
patients undress to have their eyes examined is acting unprofession-
ally within the meaning of a statute that punishes doing so.23r But I
have found only one case that permitted treating physician-patient sex
as unprofessional without some aggravating circumstance.23 6
In 1991, the American Medical Association amended its ethical
rules to make explicit the condemnation of any sexual relation be-
tween a physician and a current patient.237 Some state agencies have
rules and disciplinary opinions under non-specific rules are covered in Davis & Gri-
maldi, supra note 223, at 82-89.
228 Davis & Grimaldi, supra note 223, at 65-68, 85-87.
229 Id.
230 Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101, 105 (IM. App. Ct. 1990).
231 Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 1992).
232 In re Rinella, 677 N.E.2d 909, 916 (Ill. 1997).
233 See id. at 914.
234 See Davis & Grimaldi, supra note 223, at 59-62; Michael R. Flaherty, Annota-
tion, Improper or Immoral Sexually Related Conduct Toward Patient as Ground for Discipli-
na7y Action Against Physician, Dentis4 or OtherLicensed Healer, 59 A.LR.4th 1104 (1988).
235 See Cardamon v. State Bd. of Optometric Exam'rs, 441 P.2d 25, 26 (Colo.
1968); cf Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Steffes, 588 NN.2d
121, 122 (Iowa 1999) (concerning a lawyer disciplined for undressing a client on the
pretext of finding evidence of her physical condition); In re Romano, 675 N.Y.S.2d
610, 611 (App. Div. 1998) (same).
236 See Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 614 N.E.2d 748, 752 (Ohio 1993).
237 AMA Council on Ethical andJudicial Affairs, Sexual Misconduct in the Practice of
Medicine, 266JAMA 2741, 2745 (1991).
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done the same.23 8 The general prohibition has, of course, raised
questions of privacy and freedom of association. These questions have
troubled some courts, 239 although a writer in the Journal of the Ameri-
can Medical Association has argued that the rule is not about who can
be a lover but about who can be a patient.240 The typical court looks
for some nexus between the professional and the sexual-as in the
case of a dentist who developed an elaborate seduction ritual begin-
ning with massages for the treatment of temporomandibular joint
pain.241
In the mental health professions, on the other hand, the com-
plete prohibition has been generally accepted. 242 Ex hypothesi the
mental health patient is in a state of emotional vulnerability that it
would be unprofessional to exploit. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit elaborated upon this point in a Federal
Tort Claims Act243 suit based on the negligence of a counselor em-
ployed by the government for the benefit of certain Indians.244 The
court pointed to the phenomenon of "transference" by which the pa-
tient transfers to the counselor her feelings about her parents or
other authority figures. 245 The transference is apt to take an erotic
238 See Flaherty, supra note 234, at 1104.
239 Gromis v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 452, 456-57 (Ct. App. 1992) (hold-
ing that a statute forbidding "any act of sexual abuse, misconduct, or relations" in
connection with a profession forbids doctor-patient sex only if it interferes with a
professional relation; noting that it would raise a substantial constitutional problem if
it went further (quoting CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 726 (West 1990))).
240 Sandra H. Johnson, Judicial Review of Disciplinary Action for Sexual Misconduct in
the Practice of Medicine, 270JAMA 1596, 1597-98 (1993). But see Haley v. Med. Discipli-
nary Bd., 818 P.2d 1062, 1068 (Wash. 1991) (stating that under particular circum-
stances, sex with a former patient indicates unfitness to practice).
241 Green v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 140, 142 (Ct. App. 1996).
242 See Davis & Grimaldi, supra note 223, at 60; Flaherty, supra note 234. But see
Colo. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Weiler, 402 P.2d 606, 608-09 (Colo. 1965) (finding for a
doctor because the charges against him failed to track the wording of the applicable
statute). There is some question of who is a mental health professional for purposes
of this principle. It has been held that a clergyman is. See Destefano V. Grabrian, 763
P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988). But an Employee Assistance Professional has been held
not to be. See Reich v. Price, 429 S.E.2d 373, 375 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). Liability for
this kind of misconduct has been held not to extend to the spouse of the patient. See
Homer v. Long, 599 A.2d 1193, 1198-200 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992); Strock v. Press-
nell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (Ohio 1988).
243 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
244 Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1371 (9th Cir. 1986).
245 Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1364-68; accord Wharton v. Sobol, 580 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556
(App. Div. 1992). Transference was invoked unsuccessfully in Perkins v. Dean, 570 So.
2d 1217, 1219 (Ala. 1990), where the offending professional was a social worker, and
the sexual relation did not begin until the counseling relation was over.
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turn, which a coinpetent counselor should be able to deal with appro-
priately. The failure to do so is malpractice. In some states, it is also a
felony. In Minnesota, for instance, sex in a counseling relation, or a
former relation if continuing "emotional dependence" can be shown,
is punished as criminal sexual conduct in the third degree, along with
various forms of what other jurisdictions would call statutory rape.246
The effect of sexual misconduct on the custody and visitation
rights of divorced parents remains in some doubt.2 47 In 1979, the Su-
preme Court of Illinois, in the famous case of Jarrett v. Jarre4,2 48 took
children away from their mother and gave them to their father for no
reason except that the mother was not married to the man she was
living with and did not intend to be.2 49 The court alluded to a statute
that made the mother's conduct criminal, but the main concern of
the opinion was the danger to the morals of the children from their
mother's bad example.25
0
Jarrett, whether you agree or disagree with the outcome, was a
comparatively simple case. There seems to have been no objection to
either of the alternative households except that the mother and the
man living with her were not married to each other. A more compli-
cated case is presented when both households are problematic. In
another 1979 case, this one out of New Jersey, the mother was a les-
bian in a stable, open but unobtrusive relation with another woman,
and the father was a heterosexual of kinky tastes, married to a woman
who left nude photographs of herself around the house. 2 1 Faced
with cases like this, the courts have generally held that neither sexual
246 See TIvNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344 (West 1987 & Supp. 2000); State v. Dutton, 450
N.W.2d 189, 194 (Minn. 1990); see also CONN. GEN. STA.T. A.N. §§ 53A-71, 73a (West
1994 & Supp. 2000) (sexual assault in the second or fourth degree); Iow,% CoDE AN;.
§ 709-15 (West 1993) (sexual exploitation in a counseling relationship). If the sex act
takes place during or within a year after the relationship, Iowa punishes it whether or
not emotional dependence is shown. Id.
247 See Diane M. Allen, Annotation, Propridey of Provision of Custody or Visitation Order
Designed to Insulate Child from Parents Extramarital Sexual Relationhips, 40 A.LR.4th 812,
815-16 (1983); Annotation, Custodial Parent's Sexual Relations with Third Person asJusti-
fying Modification of Child Custody Order, 100 A.LR3d 625, 632-39 (1980); Caroll J.
Miller, Annotation, Vrsitation Rights of Homosexual or Lesbian Parents, 36 A.LRAth 997,
998 (1983); Elizabeth Trainor, Annotation, Initial Award or Denial of Child Custody to
Homosexual or Lesbian Parent, 62 A.L.5th 591, 601 (1998); Wanda L Wakefield, An-
notation, Initial Award or Denial of Child Custody to Homosexual or Lesbian Parent, 6
A.L.R.4th 1297, 1298-330 (1979).
248 400 N.E.2d 421 (IM. 1979).
249 1d. at 425-26.
250 Id. at 424-25.
251 M.P.v. S.P., 404A.2d 1256, 1257-58 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (aarding
custody to the mother).
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lifestyle nor any other single quality can be dispositive by itself in a
child custody or visitation case. 252 The Supreme Court of Illinois rein-
terpreted Jarrett along these lines only four years after deciding it."53
While most courts will not make sexual practices a per se disquali-
fication, they will not usually allow either custody or visitation in an
environment where those practices are obtrusively manifested to the
children. 254 Many courts seem especially concerned when the prac-
tices in question are homosexual.255 But it has been held that a court
cannot rely on "the real or imagined social stigma attaching to
Mother's status as a lesbian"256 in determining where to place a child.
The opinion refers to Palmore v. Sidoti257 in which the Supreme Court
held it was unconstitutional to base a custody decision on the social
stigma attached to an interracial marriage.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has characterized both homosex-
ual and heterosexual cohabitation as "immoral and illicit" and used
the characterization as a reason for protecting children from expo-
sure to it. "The father's continuous exposure of the child to his im-
moral and illicit relationship renders him an unfit and improper
custodian as a matter of law." 25
8
More often, though, the courts have studiously disclaimed any
form of moral discernment in their decision-making:
It is not for this court to determine what is moral or immoral in this
context. Nor do we do so. We merely recognize that in the
mother's view the moral welfare of the children is possibly endan-
gered if the trial judge's restriction is not upheld. We do not decide
whether the mother's views are correct or incorrect but she has a
rightful interest in the moral welfare of the children which is enti-
fled to respect. Further it must be acknowledged that her views are
not contrary to those of a substantial body of the community. We
cannot say that her apprehension that the moral welfare of the chil-
dren is threatened is arbitrary.
25 9
252 See In re Marriage of R.S., 677 N.E.2d 1297, 1311 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Fort v.
Fort, 425 N.E.2d 754, 757 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981); In re Custody of Temos, 450 A.2d
111, 122 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
253 In re Thompson, 449 N.E.2d 88, 93 (Ill. 1983).
254 See generally sources cited supra note 247.
255 See, e.g.,Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 80-82 (N.D. 1981); Constant A.
v. Paul CA, 496 A.2d 1, 4-8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
256 S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985).
257 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984).
258 Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) (homosexual); see Brown v. Brown,
237 S.E.2d 89, 92 (Va. 1977) (heterosexual).
259 DeVita v. DeVita, 366 A.2d 1350, 1354-55 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
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Or:
Our courts must serve a society comprised of groups that are widely
disparate in cultural background and moral and religious outlook.
The judges who must ultimately determine disputes over custody
have the same disparities of outlook as the society they serve. Obvi-
ously the individual judge cannot hold up his own moral and relig-
ious views as the standard against which he determines the moral
fitness of the proposed custodian, for different judges would make
conflicting determinations, and "the judicial branch of government
... would become a government of men and not of la s."
26°
In Kelly v. Kelly, another case out of New Jersey, the state that pro-
duced the first of the above quotations, a trial court provided for a
counselor to explain to the children involved in a visitation dispute
that their firmly Catholic mother and their cohabiting father, despite
their divergent moral standards, were equally worthy, of respect.
2 61
Some courts give a constitutional dimension to their custody and
visitation decisions.2 62 While the welfare of the children, if dearly
enough shown to be at stake, trumps the associational rights of either
parent, such courts require the showing to be strong and case-spe-
cific.2 63 A general disapproval of the lifestyle of one of the parents will
not suffice. Lifestyles are constitutionally protected, and a person can-
not be deprived of the society of his or her offspring simply for choos-
ing one.
2
In the Kelly case just referred to, a different constitutional ques-
tion came up when the Catholic mother invoked religious freedom to
keep her children from spending Saturday nights with their father
and the woman he was living with.265 As might have been expected,
this was a non-starter.2 66 The objection to calling for a counselor to
indoctrinate the children in the equal acceptability of both parents'
moral standards might have fared better, but it seems not to have
been raised.
260 Fort v. Fort, 425 N.E.2d 754, 757 (Mass. App. CL 1981) (quoting Reddington v.
Reddington, 59 N.E.2d 775, 778 (Mass. 1945)).
261 Kelly v. Kelly, 524 A.2d 1330, 1335 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986).
262 See Boswell v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662, 669 (Md. 1998) ("In accordance with the
Supreme Court, Maryland has declared that a parent's interest in raising a child is a
fundamental right that cannot be taken away unless dearly justified.").
263 See id- at 671 ("[uln making its written findings, the court is not allowed to
consider one factor, such as a parent's adultery or homosexuality, to the exclusion of
all others.").
264 See Schwantes v. Schwantes, 360 N.W.2d 69, 78 (WIS. Ct. App. 1984).
265 Kelly, 524 A.2d at 1332.
266 Id. at 1335-36.
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The reluctance of so many courts to concern themselves with the
morality of non-marital sex has had a good deal of impact on the legal
significance of being or not being married. I have already referred to
the cases on whether it is lawful to refuse to rent housing to unmar-
ried couples. 267 There is also a batch of cases upholding arrange-
ments made by such couples for the sharing of income or property,
departing from the traditional doctrine that any contract is void if il-
licit sex constitutes any part of the consideration and that it will be
presumed to be part of the consideration for any contract between
illicit lovers.268 Other cases have adopted a variety of conceptual ex-
pedients for adjusting the property rights of cohabitants fairly when
they have made no contracts on the subject.269
But the courts have not been willing to bring back common-law
marriage in the states (all but a few of them) where it has been abol-
ished. Property distribution schemes that resemble divorce too closely
have been repudiated by higher courts or by legislatures. 270 In a case
tendentiously labeled In re Marriage of Cary,271 one of the California
Courts of Appeal argued that denying marital remedies to long-term
cohabitants was punitive and therefore was no longer appropriate
with the advent of no-fault divorce. 272 In the leading case of Marvin v.
Marvin,273 the state Supreme Court rejected this approach in favor of
a contractual analysis.274 When the Supreme Court of Minnesota
adopted a flexible standard of fairness for dealing with former cohabi-
tants, 275 the legislature adopted a statute limiting the courts to the
enforcement of written contracts. 276 Provisions in a projected Quebec
Civil Code that would have created a status of de facto marriage failed
267 See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
268 E.g., Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141,146 (Mass. 1998); Margolies v. Hopkins,
514 N.E.2d 1079, 1081-82 (Mass. 1987); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 906
(NJ. 1979); Mullen v. Suchko, 421 A.2d 310, 312 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); see GREEN &
LONG, supra note 57, at 158-210 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
269 E.g., Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249, 254-55 (Minn. 1977); Connell v. Fran-
cisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (Wash. 1995); see GiRN & LONG, supra note 57, at 195-210.
270 See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 573.075-.076 (West 1980); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394
N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ill. 1979).
271 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (Ct. App. 1973).
272 Id. at 865.
273 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
274 Id. at 116.
275 Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249, 255 (Minn. 1977).
276 MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 573.075-.076 (West 1980).
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to get through the legislature. 277 The couple of cases that allowed a
cohabitant to recover for loss of consortium278 have been solidly repu-
diated by other courts that have considered the question.2 79 There
are unemployment compensation cases in Massachusetts and Califor-
nia holding that an unmarried woman who leaves herjob in order to
follow the man with whom she is living when he moves has not neces-
sarily quit "without good cause;" these too have not been generally
followed.28 0 A justice in the Massachusetts case said that he was not
willing to impose his "personal views on the rights of the parties and
the development of the law."21 But the more usual view is that ex-
pressed by an Illinois court that consigned non-marital cohabitation
to "a vast middle ground,... neither prohibited by the state nor pro-
tected against private disapprobation."28 2 The State, it said, adheres
to a "dichotomous public policy on cohabitation, which is to respect
'purely private relationships' without debasing 'public morality.'"283
Changing attitudes toward the difference between marital and
nonmarital sex have tended to undermine the old rule that a man
cannot be guilty of raping his own wife. Many States have now abol-
ished it. If it was a common-law rule, the courts have said they could
change it to go with the times.284 If it was a statutory rule, they have
found it unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.2
5 Sir Mat-
thew Hale, in the mid-seventeenth century, seriously obfuscated this
particular subject by saying in support of the marital exception that
the woman's consent, given at the time of the marriage, is irrevoca-
ble.28s This doctrine made it easy for the Supreme Court of New
277 See infra notes 526-28 and accompanying text; ef. William A. ReppyJr., Prop-
erty and Support Rights of Unmarred Cohabitants: A Proposalfor Creating a New Legal Status,
44 L4. L REv. 1677, 1716-22 (1984).
278 See Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078, 1079 (D.NJ. 1980); Butcherv.
Superior Court of Orange County, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503, 510-11 (Ct. App. 1983).
279 See Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, Action for Loss of Consortium Based on
Nonmarital Cohabitation, 40 A.LR.4th 553, 555 (1985).
280 See MacGregor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 689 P.2d 453, 457-59 (Cal.
1984); Reep v. Comm'r of Dep't of Employment and Training, 593 N.E.2d 1297, 1299
(Mass. 1992). I have found only one citation to either of these cases outside its home
state, and that was on a different matter and in a dissenting opinion.
281 Reep, 593 N.E.2d at 1301 (Liao, CJ., concurring).
282 Mister v. A.R.K. P'ship, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1158 (II1. App. Ct. 1990).
283 Id.
284 State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 45 (NJ. 1981); ichael G. Walsh, Annotation,
Criminal Responsibility of Husband for Rape, or Assault to Commit Rape, on lt7f, 24
A.LR.4th 105, 112-14 (1983 & Supp. 2000).
285 People v. M.D., 959 N.E.2d 702, 708-10 (IM. App. Ct. 1992); People v. Liberta,
474 N.E.2d 567, 572-75 (N.Y. 1984).
286 1 HALE, supra note 53, at *629.
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Jersey to wipe out the marital exception in 1981 by saying that if con-
sent was irrevocable in Hale's time, it was no longer so since the ad-
vent of no-fault divorce. 287 It has also made it easy for some feminist
commentators, with a good deal of historical exaggeration, to attri-
bute the exception to a general chattel status under which women
labored in patriarchal times.28
8
Hale's doctrine radically mistakes the nature of matrimonial con-
sent-in our time, in his time, or whenever you please. That consent
is to a continuing relationship of husband and wife. The right to sex-
ual intercourse is a characteristic-indeed a defining characteristic-
of the relationship, but the consent is to the relationship, not to any
specific sexual act. The right created by that consent, the debitum con-
jugale of traditional marriage doctrine, imposes a serious obligation
on either party to accede to any reasonable request of the other for
intercourse. 28 9 But the request has to be reasonable. Neither party is
obliged to have sex at inopportune times or places or with a spouse
who is drunk, unwashed, abusive, or unreasonably demanding.
Furthermore, even if the request is reasonable and the refusal
unreasonable, it does not follow that a husband may use force to as-
sert his right. The moralists advisedly refer to the situation as creating
a "debt."290 If a man owes me five dollars and refuses to pay, I am still
not allowed to throw him on the ground and shake the money out of
his pockets. I will be guilty of assault and battery. So will the husband
who forces himself on his wife, even if he cannot be guilty of rape.29'
To the extent that there is a legitimate basis for the marital excep-
tion in the laws against rape, it depends on a qualitative distinction
between marital and non-marital intercourse, a distinction that sub-
sists even when the marital intercourse is carried out through a battery
upon the wife. Such a distinction seems to be adumbrated in Black-
287 Smith, 426 A.2d at 42; accord R. v. R., 1 A.C. 599 (H.L. 1992).
288 See Emily R. Brown, Note, Changing the Marital Rape Exemption: IAm Chattel (F!);
Hear Me Roar, 18 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 657, 657-59 (1995).
289 See NICHOIAS HALLIGAN, Ti ADMINISTRATION OF THE SACRAMENTS 520 (1963);
J.L. Thomas, Marriage, Use of, 9 NEw CATHOLC ENCYCLOPEDIA 293, 293 (1967); 1 Corin-
thians 7:3. The term "debitum" is used in the Latin Vulgate text of Corinthians. The
traditional Catholic Douai version is the only English translation I know that uses the
corresponding "debt." The obligation is exactly the same for husband and wife; in
fact, St. Paul mentions the husband's obligation first: "Uxori vir debitum reddat, similiter
autem ut uxor viro." Id.
290 See, e.g., HALLIGAN, supra note 289, at 519-20.
291 SeeR. v. Miller, 2 Q.B. 282, 282 (1954). The court relies on Hale to establish
the right, then uses R. v. Jackson, 1 Q.B. 671 (C.A. 1891), a habeas corpus case, to
establish that the husband cannot use force to exercise his right. See Miller, 2 Q.B. at
285, 291.
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stone's reference to the victim as "dishonour[ed]" or "debauch(ed]"
by the rapist.292 Coke suggests a similar distinction in one place where
he defines rape as unlawful carnal knowledge without consent a3
(though in another place he uses a definition without that word). 
4
Perkins and other modem commentators rely on the word "unlawful"
as the basis for the marital exception,2 5 but Hale's rationale still has a
good deal of currency.296 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts in 1981 followed Perkins by holding that the legislature abolished
the marital exception when it omitted the word "unlawful" from its
new statutory definition of rape.297 The framers of the Model Penal
Code retained the exception as based on a qualitative distinction, but
they rested their distinction on psychological, rather than moral or
legal, grounds.298 Accordingly, they extended the exception to any
ongoing cohabitation, whether or not the parties were legally mar-
ried. I believe their approach has been pretty well demolished by the
judges and commentators who have pointed out that marriage and
cohabitation are both relations of trust.2 99 Because of the breach of
trust involved, carnal knowledge by force is worse, not better, than it
would be under other circumstances.300
So, if the exception is to stand, it must rest on a fundamental
philosophical distinction between marital and non-marital sex. That
distinction is real and important, but it does not really support the
exception. The cases where the exception is invoked are usually
292 4 Wnmui BLAcysroNE, Coomm'rARtEs *210.
293 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUES OF THE LkwS OF ENGLAND *60.
294 1 id. at *123-24.
295 See I RONALD A. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CMuInaL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 305
(1957); RoLuN M. PERKINS & RONA.D M. BoiCE, C.itNAL Lxw 202-03 (3d ed. 1982).
Only Perkins and Boyce explain the meaning of "unlawful," saying that all non-marital
intercourse is unlawful in the sense of disapproval by law, even if it is not criminal. &e
i&. Clark and Marshall cite only Hale, although they do not use his rationale. CLAmi,
& MARSHALL, supra note 31, at 755.
296 See State v. Smith, 372 A.2d 386, 388-89 (N.J. 1977); People v. Liberta, 474
N.E.2d 567, 572-75 (N.Y. 1984); R. v. L, 1992 A.C. 599 (H.L); DECRow, supra note
148, at 160.
297 See Commonwealth v. Chrdtien, 417 N.E.2d 1203, 1207 (Mass. 1981).
298 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1974). The commentary calls Hale's rationale
"traditional"-which it is not-rejects it, then says that the use of the term "unlav~ful"
begs the question-evidently on the theory that nothing can be unlawful unless a
statute forbids it. Id. § 213.1, cmt. n.8(c). On rape of an unmarried cohabitant, see
id § 213.6(2) & cmt. n.3.
299 See DIAA RUSSE.LL, RAPE IN MARRIcE 269 (2d ed. 1990).
300 See id. at 191-95.
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gross301 They can result in heavy sentences for battery, but such
sentences often seem inadequate to the indignation the cases inspire.
In any event, the erosion of the philosophical distinction has made it
easier for both courts and legislatures to abolish the exception.
The distinction between children with parents married to each
other and other children (who have been gradually upgraded termi-
nologically from "bastards" to "illegitimate children" to "nonmarital
children") was found constitutionally suspect in Levy v. Louisiana
(1968),302 although later cases indicated that it was not to be entirely
abandoned.303 Stanley v. illinois (1972) established also that unwed
fathers have a constitutional right not to be left entirely out of ac-
count.30 4 As we have seen, the old concept of filius nullius has long
been abandoned as regards unwed mothers. The fact that there is no
problem identifying the mother certainly played a part in the aban-
donment. There is now a technology available that can identify the
father with almost the same accuracy. Still, the technology has to be
invoked. Paternity, unlike maternity, is not immediately obvious to
everyone present at the birth of the child. Accordingly, both statutes
and cases have tended to make the father's rights depend on some
manifestation of intention to become involved in the child's life.
Some States require this manifestation to take the form of an official
acknowledgment of some kind; others are content with actual partici-
pation in the rearing of the child.30
According to a highly controversial Supreme Court decision, the
rights of an unwed father may still be limited by the common-law pre-
sumption that a child conceived during a subsisting marriage is that of
the mother's husband.30 6 Some States have modified the presump-
tion in one way or another, although they are still free to retain it.507
The most troubling of the unwed father cases is the one where
the father does not learn of the child, because the mother does not
tell him. He comes forward as soon as he finds out and wants to assert
301 Chraien, 417 N.E.2d 1203, State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38 (N.J. 1981), and Liberia,
474 N.E.2d 567, all qualify.
302 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968); see also In re Succession of Thompson, 367 So. 2d 796,
798-800 (La. 1979) (holding a statute that excluded acknowledged illegitimate chl-
dren from sharing succession with legitimate children to violate the state
constitution).
303 See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SusAN FREuLcH APPLETON, MODERN FAMiLY LAv
511-12 (1998).
304 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
305 See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 4 (1987); Adoption of Michael H., 898 P.2d
891, 895 (Cal. 1995); WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 303, at 528-34.
306 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 115 (1989).
307 See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 303, at 533-34.
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his right to be involved in the child's life. If he comes soon enough,
he can often block or even set aside an adoption, with devastating
effect on the adoptive parents, who have already bonded with the
child.308 For my part, I think the cases give the father more rights
than he deserves. If a man's relation with a sex partner is so tenuous
that she can carry a child to term without his finding out, it would
seem that his choice of non-involvement has already been made.
A line of cases beginning with King v. Smith (1968) s w has estab-
lished that welfare benefits cannot be denied to a child for illegiti-
macy or to a parent for immorality.310 On the whole, this continues to
be the law, despite recent statutory tightening of eligibility. Congress
has adopted financial incentives for the States to reduce the percent-
age of illegitimate births among their inhabitants; 311 how the States
will go about earning the money has yet to be seen.
Prostitution remains illegal everywhere in the United States ex-
cept for a few counties in Nevada.312 In 1972, two resourceful Ge-
orgetown Law School students persuaded a District of Columbia trial
judge that the whole line of anti-prostitution laws was unconstitu-
tional-the act protected by privacy, the solicitation by free speech.313
The decision was solidly reversed.
314
308 See In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182 (Ill. 1994); In re B.G.C., 496
N.V.2d 239, 246 (Iowa 1992). If a long enough time elapses, the father will be pre-
cluded even if he could not have learned of the child any sooner. Robert 0. v. Russell
K., 604 N.E.2d 99, 103 (N.Y. 1992); In re Baby Boy K., 546 N.W.2d 86, 89 (S.D. 1996).
The long lapses of time in B.G.C. and Doe were due to the efforts of the adoptive
parents to defeat the father's claim through appeals. Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 182; B.G.C,
496 N.W.2d at 240-41, 246. In both cases, the father had appeared within two
months of the child's birth. Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 182; B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241.
Where to draw the line between the supposed rights of the biological father and the
need for stability in the adoptive family has puzzled some commentators. See Irm
MARK EL.mAN ET AL., FAuLY LAW 1083-86 (1998).
309 392 U.S. 309, 326-27 (1968).
310 See Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 554 (1970) (holding that the income of a
man not married to the mother of dependant children does not count towards wel-
fare calculations); cf. Thomas v. Hous. Auth., 282 F. Supp. 575, 580 (E.D. Ark. 1967)
(stating that exclusion of unwed mothers from public housing is not permissible).
311 See 42 U.S.C. § 603(a) (2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
312 The Nevada legislation legalizing prostitution on a local option basis is some-
what indirect in form. See NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. 201.354, 244.345 (Michie 1997);
Kuban v. McGimsey, 605 P.2d 623, 625-26 (Nev. 1980); Nye County v. Plankinton,
587 P.2d 421, 423 (Nev. 1978).
313 United States v. Moses, 339 A.2d 46, 50-51 (D.C. 1975).
314 See id at 55; BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., SLx DzscmMtrwmo.,n AND THE L~w
911-12 (1975).
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But the Mann Act has been a good deal attenuated. The old idea
that one could violate the Act by introducing a woman into a morally
subversive environment seems to have gotten no further play after the
Calumet City cases referred to earlier.315 By the 1980s, the Caminelti
rule that non-commercial illicit sex could be an "other immoral pur-
pose" within the meaning of the Act was being treated as obsolete.316
In 1986, Congress amended the Act to put it into gender-inclusive
form.317 It now prohibits transporting anybody interstate "to engage
in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be
charged with a criminal offense."318 It would seem that as worded it
now applies to transporting customers as well as to transporting prosti-
tutes. I suppose its application to transportation for non-commercial
sex in a state where fornication or adultery are still offenses will de-
pend on the words "can be charged." Do they refer to the wording of
the statute book or to the practice of police and prosecutors? As the
federal authorities are not apt to take such a case to court, we will
probably never find out. Note that prostitution is separately enumer-
ated: recruiting outside Nevada for the legalized brothels of that state
is still a violation.
319
The law concerning rape has developed ambiguously with a shift
of emphasis from the chastity of the victim to her autonomy. Obvi-
ously, rape is an affront to the autonomy of the victim, her power to
choose when, where, and with whom she will be intimate. Strictly
speaking, it does not affect her chastity, because that is a moral virtue
and can be affected only by something she does on purpose. But we
can call rape an "affront" to chastity in that what it imposes by force
would be unchaste if it were voluntarily accepted. It is, I believe, this
understanding of the affront to chastity that is responsible for the
marital exception, which I discussed earlier, and it is the increased
focus on the affront to autonomy that has led to the abandonment of
that exception.
Other consequences of the shift are more subtle and also more
important. The most familiar one concerns the treatment of the vic-
tim's sexual history in a rape trial. As I have already pointed out, the
unchastity of the victim has never been a defense to a charge of rape.
315 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
316 SeeNL Indus. v. Gulf& W., Inc., 650 F. Supp. 1115, 1125-26 (D. Kan. 1986).
317 Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 5, 100
Stat. 3510, 3511 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998)) (amending the Mann Act).
318 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
319 Id.; United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701, 710-11 (8th Cir. 1978).
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Bracton, Hale, and Blackstone are unanimous on the point.32 0 Judges
and commentators were concerned not so much with a woman's right
to pick her occasions for being unchaste as with her right, even at the
last minute, to reform. In one case from North Carolina, decided in
1885, the victim had offered to accommodate the perpetrator for ten
cents.3 21 The court, in convicting him for trying to have his way with-
out paying, said "the law allows a 'locus penitentia'"
322
On the other hand, the law was not quick to assume that the wo-
man who needed a locus penitentiae had in fact taken advantage of it.
As an 1838 New York case (by no means the best reasoned, but for
obvious reasons the most widely quoted) put it, "[W]ill you not more
readily infer assent in the practised Messalina, in loose attire, than in
the reserved and virtuous Lucretia?"
323
The court goes on to cite cases in which evidence had been re-
ceived that the alleged victim was either a common prostitute or the
mistress of the accused; by analogy, it justifies receiving evidence of
other unchaste acts.
[T] here is not so much probability that a common prostitute or the
prisoner's concubine would withhold her assent, as one less de-
praved; and may I not ask, does not the same probable distinction
arise between one who has already submitted herself to the lewd
embraces of another, and the coy and modest female, severely chaste
and instinctively shuddering at the thought of impurity? Shall I be
answered that both are under the protection of the law? That I ad-
mit, and so are the common prostitute and equally the concubine.
If either have in truth been feloniously ravished, the punishment is
the same, but the proof is quite different. It requires that stronger
evidence be added to the oath of the prosecutrix, in one case than
in the other. Shall I be answered that an isolated instance of crimi-
nal connection does not make a common prostitute? I answer, yes: it
only makes a prostitute, and I admit introduces a circumstance into
the case of less moment; but the question is not whether it be of
more or less pei.asive force, it is one of competency; in other words,
whether it be of any force at all.
324
These sentiments seem to have been regarded as good law well
into the 1970s. When the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted in
320 4 BiAc1s-roNE, supra note 292, at *213; 2 HENRY BLucroN, ON THE Lms AND
CusroMs OF ENGLAND 415 (George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1963);
1 HALE, supra note 53, at *633-34 n.10.
321 State v. Long, 93 N.C. 510, 511-12 (1885).
322 Id, at 512.
323 People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192, 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
324 Id. at 196.
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1975, they furnished an illustration for the provision of Rule
404(a) (2), admitting "[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the victim of a crime offered by the accused or by the prosecution to
rebut the same."
3 25
With this kind of evidence available, a zealous and resourceful
defense attorney could often turn a rape trial into a trial of the victim,
and most thought it their duty to do so if they could. Here was an
obvious grievance for the revived feminist movement of the 1970s to
take in hand.3 26 By the end of the decade, "rape shield" laws restrict-
ing the use of the victim's sexual history in a rape trial were in place
almost everywhere.3 27 Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, pre-
cluding the application to rape cases of the quoted language of Rule
404, was adopted a scant three years after that language was adopted
with rape cases in mind.3 2
8
The main rationale for the now discredited use of the victim's
unchastity as evidence of consent seems to have been a worry-almost
paranoid in Wigmore's case-about the danger of false accusations.3 20
Such accusations were evidently felt to be so prevalent and so hard to
refute that no possibly exculpatory inference, however tenuous,
should be ruled out. This reasoning gains some support from the old
saw that it is better for ten thousand guilty men to go free than for
one innocent man to be convicted. I am not sure that this principle
can be accepted without qualification, nor am I sure that the typical
man who avoids a rape charge by showing consent is quite what is
envisaged by the term "innocent." But the principle was conventional
325 FED. R. EvID. 404(a) (2).
326 See Berger, supra note 55, at 12.
327 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (1975); MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 233, § 21B (Law
Co-op. 1977).
328 The volume of U.S.C.A. containing these rules has the Advisory Committee's
reference to "consent in case of rape" in its Notes on Rule 404(a) (2) and an excerpt
from the Congressional Record in its Note on Rule 412. See FED. R. EvID. 404(a) (2),
Advisory Committee Note; FED. R. EvID. 412, Historical Note.
329 See 3A WIGMORE, supra note 154, at 736.
The unchaste ... mentality finds incidental but direct expression in the
narration of imaginary sex incidents of which the narrator is the heroine or
the victim .... The real victim, however, too often in such cases is the
innocent man; for the respect and sympathy naturally felt by any tribunal for
a wronged female helps to give easy credit to such a plausible tale.
Id. For further examples of Wigmore's view, see 1 id. at 1312-34, 1602-05, 1860; 3A
id. at 736-47. Tillers is judicious in his explanation of Wigmore's attitude. SeeJolIN
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 1259-332 (Peter Tillers ed,,
1983). Ploscowe is almost as worried as Wigmore about false accusations. See PLOS.
cowE, supra note 26, at 187-94.
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wisdom until the 1970s, and except in rape cases it is conventional
wisdom still.
But there is another attitude, one less often articulated, behind
this probing of the victim's morals. It is based on the severity of the
punishment for rape. If you believe that the purpose of the law
against rape is to protect the chastity of the victim, you may object to
imposing twice the sentence that would be imposed for two black eyes
and a broken arm when the victim seems not to value her chastity that
high. Ploscowe puts it this way, referring to a date that turned into a
rape, "Even if sufficient resistance to indicate lack of consent were
present here, the enormity of sentencing this man to twenty-five years
of imprisonment when the woman practically invited the incident by
drinking with him in a lonely tourist cabin becomes dearly
apparent."330
It is less apparent if your primary concern is with autonomy
rather than chastity. Sexual autonomy has a profound place in a per-
son's humanity, even if she fails to use it well. If Messalina chooses to
be profligate, she is still entitled to choose with whom she will be prof-
ligate. She no more invites rape by drinking with a man in a tourist
cabin than she invites theft by leaving her purse on the table while she
drinks.
The emphasis on autonomy has also caused a shift in doctrine
regarding the amount of resistance a woman has to put up in order to
claim that what occurred was against her will. Despite nineteenth cen-
tury romances and melodramas, a woman has never been expected to
defend her honor at serious risk to her life. But courts generally
looked for such resistance as the relative strength of the parties per-
mitted, as well as prompt resort to any chance of escape that
presented itself.35 ' In the more recent cases, courts have tended to be
content with any kind of objective manifestation that the woman did
not wish this particular sexuxal encounter to take place.3 3 2 The shift in
attitude has often been taken up by legislatures redefining the crime
of rape and sometimes renaming it (for example, "sexual battery")sS
as well. In one case it was held that the statutory crime would be com-
mitted whenever there was sexual penetration without some affirma-
tive manifestation of consenLa 34
330 PLoscowE, supra note 26, at 174.
331 See id at 169-74.
332 See SANFORD H. KADISH ET At, CImzAL Lw AND ITS PROCESSES 382-34 (4th
ed. 1983); Berger, supra note 55, at 10-12.
333 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794 (West 2000).
334 In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1279 (NJ. 1992).
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This development has been supported by a perception that rape
is a crime like any other and that the conduct of the perpetrator, not
that of the victim, should be the focus of inquiry. The woman's will-
ingness to bestow her sexual favors should have neither more nor less
significance in a rape case than the owner's willingness to give away
the property would have in a larceny case. And the same kind of
proof should be used in the one case as in the other. A woman does
not have to fight tooth and nail against a purse snatcher to avoid the
inference that he took her purse with her permission.
Shifting attention from the victim to the perpetrator has had one
unfortunate consequence. It has led to the doctrine that an honest
belief that the woman consents will absolve the man even if in fact she
does not. This doctrine has been a substantial boon to men who be-
lieve either that they are irresistible to women or that only strumpets
are out and about after midnight. Judging from the law reports, there
are more such men than one might have supposed.
I have not been able to trace this doctrine any farther back than
People v. Maybery (California, 1975)335 and Regina v. Morgan (England,
1976).336 Mayberry grabbed a woman walking by on the street-a
complete stranger to him-dragged her to his apartment and had sex
with her, beating her whenever she showed signs of resistance 337 The
only evidence of consent on her part was that on the way to the apart-
ment she let pass a couple of occasions when, if she had kept her wits
about her, she might have escaped or been rescued.338 Mayberry
asked for an instruction that the jury was to acquit him if he had a
reasonable and genuine belief that she had consented. 3 9 Because
the trial court refused this instruction, his conviction was reversed.3 40
The House of Lords in Morgan held that the perpetrator's belief in
the victim's consent need not even be reasonable to acquit him.3 4 1
The farthest I found any earlier cases going was to say that con-
sent could be implied as well as express and that a woman might by
her actions lead a reasonable man to think she was consenting even if
she was not.3 42 But if a woman put up the quantum of resistance that
the courts until recently required to establish rape, it would be very
335 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975).
336 1976 A.C. 182 (H.L.).
337 Maybeny, 542 P.2d at 1340-41.
338 Id. at 1340-42.
339 Id. at 1344.
340 Id. at 1340, 1349.
341 Morgan, 1976 A.C. at 187.
342 Taylor v. State, 30 So. 2d 256, 260 (Ala. 1947); cf Stringer v. State, 5 SW.2d
526, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1928) (refusing to pass, on facts as favorable to the defen-
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unlikely for anyone to suppose she was consenting. It was the re-
shaping of the requirement of resistance that made it possible for a
sufficiently egotistical male to mistake genuine nonconsent for mere
coyness or feigned reluctance.
The cases before Maybery and Morgan that passed on the effect of
real mistakes were those involving "statutory rape"-intercourse with a
girl too young to give a legally effective consent. It was almost univer-
sally held that a good faith belief that the girl was old enough would
not be a defense.343 Cases on the point begin with Regina v. Prince
(England, 1875)3" and include two California cases, People v. Ratz
(1896)3 and People v. Griffin (1897).346 The problem in such cases
was whether the accused had the requisite mens rea (guilty mind) to go
with the actus reus (criminal act). The defense view in inens rea cases is
that the accused will not be guilty unless the bad intent embraces
every element of the crime; hence, if he does not know that one of the
elements obtains, he cannot have the bad intent. But the courts in
these cases held that a person who does one bad thing intentionally
cannot complain if it turns out to be even worse than he supposed.3
47
Accordingly, the intention to commit fornication or adultery supplies
the necessary mens rea to convict a man of statutory rape. "He who
engages in such enterprises is committing a moral wrong, for which
there can be neither palliation nor excuse. The illegal motive is pre-
sent, and that illegal motive becomes a criminal intent when the facts,
at whose peril he acts, are shown to exist."348
In People v. Hernandez (1964),349 the Supreme Court of California
overruled Ratz and Griffin and held that a good faith belief that the
girl was old enough would be a defense in a statutory rape case be-
cause it showed absence of mens rea. "If he participates in a mutual act
of sexual intercourse, believing his partner to be beyond the age of
consent, with reasonable grounds for such belief, where is his criminal
intent?"35 0 The doctrine of the earlier cases, that the intent to com-
mit fornication or adultery constitutes the mens rea, is not even
mentioned.
dant as those in May'beny, on whether belief in consent would be a defense; finding no
adequate evidence of such belief).
343 See PLoscowvE, supra note 26, at 184-85.
344 2 L.R.-C.C.R. 154 (Eng. 1875).
345 46 P. 915 (Cal. 1896).
346 49 P. 711 (Cal. 1897).
347 See, eg., id. at 712.
348 Id.
349 393 P.2d 673, 677-78 (Cal. 1964).
350 I& at 676.
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Mayberry, in turn, is supported by Hernandez. In both cases, if the
accused does not intend some other criminal or at least immoral act,
he must intend every element of the crime for which he is on trial. If
a growth in permissiveness has taken consensual sex out of the realm
of legally recognized immorality, then the forcible rapist must intend
to disregard his victim's lack of consent just as the statutory rapist
must intend to disregard her lack of full age. One of the Law Lords in
Morgan makes the point explicitly:
No doubt a rapist, who mistakenly believes that the woman is con-
senting to intercourse, must be behaving immorally, by committing
fornication or adultery. But those forms of immoral conduct are
not intended to be struck at by the law against rape; indeed, they
are not now considered appropriate to be visited with penalties of
the criminal law at all. There seems therefore to be no reason why
they should affect the consequences of the mistaken belief.
35 '
The Morgan defendants got no benefit from their trip to the
House of Lords. The Lords decided that on the facts of the case a
reasonable jury could not have acquitted the defendants even on the
instruction that ought to have been given.35 2 But Mayberry's convic-
tion was reversed, and he was not retried.35 3 The case is a severe mis-
carriage of justice. Courts have since mitigated its effect by holding
that the "Maybeny instruction" need not be given unless there is some
evidence of equivocal conduct by the victim. 3 54 If she says he beat her
up, and he says she was an eager participant, there is no place for an
inference that he had an honest but mistaken belief that she con-
sented. But there are still cases where the Mayberny doctrine lets peo-
ple off who should be punished,355 and more where it complicates
prosecutions that should be simple.35 6
351 R. v. Morgan, [1976] AC. 182, 238 (H.L.).
352 Id. at 235.
353 See People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1349 (Cal. 1975). I am indebted to
William Baldwin of the Alameda County District Attorney's office for assembling this
information for me. He adds that Mayberry was sentenced to from two to twelve years
on the conviction of consensual oral sex that stood after the rape conviction was re-
versed. He was released in 1976. In the same year, CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a (West
1976), covering oral sex, was amended to eliminate punishment for acts between con-
senting adults. 1975 Cal. Stat. 134 (codified as amended in CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a
(West 1976)).
354 See, e.g., People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961, 965-68 (Cal. 1992).
355 See, e.g., People v. Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315, 325-28 (Ct. App. 2000) (rape
conviction reversed due to defendant's belief that the victim was not too intoxicated
to consent).
356 See, e.g., Williams, 841 P.2d at 965-68.
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The emphasis on autonomy has had an uncertain effect on wo-
men who exercise their autonomy in favor of being chaste. Tradition-
ally, the law of evidence recognized a presumption that people behave
both morally and legally.35 7 It was therefore presumed in the absence
of evidence to the contrary that a woman was chaste. So, in a rape
case, unless the defendant introduced the issue of consent either in
his own testimony or in his cross-examination of the victim, there was
no need for the prosecution to present evidence of her chastity, and
such evidence would generally be excluded as gratuitously provoca-
tive.3 58 On the other hand, if the defendant claimed that the victim
had consented to the encounter, it wvas open to the prosecution to
refute the claim by showing that she was chaste.359 The defendant, of
course, could then rebut the refutation by showing that she ias not.
The exact relation between presumptions and burden of proof in
a criminal case is difficult to explain (or, indeed, to understand), but
the general principle is that the presumption that the defendant is
innocent trumps all others. Thus, when a trial judge, relying on the
presumption of chastity, told the jury that a man accused of rape had
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the complaining
witness consented, he was reversed. 360 If a defendant wishes to show
consent, the presumption of chastity may require him to bring for-
ward evidence on the point, but once he does bring it forward, the
prosecution must refute it beyond a reasonable doubt. To do so, they
may bring forth evidence of chastity to strengthen the presumption,
but they still have to prove this element of their case-lack of con-
sent-like all the others, beyond a reasonable doubt.
The courts are in serious disagreement over the effect of the rape
shield laws on an offer of evidence that the victim is chaste. These
laws are generally worded to preclude evidence of past sexual con-
duct. One or two courts have pointed out that they say nothing about
evidence of the lack of such conduct;361 others regard this distinction
as pettifogging.36 2 Some courts find that neither past profligacy nor
357 Se e.g., People v. Nieglos, 137 N.E. 400, 401 (M1. 1922); People v. Stephens,
310 N.E.2d 824, 831 (Mll. App. Ct. 1974).
358 See Niteglos, 137 N.E. at 402; Stephens, 310 N.E.2d at 831-32.
359 See eg., United States v. Copeland, 21 C.M.R. 838, 868-72 (A.F.B.R. 1956);
Stephens, 310 N.E.2d at 831-32; State v. Aveen, 169 N.W.2d 749, 751 (Minn. 1969).
360 People v. O'Brien, 62 P. 297, 299-300 (Cal. 1900).
361 See United States v. Duncan, 855 F.2d 1528, 1533-35 (11th Cir. 1988); People
v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
362 See Gov't v. Jacobs, 634 F. Supp. 933, 936-37 (D.V.I. 1986); State v. Gavigan,
330 N.W.2d 571, 579-80 (Wis. 1983); CHRIrOPHER B. ME.ER & LvRa C. KItPAT.
RAcK, EvmENc § 4.15 (1995).
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past continence is relevant to behavior on a particular occasion; on
this rationale, they forbid evidence either way.s3a Others find the evi-
dence relevant but too inflammatory to be introduced; they are more
apt to let chastity in while keeping unchastity out.364
No one has made much of the difference in verbal nuances be-
tween one set of rules and another. A 1994 amendment to Rule 412
of the Federal Rules of Evidence added "sexual predisposition" to
"sexual behavior" in its category of excluded evidence. 6 If chastity is
not a form of sexual behavior, is it a form of sexual predisposition?
No one has yet raised the question in a reported case. Rule 404 pre-
cludes evidence of a trait of character "for the purpose of proving
action in conformity therewith"3 66 subject to certain exceptions, one
of which is "evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of a
crime, offered by the accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same."3 67 This would seem to preclude evidence of the chastity of the
victim unless the defense has already offered evidence of unchastity,
which under Rule 412 it cannot generally do. Or is chastity a habit
rather than a trait of character? If it is, it can be introduced under
Rule 406.368
Evidence that the victim was a virgin at the time of the encounter
generally finds its way in by one route or another,3 69 although two
courts have held it definitely inadmissible.370 Courts that let it in
sometimes say that it involves a present condition, physical, psycholog-
ical, or both, rather than a pattern of past conduct.3 7 1 In some cases
also, the evidence comes in obliquely, through medical testimony re-
garding a recent rupture of the hymen or in reports of what the victim
said in remonstrating with the defendant.37 2
363 SeeJacobs, 634 F. Supp. at 937.
364 See Johnson, 671 P.2d at 1020; Stephens, 310 N.E.2d at 830-31; State v. Forrester,
440 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ind. 1982).
365 FED. R. Evm. 412.
366 FED. R. EVID. 404.
367 Id.
368 FED. R. EVID. 406.
369 E.g., State v. Preston, 427 A.2d 32, 33 (N.H. 1981); seeDag E. Ytreberg, Annota-
tion, Admissibility of Prosecution Evidence on Issue of Consent, That Rape Victim Was a Vir.
gin, Absent Defense Attack on her Chastity, 35 A.L.R.3d 1452, 1452-54 (1971 & Supp.
2000).
370 See Gov't v. Jacobs, 634 F. Supp. 933, 936-37 (D.V.I. 1986); State v. Gavigan,
330 N.W.2d 571, 579-80 (Wis. 1983).
371 E.g., Jenkins v. State, 283 S.E.2d 49, 50 (Ga. 1981).
372 See People v. Stephens, 310 N.E.2d 824, 827 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (hymen); State
v. Forrester, 440 N.E.2d 475, 486 (Ind. 1982) (same); State v. Singleton, 691 P.2d 67,
70 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (remonstration).
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It has been argued that there will not be a level playing field if the
prosecution can introduce evidence that the victim is chaste, while the
defense is barred by the rape shield law from introducing evidence
that she is not.373 The defense in Michael Tyson's celebrated case
filed a pretrial motion "to allow reference to D.W.'s alleged prior sex-
ual conduct if the State referred to D.W.'s adherence to Christian
principles, her lack of sexual experience, or her lack of receptiveness
to sexual relations."3 74 This motion was denied.3 75 On appeal, Tyson
claimed
that the State's examination of D.W., as well as its opening and dos-
ing arguments, left the jury with the impression that D.W. was a
"sexual innocent whose religious beliefs prohibited any premarital
sex and who was far too naive to understand the implications of
going to Tyson's hotel room in the middle of the night"... and he
should have been able to challenge this impression by cross-examin-
ing her about her sexual history.3 76
The court was not persuaded.
Assuming the testimony has some probative value in aid of the the-
ory that D.W. was not as sexually innocent as Tyson argues the State
suggested, "the legislature has made the determination that evi-
dence of prior sexual history, though arguably releant... is not
admissible except for three strictly limited purposes."
377
I believe it does stand to reason that the rape shield laws should
not be interpreted symmetrically. The fact that certain kinds of be-
havior, whatever they are, are morally, psychologically, or even estheti-
cally repugnant to a person would seem to be some evidence that she
did not willingly engage in any of those kinds of behavior on a particu-
lar occasion. But the fact that she does not find a certain kind of
behavior repugnant is no evidence at all that she did engage in it. So
the rationale of the rape shield laws would seem not to preclude evi-
dence that a complaining witness is chaste, is faithful to one lover, or
373 Johnson v. State, 246 S.E.2d 363, 365 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978), uses this reasoning to
exclude evidence of the victim's chastity. Other cases or statutes create an exception
to the rape shield law to allow the defense to refute evidence of chastity raised by the
prosecution. See, e.g., NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. 50.090 (Michie 1997); State v. Williams,
477 N.E.2d 221, 228 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (permitting testimony to refute the ictim's
testimony that she would not have consented to the male defendant because she was
exclusively homosexual).
374 Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d 276, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
375 Id.
376 Id.
377 Id at 290 n.15 (quoting Kelly v. State, 586 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Ind. Ct. App.
1992)).
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believes in waiting until the third date. On the other hand, I have
some trouble answering the argument made on Tyson's behalf that
any evidence that can be legitimately introduced can be legitimately
refuted. Perhaps the solution is to leave it up to the prosecution with
the concurrence of the victim to decide whether or not to bring her
sexual standards into evidence and, if the decision is in favor of bring-
ing them in, to suspend the operation of the rape shield laws to the
extent necessary to admit a fair refutation if there is one.
The growth of gender integration in the workplace has given rise
to an almost entirely new field of legal concern-"sexual harass-
ment."3 78 A computer search indicates that this term made its first
appearance in the law reports in 1976.379 It applies to two different
kinds of mistreatment. One, "quid pro quo" harassment, involves
making promotion, other favorable working conditions, or even con-
tinued employment conditional on sexual favors.380 "Hostile environ-
ment" harassment occurs when either the treatment of the person
complaining or the general level of social discourse is so obscenely,
vulgarly, or obsessively sexual as to be a source of discomfort orjustifl-
able offense.38' Both forms are now recognized as violating state and
federal laws against gender discrimination. They can also give rise to
tort actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress and, if the
facts include an offensive touching, battery. In some but not all states,
if quid pro quo harassment is carried to the point of fixing the victim
for noncompliance, there may also be a tort of wrongful discharge.38 2
If the victim is injured or made sick by the treatment, there may also
be a workers' compensation claim.38 3 In some states, either that or
the discrimination claim, is apt to supersede the emotional distress
378 The seminal book on the subject is CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASS.
MENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979). SeeJeffrey Toobin, The Trouble With Sex, THE NtLw
YoRKER, Feb. 9, 1998, at 48, for a somewhat tendentious account of the development
of the law on the subject during the 1970s and the part Professor MacKinnon played
in that development.
379 See Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 71, 77 (E.D. La. 1976). According
to Toobin the term was first used at a conference in 1975. Toobin, supra note 378, at
50.
380 See MAcKNNON, supra note 378, at 32-40.
381 Id. at 40-47.
382 See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551-52 (N.H. 1974). Con.
tra Ponton v. Scarfone, 468 So. 2d 1009, 1010 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
383 6 ARTHUR LARSON & LEx LAMSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
§ 104.05[4] (1999).
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tort-but probably not the battery.384 The tort claims are triable by
jury; the others are not.
The nuances of these legal dispositions have given rise to a sub-
stantial literature which I have no wish to augment. What I will try to
do instead is relate the whole subject to the other legal developments
we have been considering. The important question in this regard is
whether the problem the law is addressing wvasjust as acute before the
law started addressing it, or whether the legal restraints have been
adopted to fill a gap left by social restraints that are no longer in
place. It is a little hard to arrive at an answer, because the available
historical material seems to peter out just at the beginning of the pe-
riod we have to examine, then to start up again with a vengeance just
at the end. Kerry Segrave's The Sexual Harassment of Women in the Work-
place, 1600 to 1993,385 which appears to be exhaustive, has numerous
instances of women industrial and clerical workers being harassed in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Also, the handful of
women in professional and managerial positions at the time were evi-
dently placed in embarrassing situations on occasion by male col-
leagues who resented their presence. For instance, a woman M.D.,
licensed in 1902, thought it was no coincidence that she was assigned
to catheterize male patients her first day on the job in a hospital.?
But Segrave finds no instances of women of that class being subjected
either to physical abuse or to demands for sexual favors, as working
class women were.
From 1950 to 1970, Segrave comes up with nothing beyond a sur-
vey of 107 working women in 1963 in which some of them complained
of "fresh men" and "wolves,"387 both terms too broad to support any
particular conclusion. By the early seventies, the pace picks up again,
and Segrave has ample evidence of every kind of harassment.usa By
the time Catharine MacKinnon published the first law book on the
subject in 1979,m9 most kinds had found their way also into the
courts. These cases appear to be continuing almost unabated, even
384 See &g., Godfrey v. Perkin-Elmer Co., 794 F. Supp. 1179, 1187-90 (D.N.H.
1992) (workers' compensation); Greenland v. Fairtron Corp., 500 N.W.2d 36, 38
(Iowa 1993) (civil rights act). Action against the employer may also be preempted by
a union grievance procedure. SeeJohnson v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 885,
888-89 (M.D.N.C. 1989).
385 KERRY SEGRAvE, THE SExuAL HARASS.iENT OF WoMEN IN THE WoRwPLAcE, 1600
TO 1993 (1994).
386 I& at 171.
387 I& at 198.
388 See SEGRAVE, supra note 385, at 198-215.
389 N oAcKwNN, supra note 378.
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though by now they have cost some employers heavy damages and
legal fees. They are much less class specific than the earlier examples.
Intentional-even effortful, and sometimes ingenious-creation of an
offensive environment; demanding sex on penalty of being fired, de-
moted, or given disagreeable jobs; rubbing, pawing, and indecent ex-
posure are now complained of at every level of the working
environment and at every level of the working population.
We cannot take the absence of complaints as evidence that none
of this was going on in the fifties or sixties. Even with legal redress
available, complaining is often futile and often leads to retaliation.
This was even more the case in the earlier period Segrave takes up. So
it cannot be inferred from nobody complaining that there was noth-
ing to complain about. Even so, I cannot believe that the kinds of
harassment that began appearing in the law reports during the seven-
ties were going on beneath the surface to any great extent during the
previous decades. I was out of college and working throughout the
period, and I am confident that a man could not with impunity-or,
indeed, without being considered out of his mind-have assumed
without asking that a woman associate on a business trip would share a
hotel room with him390 or have grabbed the breasts or buttocks of a
woman fellow worker merely because she happened to be within
reach. 391 And a man who made a habit of firing competent secretar-
ies because they would not go to bed With him would soon have found
out how hard it was to succeed in business without a competent
secretary.
I believe, therefore, that there has been an evolution. To shed
some light on the form it has taken, let us compare the rationaliza-
tions, explanations, and excuses that were being offered for the har-
assment that Segrave found in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries with the ones that have been current since the 1970s. In
1890 or 1920, women who were propositioned by employers or super-
visors and said no were told that if they did not comply their jobs
could be given to others who would.392 Women who complained of
being grabbed or groped were disbelieved, were told that they must
have provoked the treatment, or were told that keeping males at bay
was a woman's personal problem, of no concern to her employer. 393
In 1980 or 1990, women who were propositioned and said no were
390 Id. at 33-34, 73-74; cf. PosT, supra note 9, at 555-58.
391 See Brown v. Ford, 905 P.2d 223, 226 (Okla. 1995); MACKINNON, supra note
378, at 74-75; SEGRAVE, supra note 385, at 225-26.
392 SEGRAVE, supra note 385, at 61-66.
393 Id. at 112-13.
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accused of prudery or were told that sexual intimacy is an essential
component of a close business or professional relation between a man
and a woman.3 94 Women who complained of being grabbed or
groped were told that it was all harmless merriment and that they
should lighten up.395
My conclusion from this shift of rationales is that in the earlier
period sexual harassment was generally supported by economic neces-
sity, whereas more recently it has been supported by the marginaliza-
tion of chastity. This conclusion would account for the hiatus in the
evidence during the fifties and sixties. Economic necessity had been
mitigated by legislation, by union activity, and by the general prosper-
ity of the period. A woman who was mistreated in one job could more
easily find another or leave the job market and stay home. At the
same time, the marginalization of chastity, a product of tie so-called
sexual revolution of the sixties, had not yet fully penetrated the
workplace.
To be sure, the gradual implementation of laws against gender
discrimination, beginning with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,396 has brought women into many previously all-male work envi-
ronments, where their presence has been resented. Could not this
resentment explain the growth in hostile environment harassment
quite independent of any change in attitudes toward chastity? Per-
haps, but I am inclined to think not. The patterns of harassment that
appear in the literature and the law reports from the seventies on bear
a definite resemblance to kinds of banter and horseplay that men in
an earlier period sometimes engaged in among themselves, but were
careful to avoid in mixed company. Would the introduction of wo-
men into the workplace have led men to abandon their mixed com-
pany manners so quickly if there had not been a general loosening of
social restraints? And would there have been such a loosening if there
had not been a general lessening of regard for chastity? These may be
chicken-and-egg questions, and even if they are not, I know of no data
that will help answer them. For what it is worth, though, from having
lived through the period and watched the changes happening, I
would answer no to both questions.
I think my perception of the situation is borne out by some of the
same-sex harassment cases that have begun coming down. Some of
394 MACKINNON, supra note 378, at 51, 69-70.
395 Id. at 51-52; SEGRAvE, supra note 385, at 115, 118, 154, 158; cfWeinsheimerv.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1561 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that die
plaintiff's participation in the prevailing vulgarity prevented recovery by sho ing an
atmosphere not unwelcome).
396 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994).
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these involve homosexual harassers who treat their own sex as hetero-
sexual harassers treat the opposite sex: these cases are easy enough to
deal with.397 But other cases involve heterosexual men who harass
other heterosexual men whom they perceive as effeminate.3 98 In
these cases, the perception of effeminacy appears to be based, at least
in part, on the victim's distaste for the prevailing level of conversation
and that distaste, in turn, to be based on at least a residual respect for
chastity.
My conclusion, then, is that sexual harassment as we experience it
today has gone hand in hand with a marginalization of chastity and
that it is probably more an effect of that marginalization than a cause.
A byproduct of the marginalization has been the absence from
almost all the harassment cases of the traditional distinction between
honorable and dishonorable intentions. I find only a couple of cases
where the marital status of either the harasser or the victim is men-
tioned, and in one of those cases it is mentioned only in passing.39 - In
several cases where the courts found no actionable harassment, the
behavior complained of would have been at least borderline accept-
able as an incident of an honorable courtship-though less circum-
spect than an honorable courtship should be during working hours-
but mortally insulting if either of the parties was already married.
400
In one case-again the marital status of the parties was not men-
397 See, e.g., EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1103-04 (M.D. Tenn.
1995) (holding that it would be "untenable" to allow reverse discrimination claims
but not same-sex harassment cases to proceed under Title VII). There have been
some cases, however, going the other way. See Elizabeth Williams, Annotation, Same.
sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act, 135 A.L.R. FED. 307, 334-40
(1996 & Supp. 1999).
398 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998); Polly
v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 825 F. Supp. 135, 137-38 (S.D. Tex. 1993). Golus.
zek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988), denies recovery in such a situa-
tion. Polly holds that recovery is possible in a proper case, but does not find the case
before it to be such a case. Polly, 825 F. Supp. at 138. I believe both decisions are
superseded by Oncale.
399 See Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 143 F.3d 1103, 1106 (8th Cir. 1998); Steiart
v. Cartessa Corp., 771 F. Supp. 876, 879 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (mentioning marital status
in passing).
400 See Stoeckel v. Envtl. Mgmt. Sys., 882 F. Supp. 1106, 1114-15 (D.D.C. 1995);
Ballou v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., 871 F. Supp. 1384, 1388-90 (D. Kan. 1994); Caleshu
v. Merrill Lynch, 737 F. Supp. 1070, 1081-82 (E.D. Mo. 1990); cf. Ellison v. Brady, 924
F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding sexual harassment where romantic advances,
although not dishonorable, were obsessive); Becker v. Churchvll-Chili Cent. Sci.
Dist., 602 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500-01 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (holding no sexual harassment where
a man's attempt at friendship, although not overtly sexual, made a woman uncomfort-
able, because he was married).
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tioned-the behavior complained of was nothing more than a re-
peated request for dates.4°1 The idea of honorable intentions seems
to have been totally foreign to the experience of the woman who was
asked: "He didn't come out and tell me he wanted sex. You don't
have to come out and say you want to have sex with somebody, if you
want to take them out this is what it's going to lead to."40 2 That, I
think, goes too far. The court thought so too.
403
Most sexual harassment cases are pursued under laws against gen-
der discrimination. But conduct can be highly offensive without in-
volving the express or implied threats required for quid pro quo
harassment or the continuity and pervasiveness required for hostile
environment harassment. And offensive conduct can occur outside
the educational or employment relations to which the anti-discrimina-
tion laws apply. The gaps are partly filled in by snippets of criminal
law together with two major principles of tort liability. But there are
still cases of serious offense that the law does not reach.
The snippets of criminal law include provisions against battery,
indecent exposure, and stalking. Details are different from one juris-
diction to the next. At common law, and under some statutes, any
offensive touching is a battery,40 4 though under the Model Penal
Code it is not punishable unless the victim is injured.40 5 If the battery
is sexually motivated, it will be in most places an offense distinct both
from common battery and from rape and its various extensions. But
in some places, including my own state, Indiana, there must be force
as well as sexual motivation; a person who leaves his hand on another
person's body until he is made to remove it has used enough force to
be guilty of this offense, but if he removes it immediately, he is guilty
only of common battery.
4°6
Indecent exposure is an offense under the Model Penal Code if
there is anyone present who will be alarmed or affronted; 40 7 under
Indiana law, it must be done in public.408 The Indiana law carries an
exacting mental element the actor cannot be convicted unless "he
401 Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 605 F. Supp. 1047, 1051 (N.D. Ili. 1985), affd,
798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986).
402 Id.
403 See id. at 1055-56.
404 See IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1 (1998); C.AK & MARSHALL, supra note 31, at 733.
405 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211 (1962).
406 See IND. CODE § 35-42-4-8 (1998); Scott-Gordon v. State, 579 N.E.2d 602, 604
(Ind. 1991).
407 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.5 (1974).
408 See IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1998).
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knows his conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm."40 9 If he flatters
himself, however foolishly, that the victim will relish the attention, he
gets off. This requirement, like the mental element introduced into
the rape laws by Maybeny and Morgan, gives too much scope to people
who find themselves sexually irresistible and too little to people who
opt for chastity. It allows a person to believe that everyone he en-
counters is open to the crudest of sexual advances until it is brought
home to him with sledgehammer force that she is not. On the other
hand, the law will be of some use against some harassers, for their very
purpose is to affront or alarm their victim.
Anti-stalking laws have been enacted throughout the United
States in the past decade or so.410 They are tailored to address a spe-
cific serious problem, and ordinary sexual harassment is not that
problem. But if harassment is sufficiently repetitive, obsessive, and
frightening, these statutes might usefully be invoked against it.
The major tort remedy, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, has been developing gradually since it was first discerned by
Judge Magruder in 1936.411 It was introduced into the Restatement qf
Torts in 1948,412 and now appears as section 46 of the Second Restate-
ment.41 3 The development is probably attributable to overzealous bill
collectors more than to sexual predators, with a few union organizers
and practical jokers playing a part. It still has a long way to go before
it will be fully effective against sexual harassers. It is very limited in
the conduct it reaches. The Restatement is so qualified on the point as
to be ludicrous: "Liability has been found only where the conduct has
been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atro-
cious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."414 It appears
that, at least in Arkansas, for a man to have a woman he has never met
409 Id.
410 Id. §§ 35-45-10-1 to 35-45-10-5 (1998); Laura Curliss, Note, FromnImprudence to
Crime: Anti-stalking Laws, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 819, 824-25 (1993). In some cases,
stalkers have been subjected to injunction and damages without specific statutory pro-
vision. See, e.g., Kramer v. Downey, 680 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Tex. App. 1984).
411 Magruder, supra note 64; see Godfrey v. Perkin-Elmer Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1179,
1187-90 (D.N.H. 1992); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 12 (5th ed. 1984); Annotation, Modern Status of Intentional Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress as Independent Tort; "Outrage, "38 A.L.R.4th 998 (1985 & Supp. 2000).
412 See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 46 Note to Institute (Tentative Draft
No. 1 1957) ("In its original form, § 46 stated flatly that there was no liability for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress .... In the 1948 Supplement this position
was reversed.").
413 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
414 Id.
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come to his hotel room on a business pretext and there expose him-
self and request oral sex of her does not meet this standard.415 Also,
the quantum of emotional distress a plaintiff must experience to es-
tablish this tort is set too high. Unless cold, spitting rage is a form of
emotional distress, those who respond to sexual harassment as I would
wish them to will not recover for this tort.
The other major source of potential tort liability is battery. It is
certainly possible to commit sexual harassment without committing a
battery, but most of the harassment cases in both the law reports and
the literature include some kind of offensive touching. Any offensive
touching of another person is a battery, and any sexual touching is
considered offensive unless the person touched has given some indi-
cation that it will not be.416 Given the prevailing disarray of our social
conventions, there may be borderline cases where offense is taken al-
though none is intended. But the cases we read about are not border-
line.417 Many involve repeated rubbings, pattings, and pawings where
the distaste of the victim was made manifest the first time and increas-
ingly manifest thereafter. Some involve the interruption of a purely
professional conversation by a sudden passionate onslaught. Often
things are done in public that even an acknowledged lover would be
permitted only in private. Often also, the offense is intentional and
made explicit in the words accompanying the acts; words and acts to-
gether are intended to express resentment of the presence of women
in a previously all male environment.4
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Since the offensive touch is always a tort and often a crime, with-
out any of the added aggravation required for a sexual harassment
415 SeeJones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 678 (E.D. Ark. 1998). But see Erwin v.
M filligan, 67 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Ark. 1934) (stating that recovery is available for "indig-
nity, humiliation or injury to the feelings" when "caused by willful or intentional
conduct").
416 See Yale v. City of Allenstown, 969 F. Supp. 798, 801 (D.N.H. 1997); Paul 1.
Holbrook, 696 So. 2d 1311, 1312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Nerome v. Cooper-Wss,
Inc., 347 S.V.2d 619, 621-22 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); Brown v. Ford, 905 P.2d 223,
225-26 (Okla. 1995). A battery, or even the fear of one, may sometimes be treated as
an intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Mindt v. Shavers, 337 N.W.2d 97,
100 (Neb. 1983); Waddle v. Sparks, 394 S.E.2d 683, 687 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). This
option may be important, for the statute of limitations on assault and battery is often
shorter than on other torts.
417 See Currie v. Kowalewski, 842 F. Supp. 57, 62-63 (N.D.N.Y. 1994); Leaon v.
Washington County, 397 N.W.2d 867, 875 (Minn. 1986); Mindt, 337 N.W.2d at
100-01; T.L. v. Toys '' Us, Inc., 605 A.2d 1125, 1135-36 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1992); Shea v. Cornell Univ., 596 N.Y.S.2d 502, 504 (App. Div. 1993).
418 SEGRAVE, supra note 385, at 81-102; Teresa Godwin Phelps, Gendered Space and
the Reasonableness Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 12 NOTRE D. M J.L ETHIcs &
PuB. POL'Y 265, 278-84 (1998).
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case under the civil rights laws, it seems odd that it is not proceeded
against more often. The best explanation I have found is what might
be called a shallow pocket doctrine. The perpetrator, unlike his em-
ployer,419 is generally not good for the kind of money that would com-
pensate a lawyer for suing him on a contingent fee. By the same
token, the victim probably cannot afford to pay a lawyer money that
cannot be recovered by winning the case. On the other hand, the
victim probably earns too much money to be within the guidelines of
a typical legal aid office. There is still the possibility of a criminal pro-
ceeding, but here the case will be competing with murder, rape, rob-
bery, domestic violence, and drug distribution for the limited
resources provided by the taxpayers for prosecuting offenders. So any
lawyer looking for a new field for pro bono work might well consider
this one.
There are also remedies a victim can pursue effectively without
involving a lawyer. Usually, the local prosecutor will have a Complaint
Desk where a person harassed by the criminal behavior of a neighbor
or associate can have the harasser summoned and threatened with
prosecution if he does not desist. Also, every jurisdiction has a simpli-
fied small claims procedure by which a plaintiff with a little assistance
from the clerk of the court can present a tort case without a lawyer
and can recover a judgment for a modest sum covering both actual
and punitive damages. Even if this is not enough to pay for a lawyer's
time, it may be enough to spoil the perpetrator's plans for a vacation
or a new car. More importantly, it may be enough to stop him from
doing what he has been doing.
The evolution toward no-fault divorce, already begun in the ear-
lier period, was virtually complete by the end of the 1970s. In most
American jurisdictions, the traditional grounds were replaced or at
least supplemented by "irretrievable breakdown of the marriage," a
concept introduced by the British Parliament in 1969.420 It was origi-
nally supposed that irretrievable breakdown would not be established
without serious and impartial investigation of the possibility of recon-
ciliation.421 But a growing emphasis on autonomy, along with more
and more crowded dockets, has led most courts to infer the requisite
419 The battery as such will not make the batterer's employer liable. See Paul, 696
So. 2d at 1312; Brown, 905 P.2d at 230; cf. Wiper v. Downtown Dev. Corp. of Tucson,
732 P.2d 200, 201, 203 (Ariz. 1987) (denying punitive damages against an employer
whose liability is based on respondeat superior).
420 Divorce Reform Act, 1969, c. 55, § 1 (Eng.). On the different American laws,
see CLAmR, supra note 72, at 513-21 (2d ed., student ed. 1988), and WEISBmRO & Ar.
PLE1ON, supra note 303, at 564-90.
421 CLARv, supra note 72, at 513.
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breakdown from the mere desire of either party no longer to be mar-
ried.42 2 At this point, it is pretty well the case throughout the United
States that anyone who wants a divorce can have one.
Accompanying this development has been a general movement,
nearly complete by now, to abolish the two torts of alienation of affec-
tion and criminal conversation, which were supposed to protect mar-
riages against outside interference. 42 In most places, the abolition
was by statute;424 in a few, the courts took the initiative, saying that a
rule of the common law can always be changed when it is no longer
useful.4 The rationale in either case was partly that the injuries com-
plained of cannot be compensated with money and partly that a mar-
riage relation that can be effectively destroyed by a third person is not
worth preserving. The first point depends in a way on the second. If
the relation were worth protecting, money damages for interference
with it could be justified as a deterrent even if they were not an effec-
tive compensation. What it all comes down to, then, is that fidelity to
one's marriage vows is worthless if it is precarious. To say that is to put
422 Id. at 411.
423 The first case to abolish the action for alienation of affection without statutory
authority for doing so is Wy5,man v. lWaftfa 615 P.2d 452, 453-54 (Wash. 1980). The
opinion cites all the statutes on the subject that were in force at the time and discusses
at length the pros and cons ofjudicial abolition. On the rationale, see Fundernann v.
Mielson, 304 N.V.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1981).
We do not abolish the action because defendants in such suits, need or de-
serve our protection. We certainly do not do so because of any changing
views on promiscuous sexual conduct. It is merely and simply because the
plaintif in such suits do not deserve to recover for loss of or injury to "prop-
erty" which they do not, and cannot, own.
Id. The pace of abolition is indicated by a comparison of CLAU, supra note 72, at
262-69, which devotes several pages to the subject, with the second edition of the
same work, CLAx, supra note 72 (2d ed., student ed. 1988), where the subject has
disappeared virtually without a trace.
The cases are split on whether the abolition bars an injured spouse from recover-
ing for intentional infliction of emotional distress. &e DeStefano %. Grabrian, 763
P.2d 275, 282 (Colo. 1988) (not barred); Van Meter v. Van Meter, 328 N.W.2d 497,
498 (Iowa 1983) (same); Homer v. Long, 599 A.2d 1193, 1198-99 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1992) (same); Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (Ohio 1988) (barred);
Alexander v. Inman, 825 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (same). It has been
held that the unique Alabama rule permitting a spouse to enjoin a third party from
interfering with the marriage has survived the abolition of the tort liability of the third
party. See Logan v. Davidson, 211 So. 2d 461, 461 (Ala. 1968). Most courts did not
grant an injunction even when the tort liability was still in place. Se, e.g., Snedaker v.
King, 145 N.E. 15, 16 (Ohio 1924).
424 See, e-g., DeStafano, 763 P.2d at 281 (citing COLO. RE%,. STAT. § 13-20-202
(1987)).
425 See, eg., Fundermann, 304 N.W.2d at 791.
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that virtue on a very different footing from other virtues such as hon-
esty, sobriety, diligence, and kindness.
IV. SocIAL DEVELOPMENTS
4 2 6
It should be apparent that what we have been looking at is some-
thing of ajuridical shambles. I believe we have a good deal of a socie-
tal shambles to match. While it is not quite there yet, chastity is well
on the way to becoming a sectarian practice, something comparable
to the wearing of turbans by Sikhs or the refusal of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses to undergo blood transfusions. Most of us can no longer lead a
normal social life, or even a normal family life, without having to take
account of the irregular sexual relations of one or more friends or
relatives. Miss Manners, to whom I have already referred, devotes a
good deal of thought and space to the resulting conundrums. 427 Ig-
noring such relationships or expecting them to be kept clandestine is
hardly ever an option. They are getting more and more public recog-
nition, with "guests" appearing as an alternative to spouses in wedding
and dinner invitations, with "companions" included among survivors
listed in obituaries, and with single parents listed in birth announce-
ments as routinely as married ones.
Consider also how rarely our popular culture offers us a chaste
doctor, lawyer, business executive, police officer, or amateur sleuth to
identify with. A typical television series or work of paperback fiction
will every little while introduce or at least mention a completely super-
fluous sexual episode, evidently in order to humanize the character.
There are exceptions, but they tend to be secondary characters (Ser-
geant Lewis in the Morse series) or over sixty (Jessica Fletcher).
Many public school systems have been adopting sex education
programs. The ones most commonly in use are full of admonitions to
kid-glove handling of moral questions. Basically, they call on the
teacher to avoid pronouncing any moral judgment on different kinds
of sexual behavior.428 Parents in various places have litigated over
426 This view of the social ambiance comes partly from personal observation, partly
from the law reports. Personal observation is necessarily limited and the law reports
are necessarily anecdotal. Neither can take the place of a good numerical survey like
the 1992 one referred to in supra note 4 or even of a bad one like Kinsey's, see supra
notes 3-4 and accompanying text. On the other hand, personal observation may give
a better indication of what is conspicuous in society, and the law reports may give a
better indication of what is contentious. Between them, they may give a better idea
than the numbers will of what it is like to live in this society.
427 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
428 See Laurent B. Frantz, Annotation, Validity of Sex Education Programns in Public
Schools, 82 A.L.1.Sd 579, 592 (1978).
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such plans, accusing them of violating religious convictions by
presenting sex in a value-neutral form or violating parental rights by
interfering with parents deciding for themselves how they want their
children to learn about sex.429 These objections have generally been
met by allowing parents to opt out.430 A companion objection that
the program violates the Establishment Clause by inculcating secular-
ism has not gotten anywhere in court.431 On the other hand, an absti-
nence-based program was dismantled by a court on the ground that
parts of it were "factually inaccurate" (for example, "[t] eens with a low
opinion of themselves are more likely than other teens to get involved
in premarital sex") or put forward "religious beliefs or subjective judg-
ments" (for example, "[h]uman reproduction has a higher meaning
than animal reproduction").4 2 The federal Adolescent Family Life
Act433 with its provisions for including religious organizations in its
funding of private educational programs was saved by a 5-4 Supreme
Court decision from suffering the same fate.434 Fourjustices believed,
as did the lower court, that it is impossible for a religious organization
to separate the furtherance of chastity from the furtherance of relig-
ion.435 The majority held that the separation was theoretically possi-
ble and that judicial intervention should wait for a case when it wvas
not effectively done.43
6
These cases tend to reinforce the sectarian image of chastity. If
you believe in chastity, you can pull your child out of any program of
sex education that offends your belief, but you cannot stop the pro-
gram from being implemented. But if you believe that sexual stan-
dards are a matter of personal choice, you can work for a plan that
accords with your belief and block the implementation of any plan
that does not. A similar message is conveyed by the distribution of
condoms in high schools: unsafe sex is to be strongly discouraged, but
429 See, ag., Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 124 Cal.
Rptr. 68, 76-77 (Ct. App. 1975).
430 See Citnsfor Parental Rights, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 78-82; cf Broim v. Hot, Sexy &
Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 529 (1st Cir. 1995) (denying money damages for com-
pulsory attendance at an offensive sex education presentation).
431 See Citizens for Parental Rights, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 83-88; Steven M. Lee, Smith v.
Board of School Commissioners: The Religion ofSecuZarHumanism in Publit Education, 3
NOTRE DAMI-J.L. ETHICS & PuB. PoL'Y 591, 607 (1988); Frantz, supra note 428, at 592.
432 Coleman v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 635 So. 2d 1238, 1256-58 (La. Ct. App.
1994).
433 42 U.S.C. § 300 (1994).
434 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593 (1988).
435 See id- at 625-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun was joined in
dissent by justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. &e id.
436 Id. at 600-01.
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the decision between safe sex and no sex at all is up to you. Given the
dangers of AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases, a strong case
can be made for the distribution of condoms despite the message, but
steps could be taken to counteract the message. Generally, they are
not taken. After a controversial decision was made to distribute con-
doms in the Lexington, Massachusetts high school, a group of parents
sought to buy advertising space in the student newspaper and year-
book to advocate abstinence. 43 7 Their advertisements were rejected
by the student editors as too controversial.
4 38
The early advocates of birth control were generally content with
making contraceptives available only to married people,439 and the
first Supreme Court case establishing a right to contraception, Gris-
wold v. Connecticut (1965),440 relied on the sanctity of the marriage
relation. But the next case on the subject, Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972),
held that single people have as much right to practice contraception
as married people do.441 Since then, as far as I am aware, nobody has
made any distinction between married and single people in the availa-
bility of contraceptives.
With the coming of Viagra, the principle of Eisenstadt has been
carried considerably beyond its rationale. There has been a great deal
of debate about whether this expensive pill for the overcoming of
male impotence should be covered under health insurance policies.
Some have said yes and some have said no, but no one has yet said
that it should be covered for married men and not for single men.
The pros and cons are very different from what they were in Eisenstadt.
The lack of contraceptives interferes with sexual intercourse only by
making it more dangerous. Justice Brennan's argument in Eisenstadt
was that although it is desirable to deter non-marital sex, the deterrent
effect of the danger is outweighed by the harm to those who are not
deterred. Compulsory pregnancy is not a suitable punishment for for-
nication. 442 That is hard to disagree with. But lack of Viagra does not
make intercourse more dangerous; it only makes it more difficult to
437 Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241, 242 (1st Cir. 1997).
438 Id. at 244. A panel of the court, 2-1, had found a First Amendment violation.
Id. at 242-43. But the court en banc found no state action. Id. at 243. But cf. AIDS
Action Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding
that the transportation authority cannot reject condom advertisements).
439 See, for instance, the stated policy of the clinic involved in Commonwealth v.
Gardner, 15 N.E.2d 222, 223 (Mass. 1938).
440 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
441 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).
442 Id. at 448 (Brennan, J.); see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
712, 716 (1977) (StevensJ, concurring) ("It is as if the state decided to dramatize Its
disapproval of motorcycles by forbidding the use of safety helmets.").
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accomplish. -4 3 Brennan's rationale does not give an unmarried man
any ground for complaining about not being able to have sex. Be-
tween the contraceptive decisions and the Viagra non-decisions, we
have shifted from treating chastity as a value outweighed by other val-
ues to treating it as no value at all.
The sectarian character of chastity has been underlined lately by
the debate over federal funding for the arts. In 1989, the National
Endowment for the Arts precipitated a major scandal with two of the
projects it funded, one of them scabrous, the other blasphemous.444
A wide-ranging debate ensued, with Congress deciding in the end not
to adopt specific content restrictions on funding by the Endowment,
but merely to call for "taking into consideration general standards of
decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public."445
A panel of the Ninth Circuit thought this standard was unconsti-
tutional on its face; if the government is going to fund expression, it
must do so without regard for content.446 The Supreme Court re-
versed, saying that the provision was not unconstitutional on its face,
although it might be applied unconstitutionally. 447 It sent the case
back so the court could watch for unconstitutional applications.44 8
I will not follow the vicissitudes of art funding any farther. What I
want to note is the juxtaposition of decency and diversity in the lan-
guage adopted by Congress. It is as if decency were one value among
the many and diverse values held by different segments of our pluralis-
tic society.449 And that seems indeed to be the attitude that prevailed
in Congress. Dean John Garvey, in an exhaustive study of the legisla-
tive history of the language in question, puts it this way- "During the
early 1980s moral traditionalists and religious conservatives touted
443 The tests reported in the article on Viagra, 1999 PimsiciA's Drs REFERENCE
2424, 2425, indicate that the groups of Viagra users were successful in from 48% to
70% of their attempts at intercourse as compared to 12% to 29% for the control
groups.
444 See House Passes Compromise of Federal Arts Finandng, N.Y. TziEs, Oct. 4,1989, at
C19.
445 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (1) (Supp. 1992).
446 See Finley v. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 681-83 (9th Cir.
1996), rev'd, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). No one seems to have pointed out that the artistic
excellence called for by the statute is as much a content limitation as decency and that
works lacking that quality have at least as much First Amendment protection as inde-
cent works.
447 Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 573, 586-87 (1998).
448 Id. at 590.
449 SeeJohn H. Garvey, Black and While Inages, L~w & CoNcr"ip. PRos., Autumn
1993, at 189, 209.
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themselves as the Moral Majority. By 1989 they were willing to settle
for recognition as a Moral Minority if that would give them the same
political standing enjoyed by other minorities-particularly racial mi-
norities. '450 In other words, the sectarian label is not only pinned on
the proponents of chastity by their adversaries; they have now come to
the point of finding it politically advantageous to pin it on themselves.
The marginalization of chastity has been making over our social
conventions and our social ambiance in a number of ways. One is that
"solicitation of chastity"-that is, propositioning451-seems on the way
to becoming almost respectable. It was only an ecclesiastical offense
in the Middle Ages, and it has never been much of a tort. But unless it
was unambiguously invited in some way, it used to be regarded in
most places as an insult. I have no scientific evidence on the point,
but I have a strong impression that this is no longer the case. I find
from the law reports, the media, and various fragments of anecdotal
evidence that Magruder's dictum that "there is no harm in asking" has
about completed its transformation from a principle of tort law to a
principle of social deportment; that barring some aggravating circum-
stance such as obsessiveness, intimidation, or indecent exposure, the
prevailing tendency these days is to treat sexual overtures, however
unwelcome, as kindly meant; that chaste people tend to respond to
such overtures not with rebukes or resentment, but with the vaguely
apologetic air of a vegetarian turning down the offer of a steak.
As marriage ceases to be considered necessary for socially accept-
able sexual relations, for open cohabitation, or even for having chil-
dren, people begin to ask what continuing purpose the institution
serves, or why anyone should want to be married. The November 2,
1998 issue of Newsweek predicts that by the time children born at the
turn of the millennium are ready to start families of their own, mar-
riage will be considered only one of the alternative arrangements
available for doing so. 452 This tells us more about what the editors of
Newsweek think now than it does about what their children or
grandchildren will think in the 2020s, but it is still interesting.
A common attitude is that marriage manifests a serious commit-
ment, whereas cohabitation does not. As one person put it, living to-
gether is something you do and marriage is something you are. But in
the long run, the institution will not play this role effectively unless
450 Id. at 198.
451 So called because it is a request to part with the thing solicited. See State v.
Render, 210 N.W. 911, 911 (Iowa 1926).
452 Pat Wingert, Grow Up, Have a Kid-and Perhaps a Wedding. Why Marriage May Be
Optiona NmwswEEx, Nov. 2, 1998, at 60.
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the law supports it in doing so. It will be subject to an infirmity I call
Feinberg's Paradox, because I first encountered it in a lecture by Joel
Feinberg (though he made no claim to have originated it). 453 It is
that if you are free to revoke an undertaking, you are not free to enter
into it irrevocably. Holding you to it or not holding you to it are both
diminutions of your freedom. In the case of marriage, I think the
freedom to make the commitment is more important than the free-
dom to go back on it, because I think serious love aspires to exchange
a permanent and unconditional gift.
Professor Karst, in an article I have already mentioned, offers an
effective statement of a contrary view that has a good deal of currency.
"[T]he value of commitment is fully realizable only in an atmosphere
of freedom to choose whether a particular association will be fleeting
or enduring.
"454
T] he act of marrying... undoubtedly carries greater weight as an
announcement of commitment when the wife binds herself to a
marriage from which exit will be difficult. But from the wedding
day forward, there is a progressive decline in that act's significance
for the associational value of commitment. What begins to matter
more for the husband is not that his wife was once ready to bind
herself to him by ties enforceable by the state, but that she remains
committed to him day by day-not because the law commands it
but because she chooses the commitment .... [O]nce the act of
marriage recedes into the past, the freedom to leave gives added
meaning to the decision to stay.45
5
The more I reflect on this passage, the more profoundly I disa-
gree with it. The husband Karst envisages is presumably kept on his
mettle by the constant possibility of his wife leaving him. He may have
the pleasure of congratulating himself when he gets through a day
without losing her, but I should think he would have to face each
ensuing day with a good deal of trepidation. I would expect him to
453 Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Soverigny, and Pivacy: Moral ldeals in the Constitution?,
58 No=a DAmE L. Rev. 445, 464-83 (1983); cf. CHESToE, spra note 1, at 227 ("I
could never conceive or tolerate any Utopia which did not leave to me the liberty for
which I chiefly care, the liberty to bind myself.").
454 Karst, supra note 177, at 633.
455 Id. at 637-38. Professor Karst and I, who are old friends, have had an interest-
ing exchange of e-mails regarding my criticism of this passage. He was prepared-
with some misgivings, I suspect-to recognize a continuing moral force in the origi-
nal marital commitment. I found more inconsistency than he did between the free-
dom to leave and the moral-as opposed to the legal-obligation to stay. Also, I
believe I attached more importance than he did to the role of law in firming up one's
adherence to one's own moral judgments. We are both grateful to our vives that
these questions continue to be of merely academic concern to us.
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end up rather neurotic, like a child who thinks his parents will reject
him if he misbehaves. Saint John teaches that love casts out fear.' 5r"l I
believe that the converse is also true: fear casts out love. Lovers, like
children, develop their character not by struggling to hold onto some-
thing that can be taken away at any time, but by struggling to respond
worthily to an unconditional gift.
This is not a plea for the abolition of divorce laws. We in the
Western world have been there and done that, and the bad conse-
quences on the whole have outweighed the good. If a marriage be-
comes sufficiently burdensome, it is probably wise for the law of the
state to leave it to the consciences of the parties, informed by whatever
religion they profess, to decide whether they will continue to be
bound by it. At the same time, the prospect of losing my wife if I beat
her, space out on drugs, or take up with another woman does not
inspire in me the same neurotic fear as would the prospect of losing
her if I tell boring jokes, put on too much weight, or hog the remote.
In the period with which I began this Article, it was certainly possible
to get out of a seriously bad marriage. There was some talk about the
laxity of the divorce laws in some states making marriage a less serious
commitment than it ought to be. But there was no place where it
could be terminated so easily as to be no commitment at all. Today,
however, that is the case almost everywhere. Our divorce laws have
made marriage practically terminable at wil. 457 Those who look to
the legal institution to manifest a serious commitment simply ignore
or disregard what the institution has in fact become.
A few States have responded to this situation by providing for
"covenant marriage," an alternative and less easily terminable form for
people who are really serious about it.458 As long as we have the kind
of interstate mobility we do, this device probably will not work.4 9 Un-
til there is a substantial change in our divorce laws nationwide, lovers
who wish to commit themselves seriously to one another will have to
look to religion or conscience to enforce the commitment, without
any support from the law.
456 1 John 4:18.
457 CLARK, supra note 72, at 517 (2d ed., student ed. 1988) ("[Mt is virtually impos-
sible to imagine a case in which, if one spouse wishes a divorce, the divorce would be
denied.").
458 See Katherine Shaw Spaht, For the Sake of the Children: Recapturing the Meaning of
Marriage, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547, 1565-78 (1998).
459 See generally Katherine Shaw Spaht & Symeon C. Symeonides, Covenant Marriage
and the Law of Conflicts Laws, 32 CPMGHTON L. REv. 1085, 1100 (1999). The authors
seem to me to be overly sanguine as to the recognition of covenant marriage in other
states.
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Meanwhile, unmarried cohabitants are in the position of having
to reinvent the wheel. Questions like whether one of them can buy
groceries on the credit of the other, who gets the furniture if one of
them dies, whether one can authorize emergency medical treatment
for the other, and whether it is socially acceptable to invite one to a
party without the other-all questions to which law or custom would
supply clear answers if they were married-must be negotiated, or
guessed at, or both. Efforts to deal with such questions by contract
have been on the whole unsuccessful.460 If lovers are not yet ready to
enter into a marriage, they are probably still less ready to work out a
contractual arrangement that will cover the necessary ground and be
fair to them both.
If marriage is no more than the acknowledgment of an ongoing
sexual relation, and if sexual relations are more or less freely acknowl-
edged whether ongoing or not, it is hard to find a good reason for
treating relations between persons of the same sex differently from
relations between man and woman. The claim of homosexuals to
equal treatment for their long and short term relationships is there-
fore becoming more and more insistent. It has given rise to a good
deal of academic debate, as well as a good deal of demotic resis-
tance.461 The successful academic arguments on the subject, in my
opinion, are those that oppose homosexual practices by relating the
goodness of the sex act to its effect of establishing and supporting a
personal bond that instantiates the metaphysical complementarity of
male and female-a complementarity far more profound and perva-
sive than the obvious one between alternative forms of plumbing.
462 I
believe that the demotic resistance to the homosexual agenda is attrib-
utable not to mere bigotry, but to a residual intuition of the same
complementarity and the same bond. Viewed in this light, ephemeral
heterosexual encounters are wrong because they evade or suppress
the bonding effect of the act, and all homosexual encounters are
wrong because the requisite complementarity is lacking. To the ex-
tent that we countenance the one wrong, I believe we seriously under-
mine any claim we may have to discountenance the other.
The upbringing and support of children has suffered from the
growing flexibility of the arrangements for bringing them into the
world. It has always been fairly easy for fathers to run away from their
460 See supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
461 See Symposium on Seual Orientation, 9 NOTRE DA.mJ.L ETwcs & PuB. PoL'v 1
(1995).
462 SeeJEAN GUITI'ON, Ess&tUa L'Astoua HRHtuIN 105-12,184-85, passira (1966);
C.S. LEWiS, THE FouR Lov.s 145-47 (1960); HiwUEBRAND, supra note 24, at 34-45.
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responsibilities, if they are minded to do so. It is therefore useful to
discourage men from becoming fathers until they have given some
indication of social responsibility. The distribution of condoms in
high schools has on the whole not been adequate for the purpose.
There is also of course no lack of irresponsible mothers. There
are a number of reasons why young women may wish to have babies
even though they are not materially or psychologically prepared for
the duties of parenthood. They do not become pregnant simply be-
cause they fail to use contraceptives or give birth simply because they
fail to have abortions. There are in fact real problems for which preg-
nancy and childbirth provide a short-term solution.46 3 The ready
availability of sex makes this solution easy to adopt; only later does the
realization come that children can create more problems than they
solve. In short, although the dismantling of social restraints on pre-
marital, and even adolescent, sex could not by itself have produced a
spate of irresponsible parenthood, it has certainly helped.
The effect of abortion on attitudes toward parental responsibility
is hard to judge. There have naturally been anti-abortion advocates
pointing out in connection with certain high profile cases that a wo-
man who kills her newborn baby does nothing that a doctor with a
pair of scissors could not have done with impunity a few moments
before-but I have not found the women themselves using that for an
excuse. And I should think a beleaguered mother abandoning a wail-
ing two-year-old with diarrhea might wonder why the maxim "every
child a wanted child" should become suddenly inoperative when the
child is born-but I have found no case of a mother making that
point either. On the other hand, fathers do use the availability of
abortion as an excuse for not supporting unwanted children. In a
number of support cases the father has argued that since the choice of
having the child was exclusively the mother's, she cannot legitimately
ask him to pay for it: when he offers to pay for an abortion, he does all
that she has any right to require.46 4 The courts give this argument
pretty short shrift, but it keeps coming up.
In many ways, the legal protections against rape are better than
they used to be. Most importantly, the rape shield laws have made it
much more difficult for defense lawyers to "put the victim on trial."
The improvement is reinforced by a substantial change in attitude on
463 E.g., ELAINE KAPLAN, NOT OUR KIND OF GIRL: UNRAVELING THE M1rrHs OF BLACK
TEENAGE MOTHERHOOD 180-82 (1997).
464 See Harris v. State, 356 So. 2d 623, 624 (Ala. 1978); In re S.P.B., 651 P.2d 1213,
1214 (Colo. 1982); Dorsey v. English, 390 A.2d 1133, 1138 (Md. 1978); Chambers v.
Sanderson, 822 P.2d 657, 659-60 (Nev. 1991); First v. Lewis, 417 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196
(Fam. Ct. 1979). DECRow, supra note 148, at 230, however, accepts the argument.
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the part of police, prosecutors, judges, and legal scholars. Women
have made their presence felt in all these roles, and many of their
male colleagues have paid attention to their concerns. Attitudes like
Ploscowe's and Wigmore's, discussed earlier on, would hardly achieve
even marginal respectability today.
A couple of developments do tend in the opposite direction,
though I believe that on the whole they are outweighed. One is the
honest mistake defense introduced in the Maybeny and Morgan cases.
The other is the widespread repeal of laws punishing consensual sex.
These, as I have pointed out, had a significant role as a backup posi-
tion for prosecutors in rape cases. Thus, after getting his rape convic-
tion reversed on the honest mistake defense, Mayberry was sentenced
to imprisonment for from two to twelve years for an act that ceased to
be punishable two years after he started serving his sentence:4 0 State
v. Saunders, the case in which the New Jersey Supreme Court struck
down their anti-fornication statute, was a rape prosecution in which
the State failed to prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt-4 6
But for the decision, the defendants would have served six months in
jail and would have probably been more circumspect sexually when
they got out.
These negative legal developments are accentuated by social de-
velopments. The marginalization of chastity, together with the dis-
mantling of the dating conventions, has made it possible to believe
that people have consented to sex on the slightest of acquaintances
and under the most bizarre of circumstances. This in turn makes it
easy for the rapist or quasi-rapist to mistake the intentions of the vic-
tim and believe she has consented when she has not. It also encour-
ages the jury to make the same mistake or at least to believe that the
rapist did.
The situation is also apt to give rise to ambiguous encounters,
where it is clear that the victim was overreached and the perpetrator
an evil person, but it cannot be determined beyond a reasonable
doubt that she did not, however reluctantly, consent 46 7 These are the
465 See supra note 353.
466 State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 341-42 (NJ. 1977); ef. State v. Pilcher, 242
N.W.2d 348, 352-64 (Iowa 1976) (holding that a sodomy statute cannot be applied
where force was not proved); Schochet v. State, 580 A.2d 176, 184-85 (Md. 1990)
(same). But see State v. Lopes, 660 A.2d 707, 710 (R.I. 1995) (applying a sodomy
statute over a constitutional objection where force wvas not proved); State v. Santos,
413 A.2d 58, 67-68 (R.I. 1988) (same).
467 One criminal law casebook uses Pwpve ,. Evans, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912,919-20 (Sup.
Ct 1975), as an example. See SANoRD H. K-%IH ET AL., CMuNAL. Lw AIM ITs
PROaEssEs 354-55 (6th ed. 1995).
20011
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
cases where it is appropriate to punish for fornication, adultery, or
deviate sexual conduct and unfortunate that it is no longer possible to
do so. It may be impossible to retain these punishments without plac-
ing more reliance than we should on prosecutorial discretion. But we
pay a price for getting rid of them, and the lack of a way of reaching
behavior closely akin to rape is part of that price.
We have seen that the legal restraints on sexual harassment, al-
though far from complete, are a good deal better than they were in
the past. They need to be, because the social restraints on the whole
are a good deal worse. It has become possible in many places to say or
do things that anyone decent would find offensive and then express-
disingenuously perhaps, but still with a straight face-astonishment
that offense has in fact been taken. So attenuated have our commu-
nity standards become that people often have to express their wish to
be treated with common decency as if it were a personal idiosyncrasy
of their own; otherwise no one will pay serious attention to them, let
alone afford them the protection of the law. But the literature is full
of reasons why the victims of sexual harassment fail to speak up in this
way, even to the perpetrators themselves.468 Until harassing behavior
is condemned by the whole social milieu in which it takes place, there
will be no adequate protection against it, no matter how good the laws
are.
The response, both social and legal, to sexual harassment is un-
duly restricted by a perception of it as primarily an abuse of power. In
many cases it is certainly that, but I believe it is only the prevailing
marginalization of chastity that leads us to leave so many other cases
out of account. The same kinds of behavior that can be an abuse of
power where there is power to be abused can be in other situations an
abuse of friendship, colleagueship, professional service, business, edu-
cation, politics, or, indeed, any endeavor at all in which both sexes
participate.
But I do not think it is either abuse or harassment that provides
the core objection to sex between doctor and patient, lawyer and cli-
ent, teacher and student, or members of the same military unit or
space crew. Quite independently of anything that could be called
abuse or harassment, relations within an enterprise demanding mu-
tual respect and trust can be poisoned by the prospect of turning sex-
ual. Within such an enterprise, even an honorable courtship must be
pursued with more than common sensitivity and tact, if the common
purpose is not to be undermined. Martin Buber makes an eloquent
plea for the humanity of personal relations in the working world.
468 See MAcKINNON, supra note 378, at 48-52; SEGRAVE, supra note 385, at 216-24.
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No factory and no office is so abandoned by creation that a creative
glance could not fly up from one working-place to another, from
desk to desk, a sober and brotherly glance which guarantees the
reality of creation which is happening .... And nothing is so valua-
ble a service of dialogue between one person and another as such
an unsentimental and unreserved exchange of glances between two
people in an alien place.
4 69
Now that we have about made an end of the all male workplace, we
need to insure that such an exchange will also be possible between a
man and a woman. It will not be possible if it constantly threatens to
end up in bed.
Whether the virtual dismantling of our obscenity laws has been
good or bad for the arts is a debatable question. But for popular cul-
ture it has pretty clearly been bad. It has supported a kind of for-
mulaic voyeurism that keeps appearing in the popular treatment of
sex and that keeps being intruded on our attention. There is a mod-
est but growing body of literature complaining about the situation.
Feminists, led by Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, point
out the tendency of the material to degrade women and to give male
dominance an erotic status that strengthens its grip on society.470 A
film critic, Michael Medved, has argued persuasively that sex is now
being touted in the media as persistently as automobiles or toothpaste
and probably more effectively.471 Rochelle Gurstein, in an elegant
work of historical research and contemporary argument called The Re-
peal of Reticence, shows how the relentless public exposure of explicit
sex impairs the development of sexual maturity by leaving no private
space in which it can occur and by making the whole project
mechanical.4 72
The arts community, supported by civil rights lawyers and other
allies, generally responds to complaints of this kind not by defending
469 BUBER, supra note 23, at 36-37. I have altered the translation to make it gen-
der inclusive-as the original German "Zwischen Mensch und Mensch" is.
470 Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Porography, and Equality, 8
HARv. WohmN's L.J. 1, 13-17 (1985); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil
Rights, and Speedh, 20 HARv: C.R-C.L. L. REv. 1, 8-20 (1985). The Indianapolis ordi-
nance drafted by Dworkin and MacKinnon to embody their doctrine was inmlidated
in Amercan Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnua 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1995). But similar
legislation was upheld in Canada. See R. v. Butler, 89 D.L.R.4th 449 (Can. 1992).
471 See MINCHAEL MEDvED, HOLLYWOOD vs. Aimm-Ac. PoPuLAR CuLTuRE AND THE
WAR ON T~ADrnrimo . VALUEs 250-52 (1992).
472 See ROCHELLE GuxsTIn, THE REPE.AL OF REncENc.: A HIsron, OF A.mmax's
CULTURAL AND LEGAL STRuCGLES OVER FRE SPEECH, OnscENrm SEXU,%. LImEAvno.,
AND MODERN ART 110-11 (1996). WF.NDY SHALrr, A RmURN To MODESTY 15-25
(1999), raises similar concerns.
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the popular culture, but by arguing that its excesses cannot be
avoided without imposing unacceptable restraints on the honest liter-
ary and artistic treatment of sex.47 3 I will leave to one side the ques-
tion of whether the price of such treatment is too high, but I submit
that as long as we have judges capable of making distinctions that any-
one can make who hopes to pass freshman English it should not have
to be paid.
474
V. THE ABDICATION OF LAW
Chastity is. not a moral virtue that can be safely relegated to the
private sphere. The effective working of society depends on it in too
many ways. Without it, the erotic is continually intruding into situa-
tions where it is destructive of friendship, of respect, of trust, of coop-
eration, and often of human dignity. Where chastity is marginalized,
sex is trivialized. And the trivialization of sex is ultimately the trivial-
ization of humanity.
But in the public sphere, chastity has generally proved to be a
delicate virtue. Without strong support from society, it tends to lan-
guish-as I believe it does today. Unchastity, on the other hand,
never lacks for a robust following prepared to occupy any public space
that becomes available. A society, therefore, cannot be effectively neu-
tral on the subject. Unless the practice of chastity is strongly sup-
ported, unchastity will come to possess the field.
Granted, legal support is not the only possible form of social sup-
port. But its deployment is more susceptible of deliberate control
than is that of other supports. Also, we tend in many situations to take
moral guidance from the law even when the law has no intention of
giving it. As early as 1523, Christopher St. Germain pointed out:
Many unlearned persons believe that it is lawful for them to do with
good conscience all things, which if they do them, they shall not be
punished therefor by the law, though the law doth not warrant
473 E.g., HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, BANNED IN THE USA: A REFERENCE GUIDE T'O BooK
CENsoRsmP IN ScHooLs AND PuBLIc LIBRARIES 72-90 (1994); CELEBRATING CENSORED
BooKS (Nicholas J. Karolides & Lea Burris eds., 1985). MEDvED, supra note 471, at
320-22, points out also that obscenity prosecutions can be self-defeating by enhanc-
ing the public exposure of the person or work prosecuted.
474 But see Amy M. Adler, Note, Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99
YALE LJ. 1359, 1375-78 (1990). Adler argues that with the coming of post-modem
critical theory the distinction between good and bad art is no longer viable and that
obscenity law, being based on that distinction, must fall with it. See id. Obviously, her
version of the requirements of freshman English will be different from mine. I am
not persuaded that post-modem theory is either as inexorable or as prevalent as she
seems to suppose.
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them to do that they do, but only, when it is done, doth not for
some reasonable consideration punish them that do it, but leaveth
it only to his conscience.
475
There are a good many people-not all, alas, unlearned-who believe
the same today. Consequently, the attenuation of legal support as I
have been describing it has had a good deal to do with the marginal-
ization of chastity as we experience it today.
I think it is imperative, therefore, that we take steps to reverse this
attenuation and restore to chastity some of the legal support it had
until fairly recently. I shall conclude this Article with a tentative
agenda for the purpose. First, though, we need to look at the theoret-
ical basis for the attenuation. I have pointed to four major critiques of
the law as it stood in the fifties. Each of them was in some measure
legitimate, but I believe each has now been extended beyond its legiti-
mate scope.
The first critique, the instrumentalist, is based on a very impor-
tant but seriously flawed perception that came to dominate American
legal thinking early in the twentieth century-a perception of the le-
gal enterprise as exclusively concerned with deploying the coercive
power of the State. Ploscowe was obviously right when he said that
clandestine sexual encounters between consenting adults would not
be much deterred by any coercive measures that we would tolerate
putting in place.476 Conventional wisdom reinforced the point with
platitudes about not legislating morality and with baneful examples,
especially the noble and failed experiment of Prohibition.
That law is generally meant to be coercively enforced, that the
possibilities of enforcement are not unlimited, and that threatening
enforcement without applying it can bring the law into disrepute are
all valuable insights that were not given a full systematic articulation
until relatively recent times. But they do not tell the whole story of
how law operates in society. Our law embodies the common reflec-
tion of our people on how we are to live together. Injustice Holmes's
words: "The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life.
Its history is the history of the moral development of the race."
4 77
People who are in the process of forming their consciences will not
fail to take it into account. And the unlearned persons to whom St.
475 CHRLsroPHER ST. GERMAIN, DOCrOR AND SrUDENT dial. I, c. 19 (Scholar Press
1970) (1531).
476 See PLoscoiE, supra note 26, at 140.
477 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Pad of t1w Law, 10 HARv. L REv. 457,459 (1897);
cf. Commonwealth v. Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 357, 360 (Mass. 1983) (finding a statute
punishing adultery constitutional as an expression of public policy, even though viola-
tors are rarely prosecuted).
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Germain refers will take account of its absence. Even by consenting
adults, moral choices are not made in a vacuum. They are made in a
welter of pressures and influences. If a carefully thought out set of
legal mandates is not among them, there are plenty of others to fill in
the gap-forces more powerful, less benevolent, and far less subject to
control.
As for not legislating morality, it should be obvious to anyone that
the immorality of a practice is neither a necessary nor a sufficient con.
dition for passing a law against it and equally obvious that it is a rele-
vant consideration in deciding whether to pass such a law. The old
stricture, therefore, is either trivial or absurd, depending on how you
interpret it. In fact, we legislate morality all the time, with a variety of
possible effects. Even if we cannot abolish a given immoral practice,
we can hinder it in a number of different ways and often do so.
Prohibition did not fail because it was an attempt to legislate mo-
rality. It failed because it was an attempt-and one of consummate
ineptitude-to legislate a much more sweeping restraint than morality
required.478 Drunkenness does seem to have been a serious problem,
and one with a major moral dimension, in the period leading up to
the adoption of Prohibition. The Prohibitionists attempted to solve it
at the expense not only of those responsible for it, but also of all the
people in the country who liked to take a glass or two without over-
doing it. And to implement their solution, they never got beyond the
crudest application of the criminal law. The example of Prohibition
does not tell in any way against the use of law to support moral princi-
ples by the judicious deployment of education, incentives, and en-
couragement. Law is a more subtle instrument than the
instrumentalist critique supposes.
The second critique, the libertarian, has been carried to the
point of requiring moral neutrality on the part of the State and all its
instrumentalities. I have referred to a number of examples from the
law reports. This neutrality is very far from the original libertarian
doctrine, as set forth in John Stuart Mill's On Liberty.479 While Mill is
adamant in his insistence that self-regarding conduct must not be co-
erced or punished, he is entirely ready to have society take a stand on
such conduct and deploy in aid of that stand whatever non-coercive
resources it has available.
478 See WILLIM GmaBs McADoo, THE CHALLENGE: LIQUOR AND LALESSNESS VR-t
SUS CONSTITUTIONAL GovERN-Er (1928), for a revealing picture of the ethos behind
Prohibition.
479 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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I am the last person to undervalue the self-regarding virtues; they
are only second in importance, if even second, to the social. It is
equally the business of education to cultivate both. But even educa-
tion works by conviction and persuasion as well as by compulsion,
and it is by the former only that, when the period of education is
past, the self-regarding virtues should be inculcated. Human beings
owe to each other help to distinguish the better from the vorse, and
encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter. They
should be for ever stimulating each other to increased exercise of
their higher faculties, and increased direction of their feelings and
aims towards vise instead of foolish, elevating instead of degrading,
objects and contemplations.... [I]n each person's own concerns,
his individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise. Considera-
tions to aid his judgment, exhortations to strengthen his will, may
be offered to him, even obtruded on him, by others, but he himself
is the final judge.480
Hart, taking the libertarian side in his debate with Lord Devlin,
qualifies Mill's doctrine further by admitting the possibility of a "pater-
nalistic" use of coercive power-protecting people from them-
selves.48x  Whether there is a difference between that and
"enforcement of morality as such"4 2 raises questions of ethical theory
that we need not deal with here.483 What is important to note is that
neither of the two most powerful libertarian authors gives any basis for
requiring society or the State to be neutral on questions of self-regard-
ing morality or for saying that there is no moral mainstream of which
the law can take account
The third critique, based on freedom of expression, consistently
overlooks the uniqueness of the erotic in the lives of individuals and
communities. I quoted earlier an opinion by Justice Stewart of the
Supreme Court to the effect that advocacy, even persuasive advocacy,
of adultery is as fully protected by the First Amendment as advocacy of
anything else.484 This is one of many manifestations of the common
view that sex should be treated no differently from any of the other
things that people may choose to talk about, write about, or present
on stage or screen. This view has not yet commanded unqualified
acceptance by a majority of the Supreme Court, but it has been gain-
480 Mu.L, supra note 132, at 76-77.
481 See HART, supra note 142, at 30-34.
482 Id
483 See Ivo Thomas, The Growth of Legalistic Moras, 19 A.i. J. Juus. 39, 39-43
(1974).
484 See supra text accompanying note 145.
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ing ground steadily since Jerome Frank launched it in the Roth case in
1956.485
The view, of course, is nonsense. Sex is unique among human
experiences, and the response to material with sexual content is
unique among human responses. We are sometimes told that sex is a
normal bodily function like eating, but, as C.S. Lewis has pointed out,
you cannot fill a theater by coming on stage with a roast in a covered
dish and gradually lifting the cover.48 6 Because of its power to engage
our attention, the erotic .can easily become intrusive. It can under-
mine rational decision-making. It can displace more profound and
more human emotions in those exposed to it. It can distort and trivi-
alize the social ambiance. It constantly threatens to displace more se-
rious concerns from public discourse and to drive more subtle effects
and responses from the arts. To be sure, sex can no more be ex-
cluded from public discussion or from artistic expression than it can
be excluded from life. But it cannot just be turned loose like any
other form of discussion or expression to find its own level in society.
The final critique, the feminist, draws its major strength from out-
rage at the so-called double standard-the view that chastity can be
seriously expected only of women. As we have seen, that view was re-
flected in the law until fairly recently and is probably reflected in its
enforcement even today. Feminists-and anyone else who believes in
treating women with respect-are quite right to give it no quarter.
Obviously, there are two possible ways to liquidate the double
standard: we can set lower standards for women or we can set higher
standards for men. A good many feminists seem to have chosen the
former alternative. I follow a good moral tradition in choosing the
latter.
Even from a purely feminist standpoint, I believe my choice is the
right one. I suppose it would be theoretically possible for there to be
a society where the trivialization of sex affected both sexes equally, but
ours is not that society. I can think of a number of examples, but I will
content myself with one. I was having dinner with a group of lawyers
when the conversation turned, as many conversations were doing at
the time, to President Clinton's troubles. One of the lawyers, an at-
tractive woman in her mid-thirties who had spent the day lecturing to
professional colleagues about estate planning, remarked that she was
afraid that Monica Lewinsky's antics had seriously impaired the likeli-
hood of women being taken seriously as professionals. I am confident
that she was mistaken. But I am equally confident that no male lawyer
485 United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 801 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring).
486 C.S. LEwis, MERE CH ST1irrrn 89-90 (MacMillan Paperbacks ed. 1960).
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would have thought for an instant that his professional standing
would be affected by another man's sexual activities, however
notorious.
In short, the feminist critique of the double standard is well
taken, but when it is extended to a critique of chastity as such, it goes
too far.
VI. A L-GAL AGENDA
It is apparent that a wholesale suppression of sexual irregularities
through strict legislation strictly enforced is not going to happen, and
if it were to happen it would not be a good idea. As long as we see the
function of law in strictly coercive terms, the instrumentalist critique
as I have described it is irresistibly cogent. But we do not have to put
up with the systematic marginalization of an important moral virtue
simply because we cannot enforce it coercively upon the whole popu-
lation. Something we have learned from the Critical Legal Studies
movement (however we may feel about its other tenets) is that the
distinction between rule and exception is unstable both in law and in
society.487 It can be flipped back and forth by the making and applica-
tion of legal dispositions-flipped inadvertently if we do not pay atten-
tion to what we are doing, flipped on purpose if we do.488 My claim,
based on the preceding pages, is that in the past couple of decades we
have inadvertently flipped over the distinction between chastity and
unchastity. What I want to do now is to flip it back. Not long ago,
chastity was the rule and unchastity the exception. The legal accom-
modations we have provided for the exception-mainly on account of
the four critiques I have described-have now made it the rule. This
is the situation I want to change.
What I propose requires several significant departures from the
jurisprudential commonplaces of the recent past. The first, of course,
is to extend the reach of law beyond that of its crudely coercive effect.
The second is to insist that whatever limits there may be on the coer-
cion of self-regarding conduct (and I believe those limits are generally
overrated), they do not go so far as to require the law to be neutral
concerning such conduct. I have made these two points already in
connection with discussion of the four critiques. Here I will add three
others.
One is that the right of privacy should extend only to things done
in private. This would seem obvious, but the obsessively revelatory at-
487 See Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Critical Legal Studies, 39 J. LEcL EDuc. 141, 141-42
(1989) (book review).
488 See id. at 141-46.
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titudes prevailing in many quarters have led a number of people to
believe that whatever they may do in the closet they may proclaim on
the housetops. The result is in many cases incongruous, in many cases
intrusive.489 Some years ago, the Notre Dame campus was visited by a
football team whose nickname is the same as the name of a well-
known brand of condom. It is a custom among our students to paint
various remarks on bed sheets and hang them out dormitory windows.
On this occasion, as might have been expected, the enthusiasm of the
students took a scabrous turn, and the Vice President in Charge of
Student Affairs decided to use his pass key to enter student rooms and
cut down some of the sheets. The student newspaper complained of
this action as an invasion of the right of privacy of the students who
had hung the bed sheets. Such distortions of the concept of privacy
are not rare.
Next, we need to rethink the idea of conduct as speech. Here, as
in other areas where the First Amendment is invoked against impor-
tant legislative goals, the case law is in considerable disarray. My can-
didate for a simple doctrine that would cover everything involved in
this Article is this: Conduct legitimately proscribed when it does not
purport to convey a message is not constitutionally protected when it
does, whereas conduct innocuous but for the message it conveys can-
not be forbidden on account of that message. This would distinguish
well enough, say, the nude dancing case from the flag burning case. I
believe it has adequate albeit not overwhelming support in the case
law.490
Finally, we should go back to expecting moral discernment on
the part of our judges. Edmond Cahn, in an interesting and lyrical
book, The Moral Decision, argues persuasively that the faculty of distin-
guishing right from wrong, although it is a common human faculty,
can be exercised well in a difficult case only after careful study and
reflection.491' Good judges put in the necessary study and reflection
and accept responsibility for the outcome. We cannot expect ordi-
nary citizens, with no involvement in the case at hand, to do the same.
Cahn, therefore, takes strenuous issue with Learned Hand's doctrine,
489 Paradoxically, the occasion for invoking the right of privacy to strike down
Pennsylvania's sodomy law was a stage performance. See Commonwealth v. Bonadio,
415 A.2d 47, 50-51 (Pa. 1980).
490 See R.A.V.V. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-96 (1992); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376-82 (1968); GUNTHER & SuLLIVAN, supra note 166, at 1212-34.
491 EDMOND CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION: RMGHT AND WRONG IN THE LIGHT OF
AMERIcAN LAw 300-12 (1955). Cahn cites to similar effectJoHN CHwiMAN GRAY, NA.
TURE AND SouRcEs OF THE LAw 287 (rev. ed. 1963).
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articulated in a number of cases including Schmidt, discussed above,4 2
that moral discernment when the law calls for it must be replaced by
sociological discernment. 493 The personal conscience of a wise, care-
ful, and experienced judge will give us better moral decisions than a
poll, even if we could take one. My claim, accordingly, is that within
the range of discretion entrusted to them courts should encourage
chastity not because it is popular or conventional (even if it is), but
because it is right.
With these jurisprudential adjustments in place, we can look at
particular provisions and proposed provisions of the law. We will be-
gin with the criminal law. Making a particular kind of behavior crimi-
nal can have any of several different effects.
1. The prospect of being punished may deter the behavior in
question on a simple pain-pleasure calculus. This effect, central
to the instrumentalist view of law, is important but not exclu-
sive, as I have tried to show.
2. The prohibition has educational and psychological effects. Peo-
ple may refrain from the behavior because they like to think of
themselves as law-abiding citizens. People who refrain for some
other reason feel vindicated and supported in doing so.
3. There are civil effects. In most cases, a person injured by a vio-
lation of the criminal law can sue the violator for a tort. An act
denounced by the criminal law cannot be consideration for a
contract. A place to which people resort for criminal behavior
can be dealt with as a nuisance.
4. Other behavior, more objectionable and harder to reach, may
depend on the forbidden act and be effectively prevented by its
suppression. By forbidding the sale of alligator shoes and suit-
cases in the highly accessible fashion centers of New York, we
can prevent the poaching of alligators in the remote and un-
reachable Everglades.
494
With this range of purposes in mind, we can hope to point the
way to a useful body of criminal legislation. There are only a few
forms of sexual misbehavior that we can seriously expect to suppress
by the rigor of the law. These include rape, incest, molestation of
young children, some particularly gross sadomasochistic encounters,
large-scale entrepreneurial prostitution, and some of the more intru-
492 See supra text accompanying notes 158-63.
493 CaiN, supra note 491, at 303-12.
494 K Au L EWLLYN, Law Observance v. Law Enforcement, inJusPRUDENCE 399, 408
(1962), gives another example: the virtual elimination of pilferage of books from the
New York Public Library by the adoption of a statute punishing any bookseller who
exhibited for sale a book bearing a library stamp.
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sive forms of public indecency. Other kinds of behavior-sex with
nearly mature adolescents ("statutory rape"), small-scale commercial
vice, and the less egregious forms of indecency-can be discouraged,
but probably not suppressed, by whatever laws we pass against them.
By keeping such laws on the books and punishing violators when they
come to our attention, we keep the behavior clandestine and prevent
its becoming respectable. In this way, while we can probably not deter
many people resolved to do one or another of the forbidden things,
we can probably keep a good many other people from forming the
same resolution.
For reasons I have already suggested, I would favor revising the
standard of proof in rape cases where the defendant claims the victim
consented. For one thing, I would not follow Maybeny and Morgan as
to belief in consent. If an impartial jury believes beyond a reasonable
doubt that a woman did not consent to a sex act, it would seem that
there must have been something wrong with the man involved, if he
believed otherwise. Also, even if we reject the old rationale that the
intent to commit fornication or adultery is a sufficient mens rea to sup-
port a rape conviction, the sexual standards of a man who can be mis-
taken on the subject of consent are still not such as to entitle him to
the highest protection of the law. In United States v. Balint, the Su-
preme Court, holding that a man could be convicted of selling narcot-
ics without proof that he knew what they were, said:
Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent
seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers
to danger from the drug, and concluded that the latter was the re-
sult preferably to be avoided. Doubtless considerations as to the
opportunity of the seller to find out the fact and the difficulty of
proof of knowledge contributed to this conclusion.
495
So here. A legislature might well weigh the possible injustice of
subjecting an innocent lover to a penalty against the evil of exposing
innocent women to the danger of being raped and conclude that the
latter is the result preferably to be avoided. Doubtless considerations
as to the opportunity of the lover to find out the fact and the difficulty
of proof of knowledge might contribute to this conclusion.
I would also allow the prosecution, with the concurrence of the
alleged victim, to decide whether to put her sexual standards into evi-
dence. I have already discussed this point at some length and have
shown why I believe there is no requirement of symmetry between
prosecution and defense in this regard.496
495 United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922).
496 See supra notes 358-77 and accompanying text.
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There are a number of sexual encounters described in the litera-
ture, and to some extent in the law reports, that might be regarded as
"quasi-rape." The kind of force or coercion required for a rape con-
viction is absent, yet it seems that the victim has been betrayed, im-
posed upon, or overreached. 497 There may be an abuse of power,
authority, or trust or there may be a frightening environment or a
frightening presence. Or the victim may be too drunk to think
clearly, but sober enough to defeat a rape prosecution.493 Sexual pre-
dation under circumstances of this kind may be less serious than rape,
but it still should not be possible to engage in it with impunity. I think
that if I were a legislator I would borrow the concepts of duress and
undue influence from the law of contracts for use in defining this
intermediate crime.499 It seems reasonable that people should not be
bound by consent to sex where they would not be bound by consent
to a contract
If there were such an offense as I have in mind, some forms of
sexual harassment would be punishable as attempts to commit it.
Other forms, as we have seen, would be punishable as batteries.
These forms of criminal liability would both extend and supplement
the tort remedies for harassment.
I would extend those remedies to make sexual harassment a tort
in its own right and not merely an instance of gender discrimination,
battery, stalking, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Sexual
solicitation under circumstances amounting to abuse of business or
personal relations, or to duress, should be considered tortious even if
unsuccessful, and even if the victim has too much firmness of mind to
experience the kind of emotional distress envisaged by the
Restatement.
In some of the situations I have in mind, it might be appropriate
to cut some slack for honorable though inept advances, as long as they
are not obsessive, coercive, or otherwise frightening. If someone
497 E.g., People v. Evans, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912, 920-21 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
498 E.g., Millerv. Commonwealth, 27 S.E.2d 57,57-58 (Va. 1942); Howardv. Com-
monwealth, 465 S.E.2d 142, 145-46 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
499 See RSTATEMNT (SECOND) OF CoNTAars §§ 174-177 (1981). I think a con-
tract signed under the circumstances that obtained in Evans, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 918-22,
would be voidable under these rules. Similarly, I would like to think that a contract
signed under the circumstances of Howard, 465 S.E.2d at 145-46, or Miller, 27 S.E.2d
at 57-58, would be voidable under the REsTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF Cor.Tr.ars § 16,
though that is a more doubtful proposition. Compare Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516,
522 (Va. 1954) (noting that despite some drinking by the parties, neither consumed
enough to diminish his capacity to enter a contract), with Guidici v. Guidici, 41 P.2d
932, 934-36 (Cal. 1935) (upholding cancellation of a deed due to the drunkenness of
the grantor).
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thinks he has found a potential marriage partner among his business
or professional associates, he should probably be allowed some scope
for looking into the possibility. The good of encouraging people with
common interests to marry each other will outweigh any harm that
may befall whatever common enterprise they have in hand. But when
a mere liaison is contemplated, the harm will be greater, and there
will be no countervailing good to set against it.
I remain in some doubt as to whether the criminal law should
address fully consensual sexual encounters between adults, in private,
and involving no abuse of any business, professional, or personal rela-
tion. The reasons why it should not do so were set forth by Ploscowe
in 1951500 and are at least as cogent now as they were then. I have
stated them in connection with the instrumentalist and libertarian cri-
tiques of the law as it then stood.5 01 But the reasons the other way are
not negligible. I have alluded to them in my discussion of the overex-
tension of the two critiques and of the different purposes of the crimi-
nal law. Generally, by condemning sexual irregularities, the law
encourages people who are making up their minds to opt for chastity
and makes the advisedly unchaste less in-your-face about it than they
would otherwise be. It may also have important civil consequences,
say, for the enforcement of contracts or the rental of housing.
Of course, these effects can be achieved well enough without ac-
tually punishing anybody for any of the acts in question. I have often
thought that it might be advisable for a criminal code to include some
acts, not all of them sexual, that would be officially disapproved and
would carry the civil consequences of a crime, but that would not as
such be subject to punishment.50 2 Of course, such a treatment of sex-
ual misbehavior would not serve the purpose of providing the prose-
cution with a fallback position in rape cases. For that, there would
have to be a significant-though not too severe-punishment. In
other words, there would have to be a law purporting to punish forni-
cation, adultery, and sodomy in every case, which law would only be
invoked when the prosecutor believed that rape had occurred, but
could not prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt. The obvi-
ous objection to such an approach is that it would give too much dis-
cretion to prosecutors. I am skeptical of this objection. As long as
500 See PLOSCOWE, supra note 26, at 213, 281-82.
501 See supra notes 128-47 and accompanying text.
502 See MARYANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TAUC: THE IMwovERIsHMENT OF PoiTri kL Dis-
COURSE 83-84 (1991), on the hortatory role of the law in force in many European
countries requiring the rescue of a person in danger. Commonwealth v. Stowell 449
N.E.2d 357, 360-61 (Mass. 1983), assigns a similar function to the rarely enforced
statute punishing adultery.
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prosecutors are accountable to the electorate, they are unlikely to en-
gage in a wholesale attack on illicit sex. Ploscowe, writing when these
offenses were punishable in most states, said, "Both homosexuals and
heterosexuals who observe reasonable discretion in their sexual activi-
ties and who leave minors alone have little to fear from the police or
from prosecuting authorities."503
People who fail to observe discretion raise other problems. Many
of them could be covered under statutes punishing public indecency
or something of the kind. Hart has pointed out that this is a quite
different offense from sexual immorality.
Sexual intercourse between husband and wife is not immoral, but if
it takes place in public it is an affront to public decency. Homosex-
ual intercourse between consenting adults in private is immoral ac-
cording to conventional morality, but not an affront to public
decency, though it would be both if it took place in public.
504
But Hart's distinction can come unstuck if the parties to a private
transaction go public about it, or at least about some of the inciden-
tals. At what level of explicitness does description of sex acts past,
present, or to come-with or without illustrations-achieve the offen-
siveness required by a statute against public indecency? And what is
the relation between indecency and obscenity? Does one command
the same First Amendment protection as the other? There is some-
thing to be said for finessing such questions as these by punishing the
underlying act when it comes to public attention, rather than the fur-
ther act of publicizing it.
I will end this discussion of the punishment of consensual sex
with the case of Lovisi v. Slayton.505 Mr. and Mrs. Lovisi were convicted
of sodomy on the basis of acts they had shared with a third person and
recorded with an automatic camera.50 6 Mrs. Lovisi's daughters, aged
eleven and thirteen, found the photographs and took them to
school.50 7 But for the photographs, the Lovisis would not have been
prosecuted.508 But what they were prosecuted for was not having the
pictures taken but actually doing the things pictured. Someone who
had done the same things without pictures would have been just as
503 PLoscowE, supra note 26, at 209; cf. Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202, 1205-09
(4th Cir. 1986) (stating that prosecution under a Virginia anti-cohabitation statute is
so unlikely that action to have it declared unconstitutional on priacy grounds raises
no case or controversy).
504 HART, supra note 142, at 45.
505 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), af'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976).
506 See id. at 622.
507 See id at 622-23.
508 See id at 626-27.
2001]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
guilty but would not have been punished. This is a philosophically
messy result, but on the whole, I am content with it.
Turning to the field of domestic relations, I am not persuaded
that it is a good idea to adopt the two levels of marriage envisaged in
those states that offer "covenant marriage" as an alternative. I have
already mentioned the problem of how State A will respond to the two
levels of marriage existing in State B.50 9 Even more serious to my
mind is the problem of the effect the possibility of covenant marriage
will have on people who opt for the less binding form.510 I have tried
to imagine the discussion between two people trying to decide which
form to adopt for their upcoming wedding, and I have not been able
to do so.
I believe that a more promising way of reducing the number of
divorces would be to take more seriously the concept of "irretrievable
breakdown" that appears in the no-fault statutes. I would require the
breakdown to be shown by the testimony of qualified professionals
who have tried to effect a reconciliation.51' How many of the divorces
now granted would be blocked by such a requirement I have no way of
knowing. It would at least block an especially pathetic type of case in
which someone resorts prematurely to the divorce mills and then be-
comes too deeply embedded in the process to get out.
I think the ambiguous status of unmarried cohabitants needs to
be better addressed. Despite the examples we have looked at from the
Minnesota legislature and the California Supreme Court, I do not
think this is the place to follow Sir Henry Maine in moving the law
from status to contract.512 The parties to an ongoing sexual relation-
ship are not apt to think of making contracts about it, and they are
not apt to have equal bargaining power. The one with inadequate
bargaining power is of course the one most economically dependent
on the relationship and the one with the most emotional investment
in it. That one, as the feminists are not slow to point out, is apt to be
the woman.
509 See supra notes 458-59 and accompanying text.
510 Spaht, supra note 458, at 1575-77, indicates that religious bodies in Louisiana
have adopted an attitude of benevolent dubiety toward that State's covenant marriage
law. Thus far, it appears that only a small minority of couples have opted for the
covenant form where it is available.
511 California's pioneer no-fault divorce law, adopted in 1969, was drafted with
elaborate provisions for court ordered counseling which did not make it through the
legislature. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2300-2452 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000); seeWEiSBERrG &
APPLETON, supra note 303, at 564-66.
512 See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANcIENr LAW 98-100 (London, Dent 1960) (1861).
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But even if the relation is hard bargained between people with
equal power and negotiating skills, there is something repugnant
about making sex a part of a negotiated set of rights and duties, quid
pro quo, do ut des. It is meant to be a sign of an open-ended unity. For
those who live together without marrying, it is a flawed sign, but that
does not make it into anything else.
So it is a sound instinct that makes us want to recognize the rela-
tion of cohabitants as more than merely contractual and more than
merely illicit. To assign them no responsibility for one another or
none but what they have bargained for seems a kind ofjejune moraliz-
ing. Whatever the moral status of the original decision to live to-
gether, when cohabitants turn to the law, they need help, and help
that they have generally not thought to bargain for.
As we have seen, this instinctive judgment is one the law has been
slow to put into effect.-513 Some courts have tried to make an equita-
ble adjustment of property rights when a relation breaks up, but one
of the courts that did so was overruled by the legislature.514 In a few
jurisdictions, a cohabitant qualifies as a dependant under workers'
compensation laws.515 In a few cases, moving to be with a cohabitant
has been considered good cause for leaving work.516 In some places, a
cohabitant who performs "services" other than sexual is entitled to
recover for them.
517
A few courts and a number of writers have found these piecemeal
recognitions inadequate and have advocated a broader exercise of eq-
uitable powers in adjusting relations between cohabitants or former
cohabitants. Most of them have disclaimed any intent to bring back
common-law marriage. From time to time, though, someone will sug-
gest that the old institution should be updated and revived. Professor
Cynthia Bowman of Northwestern has written what she calls a feminist
proposal to that effect. 518 Its genesis was evidently in the experience
of a client in Northwestern's legal aid clinic who, after fifteen years of
using a man's name, keeping house for him, and bearing him two
513 See supra notes 268-83 and accompanying text.
514 See supra text accompanying notes 275-76.
515 5 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 383, at 5. The leading case is still Kendall v.
Housing Author, 76 A.2d 767, 770 (Md. 1950).
516 See MacGregor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 689 P.2d 453, 457-59 (Cal.
1984); Reep v. Comm'r of Dep't of Employment and Training, 593 N.E.2d 1297, 1299
(Mass. 1992).
517 SeeWilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1998); Margolies %. Hopkins,
514 N.E.2d 1079, 1081-82 (Mass. 1987).
518 Cynthia Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to BringBadt Common Law Marriage, 75 On.
L REv. 709 (1996). In her article, Bowman cites a number of other articles arguing
for revival. See id. at 712 n.7.
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children, was ineligible for the modest remedies available to an
abused wife, because she was not a wife.
5 19
Common-law marriage might have solved the problem of Profes-
sor Bowman's client, but most cohabitants would not be helped by it.
Common-law marriage is a direct descendent of the clandestine mar-
riage of medieval times, which the Church disapproved, but did not
invalidate until the Council of Trent.520 Since England had broken
with medieval Catholicism before that Council, the clandestine mar-
riage remained valid in England, where it was not abolished by statute
until after the foundation of the American colonies with independent
legal systems.52 1 The old doctrines underwent some modification in
crossing the Atlantic, but they retained the essential element-an
agreement by the parties to be husband and wife. In addition to such
an agreement, some American courts required open cohabitation and
a reputation of being a married couple, but without the original
agreement neither cohabitation nor reputation would do.5 22 Couples,
therefore, who enter (or in the more usual case, drift) into cohabita-
tion without agreeing to be married will not be affected one way or
the other by common-law marriage.
The medieval law offered two ways of marrying privately. One
involved an exchange of consent "per verba de presenti"; the other, one
"per verba de futuro cum copula."5 23 The first was an agreement to be
married there and then; the second an agreement to be married at
some future time, which agreement was followed by sexual inter-
course between the parties.524 The fairly common case of a cohab-
iting couple who hold themselves out as "engaged" or as "fiances"
would presumably be covered by the second category. But there is
serious debate over whether that category ever became a part of the
common law in this country. The great Chancellor Kent said it did,
but most of the courts that have passed on the question have
disagreed.5 25
519 See id. at 709-10. The case was governed by Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204,
1205-08 (Ill. 1979), involving a claim to property rights.
520 T-A. LACEY & R.C. MORTIMER, MARRIAGE IN CHURCH AND STATE 140 (1947).
521 See PLoscowE, supra note 26, at 17-24.
522 See Bowman, supra note 518, at 712-24.
523 J.R.H. MOoRMAN, CHURCH LiFE IN ENGLAND IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 227
(1946).
524 See id.
525 See 2 JAmls KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMEICAN LAW *75-76. Holmes v. Holmes,
12 F. Cas. 405, 410-12 (D. Or. 1870) (No. 6638), discusses the question at some
length and then finds that it is not raised by the facts. Chaves v. Chaves, 84 So. 672,
676-77 (Fla. 1920), and Peacock v. Peacock, 26 S.E.2d 608, 614-15 (Ga. 1943), reject
the doctrine. Estate of Maher, 68 N.E. 159, 160 (Ill. 1903), accepts the doctrine, but
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I think I would prefer the approach taken by the drafters of the
proposed Civil Code for the Province of Quebec published in 1977.526
Their draft recognized a stable union of cohabitants as a de facto mar-
riage and assigned a package of rights and duties to the parties. This
approach is more broadly effective than the revival of common-law
marriage would be, because most cohabitations do not meet the com-
mon-law conditions. It would give official recognition to the status of
de facto husbands and wives and would give courts and legislatures
the necessary flexibility to deal with them fairly. It would in a way
create two levels of marriage, just as would the adoption of covenant
marriage as an alternative to marriage with divorce on demand. But I
think making the two levels consist of de jure and de facto marriage
would be more in accord with prevailing attitudes on the subject than
making them consist of covenant and non-covenant (whatever that
would mean) marriage.
When the 1977 draft reached the Quebec legislature, the provi-
sions for de facto marriage were taken out-evidently to respect the
freedom of people who chose to live together ithout being married.
Most of the memoranda submitted [to the legislature] asked the
legislators to respect this will of unmarried couples to distinguish
their choice of lifestyle with respect to marriage. So it seemed op-
portune not to intervene in this freely chosen way of life; accord-
ingly, there is no occasion to institutionalize it or to regulate it. 5
This consideration does not appear to have been among those
brought before the Civil Code Revision Office when the draft was in
the works. It is akin to a policy of "supportive neutrality" that Profes-
sor David Chambers of the University of Michigan Law School was
qualifies it pretty well out of existence by holding that the copula must be regarded by
the parties as a consummation of the projected marriage.
526 QUEBEC CRIIL CODE REVISION OFFIcE, DPu-r CIVL CODE bk. 2, art. 49,266,338;
bk. 3, art. 42 (1977). The English text throughout renders the French "Cpo,," as
"consort" instead of "spouse." The French "6poux de fai" therefore appears in the
English as "de facto consort." The proposal is somewhat similar to that put forth in
William A. ReppyJr., Property and Support Rigls of Unmarried Colhabitants: A Proposal for
Creating a New Legal Status, 44 L4. L. RPv% 1677, 1705-22 (1984). Professor Reppy is
not sure what to call his proposed status.
527 See Claire L'Heureux-DubC, The Quebec Experience: Codification of Family Law,
and a Proposal for the Creation ofa Family Court System, 44 LA. L RE%% 1575, 1589-90 nA3
(1984) (my translation). The status has nevertheless been institutionalized and regu-
lated in a number of ways. See Gou inTYssEN" DU QutaE, ,fMnaSTgr DE Jusric,
L'UNION DE FAIT (n.d.). But the parties are referred to as "conjoints"-not "Cpoux"-
"de fait." Here and elsewhere, I am grateful to Professor Nicholas Kasirer of the
Faculty of Law of McGill University for help in finding and evaluating the Quebec
material.
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marketing in 1985.528 Generally, the idea is that if you impose respon-
sibilities on people that they have not agreed to, you interfere with
their freedom to decide what responsibilities, if any, they will have.
This is true enough, but it was equally true a century ago when it was
brought forward to attack government interference with the employ-
ment relation. And it is as perniciously irrelevaht now as it was then.
Far more than an employment relation, a sexual relation creates
bonds that may not be anticipated or chosen, but that the law must
take into account or somebody will get hurt.
My theory is that the recognition of de facto marriage will tend to
support chastity by assimilating the relationship to a chaste counter-
part. It avoids validating the option for unchastity. Evidently the Que-
bec legislature rejected it, because they wished to validate that option,
But it also avoids leaving the often unfortunate consequences of that
option to go unchecked in society and in the lives of individuals.
Long term sexual relations between people of the same sex may
also have unfortunate consequences. Here, we cannot solve the prob-
lem by recognizing a de facto marriage, because there is no de jure
marriage to which the relation can be assimilated. I have already ex-
pressed briefly my reasons for not accepting same sex marriage. 2 1-
They are metaphysical, and this is not the place for an extended met-
aphysical discussion, so I will not elaborate on them. They require me
to look elsewhere for a way to deal with the problems of homosexual
cohabitants.
I suggest that the chaste counterpart in this case is the living to-
gether of people whose relation is not sexual. All manner of house-
holds and extended families would qualify. There is no lack of
legislative, administrative, and judicial material defining such rela-
tions for purposes of zoning, insurance, food stamps, and rent con-
trol.53 0 With this material in hand, it should be easy enough to
develop a scheme that would give suitable protection and recognition
to people who pool their resources and living arrangements, without
taking their sexual practices into account.5 31 For instance, the New
528 See David L. Chambers, The "Legalization" of the Family: Toward a Policy of Support.
ive Neutrality, 18 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 805, 813-27 (1985).
529 See supra text accompanying note 462.
530 See ELLmt Er AL., supra note 308, at 20-40. The term "household" played an
important part in the standard automobile liability policy until fairly recently, when it
gave way to "family." See ROBERT C. KEETON & ALAN L. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A
GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRIACrrics
1117, 1121 (1988).
531 This approach resolved the dispute between the Catholic Archdiocese of San
Francisco and the city government over the requirement of S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 12B.1
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York law on public housing has an elaborate set of criteria for deter-mining who is a member of the tenant's family, adding that "in no
event [will] evidence of a sexual relationship between such persons be
required or considered."
53 2
The "domestic partnership" ordinances adopted in a number of
municipalities do more than adjust the relation between cohabitants;
they are more or less explicitly calculated to validate the sexual aspect
of such relations. The pioneer ordinance, San Francisco's, is very
clear on the point: "The purpose of this ordinance is to create a way to
recognize intimate committed relationships, including those of lesbi-
ans and gay men who otherwise are denied the right to identify the
partners with whom they share their lives."533 Others are less definite;
the District of Columbia, for instance, is content with a "caring" rela-
tionship.534 But all such laws assimilate the partnership to a marriage
by providing that no one can have more than one domestic partner at
a time and that no married person can be a domestic partner.r3  It is
here that I part company with proponents of this kind of legislation,
(2000) that bodies contracting with the city extend the same health insurance bene-
fits to domestic partners of their employees as tospouses. Millions of dollars of fund-
ing for the charitable activities of the local church would be jeopardized by
noncompliance. An agreement was reached to work towa rd implementing a provi-
sion to allow an employee to "designate a legally domiciled member of the employee's
household as being eligible for spousal equivalent benefits." 26 Ootn's 570 (1997).
The municipal authorities agreed that the proposal "not only meets but also exceeds
the requirements of the ordinance," while the archbishop
expressed his satisfaction that an agreement in principle was reached with
city officials which will allow archdiocesan agencies and other Catholic insti-
tutions to expand benefits more broadly in accord ith the goals of Catholic
social teachings, while at the same time, ensuring that church agencies are
not required to compromise our Catholic teachings on the unique impor-
tance of marriage and fimily.
Id.
532 N.Y. PuB. Hous. Lkiw § 14(4) (c) (i) (McKinney 2000).
533 S.F. ADmIN. CODE § 62.1 (1990).
534 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1401(1) (1992).
535 The Hawaii Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, HAw. RE%,. STAT. § 572C (Supp.
1997), adopted in response to Baehrv. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), provides many
(but not all) of the benefits of marriage to people who register as "reciprocal benefi-
daries." To be eligible, they must be single and must be forbidden by law to marry
each other. The preamble refers to family members such as brother and sister or
mother and son, as well as to people of the same sex. See generally W. Brian Burnette,
Note,- Hawaii's Reciprocal Beneficiares Act: An Effecke Step in Resolving the Controversy
Surrounding Same-sex Maniage, 37 BRANDEIS LJ. 81 (1998). The Supreme Court of
Vermont, while refusing to impose a constitutional requirement of same sex mar-
riage, required the incidental benefits of marriage to be made amilable to same sex
couples, staying its mandate so the legislature could enact suitable legislation. See
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for it is here that they go beyond protecting the parties to the un-
chaste relationship and seek to validate the relationship itself.536
Besides spouses and cohabitants, we have one additional status
concern: children born out of wedlock. The tendency today, as we
have seen, is to give them about the same rights as their lawfully begot-
ten siblings.53 7 It is hard to disagree with the arguments for doing so.
Children are obviously not to blame for the immorality of their par-
ents. There is, to be sure, some evidence that allowing fathers to
avoid responsibility for their illegitimate children has a tendency to
deter women from conceiving such children-or did before our pre-
sent welfare laws were in place.5 38 But to make children bear the bur-
den of preventing the birth of other children seems morally
unacceptable.
But there is no reason why the rights of the child should be sym-
metrical with those of the father. While we should not allow a man to
escape responsibility for begetting a child out of wedlock, it seems
quite in order to say he cannot acquire rights by doing so. I would
make rights depend on actual involvement in the life of the child.
And I think I would make his right to take on such involvement de-
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 877-912 (Vt. 1999). The legislature adopted a statute
similar to Hawaii's. See Act Relating to Civil Unions, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91.
Canada may be moving in the same direction. The Supreme Court of Canada
has held that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms requires extending the same bene-
fits to same sex cohabitants as to unmarried cohabitants of opposite sexes. Attorney
Gen. for Ontario v. M., 171 D.LR.4th 577, 596 (Can. 1999). Roderick A. Macdonald,
President of the Law Commission of Canada, has suggested looking into extending
the same benefits to non-sexual relationships as well. See Roderick A. Macdonald,
Perspectives on Personal Relationships, Address at the Conference on Domestic Partner-
ships at Queen's University, Law Commission of Canada, at http://ivw.lcc.gc.ca/en/
pc/speeches/s211099.html (Oct. 21, 1999). But an extensive research paper indi-
cates that such relationships should be protected only in case of actual dependency of
one person on the other. See Martha Bailey, Marriage and Marriage-like Relationships,
Law Commission of Canada, at http://vv.lc.gc.ca/en/papers/mpport/bailey.html
(last visited Dec. 1, 2000). Meanwhile, Quebec has extended the status of "conjoints
de fait" to same sex couples. The extension was by unanimous vote in the legislature
and was celebrated in GoUVERNEMENT DU QUkBEC MINIs'rLRE DE JUSTcE, LE S xE N'A
PLUS D'IMPORTANCE (1999).
536 An editorial entitled Separate But Equal argues that domestic partnership laws
are inadequate for just this reason. Editorial, Separate But Equa4 THE NEW RuPuBuc,
Jan. 10, 2000, at 9. But Burnette, supra note 535, at 94, is probably right that such an
accommodation is probably the best that homosexuals can hope for given the present
state of public opinion.
537 See supra text accompanying notes 119-24.
538 See, for instance, the attitude of the English Poor Law Commission that re-
ported in 1832. ELIE HAJi, THE TRIUMPH OF REFoRM, 1830-1841 at 122 (E.I.
Watkin trans., 1st paperback ed. 1961) (1927).
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pend on a more than ephemeral involvement with the mother, or else
on an express invitation from her.539 Here again, there is no place for
symmetry. A woman who gives birth to a child has already paid
enough dues to deserve some say in the child's future; a man who
begets a child and walks off has not.
We have looked at a number of what might be called lifestyle
cases-cases involving sexual irregularities on the part of teachers, po-
lice officers, and other "role models"; cases of sex within professional
relations; child custody cases where the sexual practices of the parents
are urged upon the consideration of the court. These cases are com-
plicated, and I am afraid I have no lapidary formula for making them
simple. I do think, though, that they would be handled a good deal
better if the courts would recognize the need for moral discernment
in handling them. The immorality of the sex acts involved in these
cases is not a sufficient condition for legislative, administrative, orju-
dicial concern with them. But I believe it is a necessary condition.
Courts that fail to recognize it as such lapse quickly into incoherence
when they take the cases up. The objection to notorious unchastity on
the part of teachers or police officers may be that it impairs their ef-
fectiveness at theirjobs. But the reason it impairs their effectiveness is
that it is immoral and, when notorious, is notoriously immoral. The
objection to sex between lawyer and client, doctor and patient,
teacher and student may be that it is abusive and unprofessional. But
the reason it is abusive and unprofessional is that it is immoral in a
situation where there is moral influence to be exerted. The objection
to the sexual irregularities of parents may be the possibility of chil-
dren being exposed to them. But the reason we wish to protect chil-
dren from being exposed to them is that they are immoral, and we
fear that the example will impair the moral standards of the children.
In short, there are severe limits on the extent to which sexual morality
can or should be enforced against people who advisedly reject it. But
we will have no success discerning and applying these limits unless we
recognize that it is morality and not something else that we are decid-
ing whether or not to enforce.
Cases involving obscenity and the arts also require moral discern-
ment on the part of the courts. In these cases, esthetic discernment is
also required. The question in each case is first whether the erotic
539 SeeJanet L. Dolgin, Just a Ge.'Judidal Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA
L. RE:v. 637, 647-72 (1993); cf. Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9, 17-19 (NWis. 1974)
(holding that a mother's ability to provide for her child is a defense to the unwed
father's claim to involvement; holding a mother's action for seduction to be a coun-
terclaim in the father's action to assert rights).
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content of the material in question is disconcertingly explicit and, sec-
ond, if so, whether there is a good reason for allowing it to be
presented. The first question requires a combination of moral and
esthetic discernment; the second requires sometimes one (a medical
textbook, for instance), sometimes the other (a nude statue), some-
times both (Ulysses).
This area is one in which time, place, and manner restrictions on
free speech rights are particularly appropriate. In regard to chastity,
the social ambiance is particularly fragile and particularly in need of
protection. And where the protection is needed, it is appropriate for
the law and its enforcers to provide it. The unchaste have no right to
equal access to the social ambiance, no right to compete on equal
terms in the marketplace of ideas. Like racists, communists, single tax
advocates, opponents of fluoridation or motorcycle helmets, smokers,
choppers-down of old growth forests, and exterminators of whales,
they are entitled to free speech, but they have no claim to introduce
their speech into a society whose official organs are neutral as be-
tween them and their opponents. This of course is also the answer to
people who claim that government subsidies cannot be granted to ed-
ucational programs because they favor abstinence or denied to works
of art because they are licentious. There remains the argument that
the State has to be neutral about sexual morality because sexual mo-
rality is a religious matter and the government has to be neutral about
religion. But the argument proves too much. Chastity is neither more
nor less a religious principle than racial equality or a number of other
things about which the government has never tried to be neutral.
My last point about the arts involves rethinking the distinction
between speech and conduct. I have already suggested that behavior
that would be innocuous if it conveyed no message should be pro-
tected when it does, whereas behavior that would be objectionable if it
conveyed no message should not become protected when it does. If I
come into court and throw a custard pie at the judge in order to pro-
test one of his opinions, I should be neither better nor worse off than
if I throw it just for fun. I believe this principle will cover the whole
range of cases involving topless dancing and the like.
I have said that under the law with which I began this study, and
in the social order it supported, it was generally accepted that waiting
for marriage, marrying for love, and living faithfully thereafter were
both normal and normative. My claim in leaving off is that they can
and should be accepted as normal and normative still. I believe that
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everything I have proposed here for the purpose is appropriate for
legislative or judicial action within the context of the law as it now
stands and of our people as we now live. We are not yet irrevocably
committed to the trivialization of sex, of life, or of law.
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